DANIEL PATRICK MOYNIHAN ARMS LIMITATION LOST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360034-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 34
• Publication Date: August 2, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360034-5
THE WASHINGTON POST
._'i.1CLE .,'LV PEAKED 2 August 1979
Daniel Patrick Moynihan
Arms Limitation Lost/
In 1969 when discussion of an arms These are not instructions; even if "
American nuclear forces is also to._ the
they are not binding. They
were
,
y
limitations treaty began, the Soviets take place. This is then agreed to on d
had 1,050 ICBM warheads. In 1985 at our side through a complex negotia- reflect nothing more than the ideals
the conclusion of SALT they will tion involving the White House, the with which SALT I and SALT IT were
have upwards of 12,000. This is four p entered upon-on our side. For it is
State De p the Defense De- an open secret that when the United
warheads for every county in the partment and Congress.
United States. In terms of missile The MX has become the price of States in cscowin blanch
athe Soviets will con- posed sed a specific reduction in strategic
throw-weight, SALT II. It is hard to describe the
re-
tinue their rapid increase from their; arms of. one-third, the Soviets ,
weapons system, for it changes every ) jetted any such specific. Less s known,
current level of 11.3 million pounds to but now more important, at Vienna
15 million pounds by 1985, the treaty's day. At minimum it is complex. More in June the United States proposed to
expiration date. This will be half seriously, it will require the Soviets to the Soviets that the joint statement
again the American throw-weight. deploy some 8,000 warheads to neu- on SALT III specifically call for none-
The number of Soviet MIRVed mis- tralize it. (Two warheads per 20 possi third reduction in strategic arms, and
sile launchers alone will almost dou- ble sites for 200 missiles.) again the Soviets refused.
ble under the treaty period from they!. Thus the United States joins the
present level of about 700 to 1,200 in, arms race the Soviets insist on. This is Worse. The United States entered
1985. the ultimate irony. Without thinking, into the negotiations for SALT I with
The problem I suggest with the ? without so far as I can tell even notic- a pronounced advantage in strategic
process is that-so far-it has re- ing, United States behavior in nu- weapons and those for SALT II with a
quired American negotiators to reach clear weapons has become basically sufficient advantage. The prospect is
agreement with the Soviet Union in' imitative of Soviet behavior, because that the SALT III negotiations will
an area where there is no agreement. we have accepted the Soviet def ni- begin with the Soviets anticipating
Their strategic buildup has been tion of "arms control." Strategic supremacy by the end of the
under way, as Secretary of Defense By the end of SALT H the United I process. In such circumstances, to
Harold Brown attests, for 15 years. It States will have four nuclear war- hold out hopes for any real reduction
was well under way when formal heads for every rayon-the Soviet is self-deception or worse.
SALT negotiations began. It has equivalent of our county-in the Our only hope is to obtain agree-
never ceased because the Soviet Soviet Union. ment for a SALT Ill -reduction in
would not agree to do so. In the meantime, our conventional arms now while the United States still
As a result, more often than not, military forces grow relatively retains the option to head off that
the actual negotiations in SALT have weaker with respect to the Soviets. In shift in the strategic balance. If there
taken place within the American gov- the kind of conflict one can imagine are to be reductions in SALT III, their
ernment..The process goes something and could accept we are ever more attainment must be written into
as follows. The advocates of strategic likely to. be overmastered. All be- SALT II.
arms limitations obtain agreement to cause we wanted arms limitation and I therefore propose an amendment
have "talks"-that is the terns-with went about it badly. to the treaty that will add a new
the Soviets. In these talks they find provision toArticle XIX of the text-
the Soviet government has already The gods must weep.
agreed with its military to continue I would hope we do not have to
their nuclear buildup. (At the time of settle for this. I believe we can still
SALT I the Soviets had already de- negotiate a strategic arms limitation.
cided to build the SS19, which they agreement that will limit arms. C DNTYI
proceeded to do. This is one reason Such hope as there exists for this is
why our Minuteman force is now found in the "Joint Statement of
threatened.) Principles and Basic Guidelines for
Accordingly a treaty is drafted that Subsequent Negotiations on the Limi
permits the increase in Soviet strate- tation of Strategic Arms," an append-
gic forces the Soviets have already age to the treaty, though not a part of
planned. Our negotiators return with it that sets the agenda for the next
this treaty, which the American mili- round of SALT. This joint statement
tart' in all honor cannot support un- calls for a third SALT agreement that
less a corresponding increase in will bring about a "reduction in the
numbers of strategic arms, as well as
for their further qualitative limita-
The writer is a Democratic sena- tion."
for from New York. This article is
excerpted from a statement to the
Senate on Wednesday.
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 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360034-5
4. The Parties shall conclude, by
December 31, 1981, an agreement
which shall, as a result of the nego-
tiations undertaken in accordance
with the Joint Statement of Princi-
ples and Guidelines for Subsequent
Negotiations on. the Limitation of
Strategic Arms agreed upon at
Vienna on June 18, 1979, effect 'sig-
nificant and substantial reductions
in the numbers of strategic offensive
arms, consistent with the require-
ment for the maintenance of essen.
Vat strategic equivalence. This
agreement shall enter into effect im-
mediately upon the expiration of the
present Treaty or sooner, as the Par-
ties shall decide. If the Parties are
unable to conclude such an agree-
ment by December 31, 1981, the
present Treaty shall terminate on
that date.
Unlike other proposals that have
been made to force the pace of the
SALT III negotiations, this provision
does not require undoing the present
SALT IT treaty. With respect to tim-
ing, it meshes with the expiration of
the protocol to the treaty, which will
itself automatically lapse on Dec. 31,
1981.
This much is certain: Our margin
for error in SALT has disappeared.
We must rescue the "process" from
itself; otherwise, it will present us
with ever more unappealing choices.
We must recover for SALT the possi
bility of arms limitation and genuine
arms reductions. This, so it seems to
me, is the major contribution the Sen-
ate can make to the preservation of
the SALT process that the president
and others seek. We must at least
make the effort.
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