FEAR OF REJECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370019-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 16, 2004
• Sequence Number: 19
• Publication Date: June 19, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-01315R00040037Q 19-1_
ARTICL ; ,:i'_- -RED C_ i
aV, PwxG ' z - 19 . ura 1,)-(9
C1~~ _ `} c .4 r~;
Fear of Rejection
v
en more.precisely. what are the
E
real constraints on the Soviets? It's
hard to find any serious constraint on
The
their weapons program in SALT
.
The long-i;:uninent strategic armsi have conducted a huge build-up, both that they might react to the rejection
y
treaty has finally arrived, and over strategic and conventional, under or amendment of SALT II with a show
the next iew weeks there will be SALT I. SALT I1 will require them to of belligerence somewhere in the
plenty of time for detailed textual deactivate some 250 missile silos. but `titer , exploiting sooner ner rather than
analysis. But listening to many of the it allows them to add some 5,000 war- later the opporrilitarY posture, e, a de-
proponents over the last few months, t in crucial U.S. military osture even
heads. Within the treaty they can ,
have heard that the text hardly m
in crucial areas such as the Middle
ilit
e
ui
t th
et
me
q
e
any m
ary r
re
n
ey
;otters. Whatever the flaws the pro- are likely to want. Why would they East. Yet unless the unWest derloes sorne-
visions are the best we can do, they build more without it? thing to redress the rip, these
argue, and rejecting the deal will only. The truly serious constraint on so- lacy and political deterioration. these
make matters worse. diet weapons-building is the economic opportunities will only grow, and ul
m
At the Vienna summit, Soviet one. Last June the ately and inevitably be exploited..
. CIA issued a public
1
Chairman Brezhnev backed this argu- assessment of Soviet military spend- with SALT or without it
ment with some threats of his own. If ing, showingit growing # This is why Senator Jackson has
% to 5% a
the CT. S. Senate rejects or even year in constant prices, consuming started to talk about-"appeasement"
amends the treaty; he warned of Ill, to 13--/c of the Soviet GNP,. and About this he was rather precise:
"grave and even dangerous conse- consuming one-third of the output in aDiplomatic accommodation becomes
for our relations and for the machine building and metalworking. appeasement when we Soviets in the world as. a whole." , A slowing Soviet economy will make slops out of fear that the Soviets will
The fear of rejection has to be I it more. difficult to sustain this pace, cause trouble around the world unless.
faced squarely. It will be the great the CIA estimated, but predicted at we yield to their desires-" The precise
subterranean force behind the drive _best .amargin_ai slowing_~It--added mistake made at Munich was to yield
'
out.of fear
for ratification. Its influence reaches "Conclusion.of a SALT II agreement to unreasonable demands
far beyond a final up-or-down vote. In i along the lines currently being dis of what ? would happen' if those de;
our judgment it has already pro-; cussed Would not, in itself, slow the mands were rejected; we learned dial
roundly influenced the- negotiations growth of Soviet defense spending sig-: appeasement leads to yet more unre.a
? And certainly it will influence the nificartly." sonable demands and higher risks of
drive for amendments. Proposals for; In the political field the Soviets con,+li
th
?.mendment are likely to be met not have stepped. up emigration permits the debate on SALT comes baclt
with arguments on their merits ' but f and made a few friendly gestures. But - _1' whether the text released yesterday
,with the objection: yes, yes, but deven the gestures are marred by what can withstand' the scrutiny it will re--
0:1
r
you want to kill the treaty' . . 1 seems a congenital ill-nature; as when ceive, whether it really povides-.:
Fear of rejection is in large, part they allow a dissident to flee but drag requality or advances the, Soviet* build-
oll- up, whether its its terms are. rneaningfuf`
simply fear of the unknown, but if you 7 their feet over his family In
oo-
g
p
,. try to break -it into analytical pieces tics, they have supplied arms aid to constraints or vaguely ambiguous. If
imes in it fails in these respects. it should e
you come up with two,concerns. Witte- establish- new Marxist- re
g
out the.treaty, the Soviets will acceler- South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, An- amended or rejected.`T there is,no
ial_constrain on So-
ate their military build-up.. And. with- gola, Ethiopia, Afghanistan and South treaty, the
I
wi
will remain. If f a bad,
out the treaty,' the Soviets will stir up Yemen. Without SALT, without de-. viet behavior or
more trouble- around the world.' But tente; would it have been nine nations treaty is approved,-rtheresult_is not..
the Soviets are already turning out instead of seven? likely to be a more reasonable Soviet
Union. Rather; the r t will be even
arms like sausages, and are already :Regardless of treat
ratificati
y
on
,ide stirring trouble from Cambodia to An the Soviets will be : constrained by more ' bold and stz~cient Soviet de,
cause them to be more reasonable, or cession uncertainties, and most of all
rejecting SALT cause them to be less'.. by wariness about awakening a West
so? still full of latent power. That is not to
say, of course; that it's impossible to:
wring more military expenditure out
? ' of a stagnant economy. And it cer-
tainly is not to dismiss the possibility
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400370019-1