SALT II AND U.S. STRATEGIC SAFEGUARDS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360039-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: August 31, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

ARTICLE
ON PAGE
31. July 1979
ii and U.S. Strategic
WWIashington.
-r., OF THE OBJECTIVES of SALT is
to regulate, in a balanced fashion,
!pacts of two fundamentally dissimilar and
.;ymmetrical force structures. Not only are
i. _r force structures different in their compo-
.tion, but different features on each aide's
sees are viewed as more threatening by the
-;.her side.
These differing perspectives have
.reduced a negotiating process marked by
srious compromises and tradeoffs as each
,;ide seeks to protect the essential character of
By Gen. David C. Jones
is own forces while attempting to minimize
,;he most threatening aspects of the other
:,fide's.
The result is an agreement with some
provisions dearly favoring one side and some
,: learly favoring the other. The question of eq-
uity, then, cannot adequately be evaluated by
;. narrow and selective critique of portions of
the SALT II agreement. Only a balanced ap-
praisal of the total will yield an adequate
evaluation.
Two issues of particular concern to us with
regard to equity have been the Soviets' unilat-
mak
- -
?.;Ial _
fir O owed Y. S.,a-, .. ...
-r _-
r Missiles (MLBM), which was allowed in ? Counting ules--Provisions on ICBMs j period of the treaty.
tinental Ballistic Missiles) such as I ? Testing, production and deployment of
nd carried forward to
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SALT II, and the exclusion of the Backfire "once tested MIRVed, all counted MIRVed" ! the SS-16 (Soviet missile] banned.
bomber from the aggregate totals of strategic and "look alike, count alike" help resolve! On the other hand, the specific limits on
nuclear delivery vehicles (SNDVa) allowed ! potential verification ambiguities; similarly, ! the United States are quite nominal and pro-!
under the agreement requirements for various types of externally vide the folowing options in planning our!
I
hi
ng
. observable differences assist in distinguis
the desired result would have been
Clearly
,
a major reduction in Soviet MLBMs in order ' among various aircraft and cruise missiles.
to have reduced their very significant throw- ? (yon . interference / non concealment
weight capability and attendant potential to measures-Most important of all is insuring
carry large numbers of warheads. Having access to photographic and electronic moni-
failed to achieve that objective, we ahi uld ac-
cantuate our determination to obtain bstan?
tial reductions in future negotiation's ',n the
interim, limiting the SS-18 [heau_yile]
intercontinental range capability. agreement on telemetry encryption. The
Nevertheless, the United States did obtain agreed Second Common Understanding to Ar-
some constraints on the Backfire, the most ticle XV of the treaty states that "... neither
important of which is a production limit not party shall engage in deliberate denial of tale-
to exceed 30 a year. Furthermore, the United metric information, such as through the use of
States retains the right to build and deploy an telemetry encryption, whenever such denial
aircraft with equivalent capabilities. impedes verification of compliance with the
We believe that an issue of great impor- provisions of the treaty " Any Soviet attempt
tance is the question of whether the SALT II to deny or impede our ability to monitor
agreements can be verified adequately to pro- SALT-limited parameters would be regarded
tect our national security. by us as a most grave violation of the treaty.
The many quantitative and qualitative Thus far in this discussion of equity and
limitations contained in the treaty will pose a mutual interest, I have concentrated on the
stern challenge to our varied and highly cape- key issues of most concern to us. There are
hie intelligence systems. Our review of these also a number of important restrictions in
aril- to our sd.
ran
t
h
h
Soviet compliance with the many provisions
of the agreement varies substantially. The dif-
ficulty of this task and the loss of important
capabilities associated with our collection sys-
tems in Iran, make it essential that we vigor-
ously pursue improvements in the capabilities
of our monitoring assets.
While recognizing the difficulties associ-
ated with verification, we must also acknowl-
edge the important assistance the SALT IY
treaty will provide in this effort. With or with-
out SALT, we will be required to keep track
of Soviet military capabilities as the basis for
our defense planning and ultimately our na-
_
_- within the
C
o
opera F
ic
OALT II w
vantage. Among the most important provi-
sions having an impact on Soviet plans for
strategic forces are:
? Aggregate limits that will require the
Soviets to dismantle (or convert to non-offen-
sive systems) 250-plus operational systems;
these are older and less capable weapons but
still a significant fraction of their total sys-
tems and megatonnage.
? The various limitations that will enhance
the predictability of the range of Soviet force
developments, thus assisting us in our force planning.
? The cap on RV (Re-entry Vehicle) frac-
tionation that denies full exploitation of the
major Soviet throw-weight advantage for the
strategic forces.
? We can build an ICBM which fully meets
our security requirements.
