LOOKING OUT FOR NO.1 IN SALT-2

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360040-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: August 31, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R00040036004(k
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By GEORGE M. SEIGNIOUS 2d
IN THE LAST YEAR, Soviet missile' sub-
marines have been dismantled because of
limits under SALT-1. We watched as they built
these submarines. When they were fitting out for sea
trials, we knew it. We watched as they put to sea. And
we watched as the submarines were dismantled.
The SALT-2 Treaty, signed in Vienna in June by
President Carter, was painstakingly designed and
negotiated so that we can adequately verify-by our ;
own independent intelligence capabilties-that the
Soviets are living up to its terms.
We use photographic satellites, other satellite-
borne sensors, powerful radars and numerous other
means, operating from air, land and sea, to survey'
the Soviet Union on a regular, thorough and accurate
basis. We do not depend on any one source exclusive-
ly. If we have even the slightest suspicion of a
violation we can raise it with the Soviets at a special
commission that has been set up for this purpose.
The ultimate sanction, if our concerns are not
satisfied, is to repudiate the treaty and take whatever
steps we believe necessary to protect our security.
The treaty itself provides for this.
ingI find our intelligence capabilities truly astonish-.
ing. especially since when I began my military
career in World War II, we seldom knew what was
happening 600 yards behind enemy lines, let alone
6,000 miles away.
Today, it's vastly different. We know where Soviet
missile subs are built. We count their missile tubes
as they are installed and can determine the type of
missile they are designed for.
We know the location and type of all Soviet ICBM
launchers. We carefully observe missile flight tests, I
and we know whether a missile is tested with one
warhead or with more than one. We can.count the
Soviet missile reentry vehicles as they reenter the
atmosphere. We monitor the conversion of older
ICBM launchers. Well before conversion is finished,
we know what type of missile it will contain.
The treaty bans deliberate concealment which
interferes with verification, and it bans interference
with our verification techniques. It also contains
precise definitions and special rules to aid our
verification efforts. If SALT is rejected and we lose
these provisions, it would be harder to collect
information on Soviet weapons, although our need
for the information would be no less. No military
leader likes to plan with less, rather than more,
information about a potential adversary-that's one
reason why I'm for SALT.
As in any intelligence effort, we can monitor
some systems with greater precision than others.
But I know of no way the Soviets could cheat in
SALT on a scale large enough to pose significant
military. risk, or adversely affect the strategic ba-
lance, and. not get caught. The bottom line is that
now and in the future we can safeguard the strategic
balance and our security against Soviet violations of
SALT.
(Retired Gen. Seig eious is "director of the U.S.
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.)
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360040-8