TIME SPIES IN THE SKY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360042-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 42
• Publication Date: July 30, 1979
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For Rele se 95 12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360042-6
Spies _the Sky
Thefate of SALT II may
depend on "verification"
ill the U.S. be able to catch the So-
UN viets if they cheat under the SALT II
treaty'? The answer may determine the
fate of the arms ?imitation accord in the
Senate. As the Foreign Relations Com-
mittee ended its second week of hearings
on the pact, Delaware Democrat Joseph
Biden said last week: "Verification is go-
ing to be the cutting issue of the com-
mittee's vote on the treaty and ultimately
on the Senate floor."
What has made verification so con-
troversial was the loss early this year of
two important CIA listening posts in Iran,
close to the U.S.S.R. border. From these
sites, U.S. computers and other electronic
devices in tandem with spy satellites had
been able to monitor most Soviet missile
test-firings and hence learn, among other
things, the weapons' length, diameter and
launchweight. This is precisely the kind
of information that will be essential for de-
termining whether Moscow abides by a
crucial SALT II restriction: increasing or
decreasing key characteristics of an ex-
isting intercontinental ballistic missile by
more than 5% would classify that ICBM
as a "new missile." SALT II allows each
side only one "new" ICBM.
Despite the loss of the Iranian sites,
the Administration insists that the U.S.
can adequately verify the arms pact. At
last week's hearings, Defense Secretary
Harold Brown emphasized that U.S. spy
satellites and other means of gathering in-
telligence keep close tabs on the devel-
opment, testing and deployment of all So-
viet strategic arms. He even claimed that
every new Soviet ICBM is detected while
still on the Kremlin's drawing boards,
presumably a rare public allusion to U.S.
cloak-and-dagger activities inside the
U.S.S.R. Pointing out that development
of a new missile system takes about a dec-
ade and requires some 20 to 30 test flights,
Brown said: "It i:, Inconceivable to me that
the Soviets cot.xid develop, produce, test
and deploy a :)ew ICBM in a way that
would evade t~~s monitoring network."
(Even as Brow?r was discussing Soviet
testing, the deadly U.S. air-launched
cruise missile was beginning a crucial
phase of development. See SCIENCE.)
B rown's assurances did not satisfy Sen-
ator John Glenn, the Ohio Democrat
who has devoted hundreds of hours to
studying the complex verification issue.
As a former astronaut with some first-
hand knowledge of how highly sophis-
ticated electronic devices work-or fail
-Glenn is looked to for guidance on
verification by man of his Senate col-
leaguesApja r1FactRe8aSe 2QQ6
to vote for SALT, but I want to know
that the Soviets are living up to it." He
believes that the loss of the Iranian posts
left the U.S. with no way of sufficiently
monitoring Soviet missile testing. He fears
that the U.S. will have more trouble in-
tercepting Soviet telemetry, the perfor-
mance data beamed back to earth by
the test missile. Noted Glenn: "Brown
tends to minimize the importance of te-
lemetry, while analysts say that telemetry
is key."
To allay his doubts, Glenn is con-
sidering proposing three reservations to
be attached to the Senate bill approving
the arms pact. One would urge Moscow
not to encrypt any of its telemetry. The
second would require the Administration
to inform Congress whenever it brought
complaints about possible Soviet cheating
to the Standing Consultative Commission,
Still worried about Russian cheating.
a U.S.-Soviet body that deals with
charges of treaty violations. Because nei-
ther of these reservations would be bind-
ing on Moscow, they probably would
not require new negotiations with the
Kremlin.
That almost certainly would not be
the case with Glenn's third reservation: a
requirement that Moscow give advance
notice of all its ICBM tests. The U.S. al-
ready gives notice, primarily because
American test missiles fly over interna-
tional waters. Advance Soviet notice, ar-
gued Glenn, would enable the Pentagon
to get the maximum number of satellites,
planes and ships in place to monitor the
Soviet tests, thus significantly compensat-
ing for the capabilities lost in Iran. But it
is very likely, according to State Depart-
ment aides, that Moscow would balk at
Gle", wan
5A W%fthm-64
ment that SALT advocates fear may doom
the treaty. ^
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