ROWLAND EVANS AND ROBERT NOVAK SALT, SOVIET STYLE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360023-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 23
• Publication Date: August 10, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

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..riot land Evans and -Robert Novak
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Three "distinctly new" test silos for
`'rodernized" Soviet long-range mis-
siles are now receiving final prepara-
tions at Soviet test ranges, a piece of in-
telligence that could doom continua-
tion of SALT as a game that runs so
heavily in the Kremlin's favor.
Itio longer in question is the clarity of
intelligence demonstrating -Moscow's
intent to trigger a huge new test pro-
gram the instant the new Strategic
Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT ID is
ratified. It seems likely to harden
American public opinion against what
has come to be called the SALT "proc-
ess."
"This may well prove to be the end of
the SALT process," says a Nixon-Ford
administration official, who was one
of the original authors of SALT II and
who supports the final version. "When
our people read about what Moscow
is legally doing under this new
treaty, they may say to hell with
SALT."
Students of SALT, mostly critics but
also including important supporters,
long have been concerned that the
"process" of SALT, replacing sub-
stance, has become the political objec-
tive, The impending Soviet test pro-
gram could stop this dangerous inver-
sion by concentrating public attention
on substance.
During the period of intense Soviet
testing following SALT I, the United
States still had strategic superiority. In
contrast, the United States today is on
the verge of losing, if it has not already
lost, strategic parity. That points to out-
rage as the public watches four. free
years of testing for Moscow, while the
United States fails to test a single new
intercontinental ' ballistic - missile
(ICBM).
Preparations of the new test silos to
let Moscow exploit Article 4 of SALT II
are virtually complete. high Pentagon
officials are privately warning senators
and other politicians not to be sur-
prised when "modernized" (improved)
versions of the main Soviet ICBM force
are tested immediately following final
ratification of the new treaty.
One defense official made that clear
last week to a meeting attended by Sen-
ate staff experts: U.S. negotiators of
SALT II "know that the Russians delib-
e
erately negotiated Article 4 so that they
could go ahead and test and deploy all
their new missiles without violating the
treaty."
This Soviet upgrading or moderniza-
tion of the existing force is a loophole
totally separate from the provision in
the treaty (Article 2) that gives each,
side the right to build one new missile.
President Carter has announced a deci-
sion (still resisted by arms-control en-
thusiasts) for the United States to build
the MX mobile missile as its new mis-
sile.
The United States has no plans far-'
upgrading or modernizing its pres-
ent land-based missile force. There is
today no intention to fire a single test ,
of any long-range missile until the
MX itself is fired (now scheduled for
1983).
That means silence from the Ameri-
cans amid heavy Russian missile-rat-
tling. The Soviet Union, without cheat-
ing, is in the same position to modern-
ize its land-based long-range missiles as
it was after ratification of SALT I on
Sept. 14, 1972 Immediately thereafter,
the Soviets began initial tests of the
lange SS13 and the large SS19, whose
size did violent injustice to the spirit of
SALT 1. Now, both the SS1S and the
SS19 will be modernized under SALT II,
along with three lesser missiles.
Skeptics within the U.S. SALT dele-
gation sounded repeated warnings dur-
ing the negotiations that Article 4 must
not leave the "modernizing" door wide
open. One result was to limit the mod-
ernized missiles to a 5 percent variation
from the older missiles (which the
Soviets can easily violate). 4
Moscow's negotiators never have
been willing to give the United States
accurate measurements of its existing
missiles from which to measure the
permitted 5 percent variations. Indeed,
the "modernizing door" was left open,
as the intelligence reports of the new }
silos at Soviet test sites prove.
That sets the stage for public outcry
as soon as the new Soviet tests are -
launched. It could mark the end of in-
nocence that tip to now has made the
SALT process a self-contained objective
even more important than the SALT I
substance.. I
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360023-7 -