? We can continue with the modernization t
of our Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile
toring data; in the absence of such measures, (SLBM) program at the pace we determine.
there would be no restriction on any intelli- + We can continue to modernize our air- !
gence-denial measures the Soviets might breathing systems, including the exploitation
severely compounding our in- of our air, ground and sea-launched cruise
ose to take
h
,
o
c
to 10 warheads achieves an imp+*~at re- telligence gathering difficulties (a much i miles,
straint on their MLBM potential. greater problem for us than for the Soviets, ! The danger to the United States does not
The second major concern is the '4slure to due to the open U.S. society). arise from any specific limitations in the
count the Backfire bomber in the SNDV ag- in this connection, there has been much agreement, but from potential consequences
gregate totals. While we are well aware of its discussion r garding agreement or lack of I of unilateral actions or inactions in the past
employment capabilities in peripheral and and, if we are not careful, in the future.
maritime roles, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
consistently recommended that the Backfire
be included in the aggregate because it has an
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 Uur ability to take the necessary program- I anon
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equivalence is the ultimate test for Salt IL( but useful step in a long-range process which
Our options and flexibility under the treaty must include the resolve to provide adequate
are adequate, so long as we choose to exercise capabilities to maintain strategic equivalence
coupled with vigorous efforts to achieve fur
The most serious concern of the 'Joint
Chiefs of Staff in this regard is the risk that
SALT 11 could be allowed to become a tran.
quilizer to the American people, in which case
adverse strategic trends could well become ir-
reversible.
In 1972, our predecessors on the Joint
Chiefs of Staff endorsed SALT I with the as-
surance that certain follow-on actions would
be implemented to safeguard our strategic in-
torests. Regrettably, their advice was not
heeded. Had it been followed, we would face I
less perilous strategic prospects in the "I98(1s,
and we are convinced we could have achieved i
deeper mutual reductions in SALT IL -- - " I
' We are seriously concerned lest the. nation
repeat earlier mistakes through complacency,
an incomplete understanding of the magni-
tude of the Soviet buildup, or an insufficient
appreciation of the broader consequen~es,.of
Soviet momentum in terms of stability, global
power relationships and long term U.S' inter-
ests.
Therefore, we consider it absolutely'essen-
tial that, if the nation accepts the SAI. T 11
agreement, it does so with a full understand-
ing that we will be required to undertaka xse.
Ties of important strategic modernization pro.
grams in order to maintain strategic- parity
within the limits agreed upon. In this q nuec.:
tion, the decision to proceed with the develop
hient of the MX (mobile) missile, capable of
carrying 10 re-entry vehicles and deployed in
a survivable basing mode, is an importano
step toward this end.
None of us is totally at ease with all the
provisions of the SALT agreement. I ex
pressed our concerns on the Soviet MLBMs
and Backfire earlier and we also have signifi-
cant concerns with regard to our ability to
monitor certain aspects of the agreement.' %
believe, though, that the risks in this mare
acceptable, provided we pursue vigorously
challenges to questionable Soviet practices,
improvements in the capability of our moni-
toring assets and modernization of our etzatel.
?gic forces. In this cc nttwit, the Joint Chiefa,of
Staff believe the s4.eement. is adequately
verifiable.
If this can be achieved, history will record
SALT 11 as a step forward; without this com
mitment, we will find that SALT 11 made lit
tle difference and may have been a net loss.
Fortunately, our nation has the opportunity
to make that choice.
General David C. Jones is chairman of the
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. This arricie..wcs
a&ipted from his testimony on the straregics
runts limitation treaty (SALT ID this math'
before the Senate Foreign Relations Gemmi-
tee. ,
lossary
Following Is a glossary of selected terms
used in the strategic arms discussion:
Fractionation-The division of a, mis-
sile's payload into separate re-entry vehi-
cles.
MIRY-Multiple Independently tar-
getable Re-entry Vehicle; a package of two
or more re-entry vehicles which can be
carried by a 'single ballistic missile and
delivered on separate targets. A missile so
equipped is said to be MIRVed. MiRVing,
i3 a kind of fractionation.
NiLBM-Modern Large Ballistic Mis.
sile; another term for Heavy Missile. A
heavy missile is one with a large payload of
nuclear warheads capable of destroying
fixed, hardened targets, such as U.S. Min-
utemen ICBMs in silos hardened, or pro-
tected, by concrete.
Telemetry-The transmission of elec-',
tronic signals by missiles to earth. Moni-
toring these signals aids in evaluating a
weapon's performance and provides a way!
of verifying weapons tests undertaken by
an adversary. Encryption of such signals
means encoding them to conceal the data
thus transmitted.
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