SALT RATIFICATION: LOOKING FOR A SPY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360086-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 86
• Publication Date: July 6, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

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WASHINGTON Domestic pplitical
-concerns in Ankara and Moscow could W' ILLIA011 BE ECgHE.R
-sgnificant1v affect the ratification
pros- of the S:' ,'i' 11 treaty. cent without being classed.. as "new.
Car ter Administration officials pri- 'Since the Soviets are believed to be devel-.
aately say the taughest single issue stand- oping as many as five new missiles, this
ping in the pith of the controversial agree- provision also is viewed as important.
--ment is widespread apprehension among Only through careful monitoring can
.,senatorial fence-sitters as to whether the such constraints be policed{
meaty can be verified in the lace of the : One might think if a simple matter for
moss of two key intelligence stations in",. Turkey, a.-member of NATO which al-
a ;;.` ready permits US monrtoriag'stations on
F= "A lot of senators, like John Glenn (D its soil, to routinely OK. the U-2 flights.
would like to be with us onSALT,', The PurP ose "after aIl, is to: enforce an
Ohio),
n Administration official notes;:,"but arms-control agreement that.-both the U S-
crthey -plain don't trust the Russians as far and the USSR insist is :in'the:interest of
.-As they can spit- I in y want to be sure we. world peace and stability.
'have the-unquestionable ability to pre- But Turkish' Prime Minister Bulent
anent cheating. Ecevit is fighting for his political life.. His
3ZA i The American intelligence community, economy is in tatters. Political violence
vitas come up with five options, short and rages across his campuses. Defections:in
-`lpng run,"aimed at compensating for the his party put his parliamentary- inajority"
ibss of the Iranian listening posts: flying in dire question. The recent Houseof Reps
nuvo specially equipped , U-2s along the resentatives rejection of treating $56 mil-
; urkish-Saviet border near the big Rus- lion-in military aid as a grant raised anew !
.Tian missile test center at Tyuratam; mod- - doubts about the American connection.
,~Ifying the operational Chalet satellite so In that environment Ecevit.feels he -~
:1l can alert the U-2s and other systems as.- cannot risk making the Russians so angry
to imminent tests at Tyuratam; upgrading about new "spy" flights =even through
they might re
zhe capabilities of a radio intercept sta- his own air space that
&l,ion in Norway, developing a very capable taliate by cutting back on vital aid ari&'j
,,,r-ew electronic intelligence satellite to be- / trade. So he asked Washington to get as
gin operations in 1933 or 1984; and mount, surances from Moscow that it would not
.4ng a hush-hush covert operation to fill retaliate for U-2 flights.
asbme data.gaps. President Jimmy Carter tried that at
i The U-2;proposal has. the quickest po-. Vienna with Leonid Brezhnev, bttt failed.
Lential payoff and thus has been the main The aging Soviet leader had been told in
pcus of Senate interest. advance the issue would be raised and as-
s The-first 60 sF-eon.s of missile flight sent would go a long way toward relaxing
ppresent a critical period. Radio teleme- Senate suspicions, thus improving the un-
1y intercepted ~ ring this:.boost phase certain ratification prospects of. SALT
E~can tell- weapori analysts - how much `:Still he refused.*..
1.hrust -and p c'...; the ICBM has, the' .. This has prompted some'American an- -
%mumber:of ?? -'ads it carries and alysts to ponder whether Brezhnev's
?het~er it=.can a? u.crately dispense more health is so bad and his clout so dimin-
,arheads--.thaa actually released on Fished that he wouldn't risk antagonizing
my particular fi t. ' hard-line Politburo colleagues.
;."; One important SkLT II provision lim- The Administration hasn't given up.
-its to 10 the number of warheads on any Now the Turkish parliament has gone on
a13 vL The main target here is the giant recess, Ecevit has about three months be-
-Soviet.SS-18 which has been tested with fore facing another challenge from the
. at least 12 'warheads and theoretically opposition. If Moscow can be persuaded to
=ould carry as many as 30 or 40. But if the go along, the hope is that U-2 flights can
:-new US mobile MX missile deployment be OK'd and announced by fall.
,,scheme is to be safe from surprise attack, For ratification of SALT is not only
=the total number of Russian warheads important to Carter's foreign policy, but
nsust be, p-6vai For Release 2005/101U' T7 vt:Lti~4(1PM=b9lii 6M 360086-8
Another major SALT clause- restricts : We ? ..
=each side to one new ICBM through 198
.nd.holds that)cistina land-ha-ad rni- rl'illiam Beerher i., The Globe's diD-
proved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400360086-8
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