THE BATTLE OVER VERIFICATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360085-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 85
• Publication Date: July 7, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

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ARTICLE APPA. Bved For ReI6/bM9'i: 31 -RDP88-01315R0
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Verification
The struggle over ratification of the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II) with the Soviet
Union turns in part on how well Soviet compliance can be verified. Paul R. Bennett, who thinks
it can, is an arms control specialist with the Union of Concerned Scientists. Charles M. Kupper-
man, who does not, is a defense analyst with the Committee on the Present Danger.
T WOULD be utterly foolish and
tremendously dangerous to rely
on""the honor system" for enforce-
ment of SALT II. Fortunately, we
don't have to trust the Russians, be-
cause today's sophisticated military
satellites, radars, signal reception
gear- and computers can probe deep
into the interior of the Soviet Union
and detect any significant violation.
Take SALT's overall ceilings, for
example. Since our huge satellite
cameras can capture details as small
as a golf ball, the Soviets have vir-
tually no chance of building illegal
missile silos, submarines or bombers
without detection. Nor could they
slip extra Backfires or forbidden silo
reload equipment past our view. Cer-
tainly the Soviet Union stretches
across vast territory, but American
satellites pass over every inch of it
every day
Camouflage= won't help either.
Special muli.color image techniques
and computerized picture enhance-
By Paul R. Bennett
ment would reveal. any hidden facili-
ties. Efforts to conceal would theme
selves constitute violations of the
treaty..
In fact, launcher verification by
satellite is so good that SALT critics
generally skip over the subject entire-
ly and go directly to other concerns:
Can we determine the number of
missiles equipped with multiple war-
heads ("MIRVs" in SALT jargon)?
Can we count the MIRVs atop a par-
ticular missile?
Yes we can, during the two dozen
test flights every Soviet missile goes
through to attain combat reliability.
Anything shot up in these tests falls
to earth within easy range of what is
probably the world's most sophisti-
cated radar, at Shemya Air Force
Base in the Aleutian Islands. A Sovi-
et basketball couldn't get past this
device, which is supplemented by
planes and ships in the vicinity.
Under SALT rules, "blank shots"
(Like those included in several Soviet_ .I
SS-18 missile tests) count as the real
thing. Aiming and shooting maneu-
vers of a warhead carrier, tracked by
our powerful radar in Turkey and sig-
naled by intercepted telemetry, count
even if no warhead is actually re-
leased.
Assume a test missile carried
MIRVs. Prior to liftoff, American
satellite cameras photographed its
launcher (silo or submarine tube). All
other launchers of the same design
count as MIRV launchers. Non-
MIRV look-alikes of these launchers
are banned. These rules leave the So-
viets no way to secretly add illegal.
MIRVed missiles.
All this should give some perspec-
tive on the loss of our Iran monitor-
ing stations. Radar and listening
equipment there followed Soviet mis-
sile tests at low altitudes, providing
important tip-offs to new missile de-
velopments restricted by SALT. Sim-
ilar facilities in Turkey fail to pick up
certain valuable data, because they
are older and farther away.
Where does that leave us? Satellite
photographs still reveal the dim_._::.- f
sions of test missiles. Our Aleutian
radar tracks descending warheads, al-
lowing us to calculate missile throw-
weight. The bases in Turkey, radars
elsewhere and heat-sensing satellites
watch the 'ascent of test flights. But
the certainty of several 'measure-, me t ou
C O.TTIPI
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We can quickly compensate for I
the loss by improving our facilities in
Turkey, by sending in specially
equipped U-2 planes to follow missile
tests, and/or by launching sounding
rockets to shadow those tests. Ulti-
mately, we can orbit enough electron-
ic intelligence satellites to eliminate!
dependence on ground stations for
launch monitoring. These steps will
maintain the total monitoring capa-
bility necessary to SALT verification.
That brings us to the cruise mis-
ile, the favorite straw man of SALT
verification critics. Sure, the small
size of these precision-guided drones
makes them difficult to verify. But
the Soviets lag so far behind in cruise
missile development that they
couldn't reach illegal levels before the
treaty expires anyway. The United
States accepted cruise missile limits
because in return the Soviets agreed
to a ceiling on MIRVed land-based
missiles (their most threatening
weapons) and to a freeze on warheads
per missile (the payload of their most
threatening weapons). These crucial
restrictions can be confidently ve ri-
fied, as described above.
So why does everyone think the
United States cannot monitor SALT?'
I suggest that SALT opponents have
successfully exploited this technical,]
issue by scaring the public with sea- I
sational charges. Somewhat excessive
secrecy restrictions have prevented a ",
credible Administration response. It's
a clever tactic - for defeating the
treaty, but not one that serve:, the av
curity interest- America in the nu
clear age.
