MAXWELL D. TAYLOR SALT II: THE NUMBERS FALLACY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360012-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: August 17, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R0004003600~2-b
THE WASHINGTON POST
17 August 1979
.tMlaellD. Taylor
A '' II; The Numbers F allac
vith plans for expanded air and civil
the coarse of forming an opinion silos and
In so doin
waste man
I
,
g,
s,
y
of the merits of SALT II, I have been American weapons on empty holes defense. All this would cost a great deal
impressed by the damage to its case re- Similarly, if our retaliation extended of money that, in times of economic
suiting from a fallacious, assumption. It to urban industrial targets, we would. agency like the present, would be
Ss that parity in strategic forces can be need to expend many more weapons , raised largely at the expense. of our
achieved through rough equivalence of than the Soviets to achieve equivalent:. under-strength non-nuclear forces. The
numbers of strategic weapons, or, more damage on similar targets. This is -be. result could be a serious Imbalance of....
accurately, strategic launchers. If it can 77 force structure to the detriment of I
be shown that this assumption is Incor cause the larger number and greater highly important tasks involving the
rect and that equality in numbers does. dispersion of such targets in the Soviet support of allies, the protection of sea
not assure "equivalent overall military Union and the better protection afford, lanes and the assurance of access and
capabilities"-a requirement set by the ed them by Soviet air and civil defense undisturbed trade with essential over..
administration for an acceptable arms--- m,,: - --?-- ~ sears sources of ail and other important
control agreement.-the case for. SALT ` Thus, it is clear, that U.S. forces-_to rawmaterial&
is in serious trouble. match Soviet destructive capabilities, Such are a few of the possible cone-
A mere count of strategic weapons is would need a considerable superioritl quences of the numbers' fallacy. As
wholly inadequate to measure the rela- In numbers of weapons to compensate long as it is the accepted formula for
tive effectiveness of opposing forces. determining military needs in the
The only military capability possessed for these disadvantages. SInce SALT U strategic field, we shall be condemned.
by such weapons is the ability to de? obviously contains no such compensa. to a mindless numbers race whether or
stroy hostile targets on order,. and tions, it cannot rightfully claim to es- not SALT is ratified. Only if we insist
hens, the only meaningful measure of tablish essential equivalence in the pre. an basing our weapons requirements .`
them value is their target destruction eminent measure of . strategic power. on the need to perform 0s3cs of tmchal-
potential. The latter derives not only target destruction potential. Accord- lenged importance to our security--4n from numbers of weapons but also tngly, parity based on numbers alone is most cases the destruction of certain
from such things as the accuracy, relia. revealed as a dangerous faihcy, one designated target systems-can we
bility and throwweight of weapons, which entails serious consequences. Imow with reasonable certainty what
their survivability under attack and the Since the treaty purports to establish and how many weapons we really need
number and nature of the targets they pity in military capabilities yet does either for deterrence or for retaliation.
must destroy. ; not, its ratification would mislead our As an added plus, a strategic policy so
Analytic studies of the relative losses country and its allies as to the true bal= conceived would not depend on num-
that would be suffered by U.S. and ante of forces resulting from it-a mix- bers decisions made in Moscow. - .
Soviet forces in a major strategic ex- apprehension unlikely to be shared by ! Does the numbers fallacy with its
change usually indicate that the U.S. Soviet leaders, who are openly, de- consequences constitute a fatal weak
side would be at a serious disadvantage. lighted with its text in the present ness for SALT, one justifying its rejec?
phis is because we must assume that a - ; former, ratification would validate ion? Probably not, if the administrae? 1
nuclear exchange would be initiated by Lion can translate the numbers of weap- 3
a Soviet first strike, probably directed' and perpetuate the numbers fallacy for ons permitted by the treaty into terms
at our exposed ICBMs. In this case, we all future- arms control treaties since of destruction potential and then pro-, I
would have to expect to lose a large . we would find it hard- to reject at a ? duce convincing 'evidence of the ade.
part of these weapons, perhaps up to 80 later date or to persuade the Soviets to quacy of the latter against all major.r
percent or more at the height of the - abandon a standard that 9Y must Per' Soviet target systems under all likely
Soviet destructive capabilities In the ceive as advantageous conditions. I suspect that the adequacy
1980s.Moreover, if we wished to retail- -Finally, since our government follow- probably exists, but the Senate and the
ate against their unfired ICBMs, we ? tag ratification would be expected public are surely entitled to the evir
would be uncertain which missiles had . henceforth to follow a military policy deuce:.
been launched and which remained in consistent with the treaty, in logic our
w1i fie. chairnm
~*
silos ready for a second salvo To do strategic Programs would be designed ne ter is
maximum damage to the remainder; to catchup and keep up with our Soviet; the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
we would have to fire upon all known rivals the strategic field in every way
Vermitted by its terms. We could ex..
pest such programs to include not only ..
an MX missile to match the best of the
Soviet ICBMs but also probably a new
bomber to offset the Backfire along
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360012-9