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RESIDENT Carter has stated re-
peatedly that the SALT II treaty
holes permits the Soviet Union to
further expoit its "breakout potenti-
al" for quickly adding to its strategic
capability. Components of the fifth
generation of Soviet missiles could be
easily retrofitted to Soviet ICBMs
currently deployed. Placing the pro-
pulsion system of the SS-17 or an im-
proved version in an SS-19 type mis- i
sile would give the Soviets an ICBM, is
nearly as capable as the heavy SS-18 j
missile.
While the administration appears
to be satisfied with its assertion that
"we do not rely on trust or Soviet
good faith," provisions covering Sovi-
et cruise missile capabilities and de-
ployments, Soviet encryption of te-
lemetry in missile tests, and the flim-
sy assurances relating to the Backfire
bomber, for example, are based on
trusting the Soviets.
Even assuming that the Soviets
will neither deliberately conceal ac
tivities nor attempt to deceive U.S.
intelligence (an analytical leap, of
faith by the administration of the
first order), recent intelligence coups
by the Soviet Union--a ' 'on of
the technical manual for-the KH-11
satellite (reportedly our most ad-
vanced photo reconnaissance satel-
lite) and vital information on other
U.S; satellite systems-have severely
`compromised U.S. verification re-
sources and capabilities. As a conse-
quence, the Soviet Union now knows
what U.S. intelligence satellites can
see on each pass over the Soviet Un-
ion.
Despite the administration's fixa-
tion with compromised verification
technology, the fact that the number
of Soviet missiles and warheads pro-
duced and stockpiled is not limited,
by SALT should not be forgotten nor
that overhead photo reconnaissance
cannot peer inside a building, shed,;
or under canvas, and that it is limited 1,
by adverse meteorological conditions. j
Regardless of how precise satellite;
photo reconnaissance becomes, it
cannot reveal the range of Soviet
cruise missiles or the type of war-
heads they carry. Verification of So-
viet cruise missile deployment inside
Backfire bombers will be virtually
impossible to detect. Other potential
Soviet developments that would be j
militarily significant and unverifiable
include the clandestine deployment
of MIRVed or un-MIRVed missiles
or deployment of a longer range sea-
launched cruise missile on their al-
ready large number of cruise missile
submarines.
The loss of U.S. intelligence facili-
ties in Iran has virtually eliminated I
our ability to verify critical qualita-
tive aspects of Soviet missile per- s
formance, including the power of So-
viet missile boosters, the speck im-
pulse of the propulsion system, and
the throwweight of the missile. The
proposed stopgap measures simply
cannot replace these sites, and when i
Turkey, a NATO ally, requires Soviet
permission to allow American U-2
aircraft the use of Turkish airspace,
this indicates how far the strategic
balance has shifted against the West. i
Finally, verification of the terms of
SALT II ultimately rests upon the
nature and accuracy of intelligence
estimates. The SALT record indi-
cates a rather substantial American j
error rate in - the intelligence esti-
mates of Soviet quantity, quality, and 1
the rate of Soviet strategic improve-
ments. As Walter Lippmann said,
"I do not find much ground for
reasonable confidence in a policy
which can be successful only if the
most optimistic prediction should
prove to be true. Surely a sound poli-
cy must be addressed to the worst
and hardest that may be judged to be
probable, and not to the best and-
easiest that may be possible."
After nearly ten years of SALT, such skepticism is long overdue. 4
"will be verifiable" because "we have
very sophisticated proven means--
including our satellites-to deter-
mine for ourselves whether the Soviet
Union is meeting its treaty obliga-
tions." Such words fail to place the
issue= of verification in the proper
perspective: That SALT II, far from
By Charles M. Kupperman
being verifiable, is a bad agreement
on both strategic and political
grounds, and a bad agreement does, i
not cease to be a bad agreement by j
being wholly verifiable. Not only does SALT II limit the
wrong things, the United States has
little capability to verify Soviet com-
pliance with the critical terms of
SALT II limits. Soviet violations of
both the letter and the spirit of
SALT I and our reluctance to con-
front the Soviets quickly and reso-
lutely on such matters have set a bad
political and strategic precedent for
Soviet compliance with SALT H.
Another major source of difficulty
is the treaty's language. Definitions
of key terms, such as "missile launch-
er" and "heavy bomber," are ex
tremely weak. In addition, loopholes
in the treaty will compound the prob-
lem of verification. The limit of onel
"new type" of ICBM with no limits!
on new types of submarine-launched!
ballistic missiles is one glaring loop-
hole. The failure to close such loop-i
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