THE SOVIETS ON SALT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400380011-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: May 28, 1979
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

GL ~ iliYiilliWrlYw ,
For Release ~~~~~ :CIA-RDP88-01315 00400380011-8
GN PAGED
28 May 1979
CartgressionaC critics of the SALT II
agrc~ernent have taped about amending a
number of its provisions. In an exclusive
article for NFwsvvEEx, Dr. Georgi Arba-
tov, a member of the Supreme Soviet and
director of :'tfoscow'r Ltstitute of U. S. and
Canadiarz Studies, tells why t6~e Russians
want a SALT II treaty and what the Soviet
response would be tv Senate-imposed
changes.
1 have been in the United States since early
May, and Americans have asked me a lot of
questions about the SALT II agreement.
One of t}re most frequent is: why is the
Soviet Union. so interested in this arms
limitation agreement?
The answer is very simple. The Soviet
Union considers prevention of war to be the
-most important goal of foreign policy, a
goal that cannot. be achieved without the
limitation and reduction of armaments. I
am convinced that it is as important for the
U.S. as it is for the Soviet Union. Bath
countries now face the same alternative.
developing and stockpiling
means of destruction. It is an
enormous machine, served not
only by numerous experts, lab-
oratories and factories but also
by perceptions, prejudices and
mutual suspicions that have
become implanted in the minds
of people over decades.
and international security.I
What will happen if the
U.S. Senate does not ratify the
agreement? The answer to this
question is generally self-evi-
dent, and I would rather not
elaborate on it, to avoid asser-
tions that Soviet spokesmen
interfere in the internal affairs
and the political process in the
United States and try to exert
pressure on the Americans. I
shall only say drat the eonse-
quences of a failure to ratify
In contrast, great efforts, Arfiatov: `Turning pvint' the agreement will be very ~
perseverance and, quite often,
uncommon political courage are required
to stop these mechanisms and change these
perceptions. The future of our countries,
even the future of human civilization, may
depend on whether we shall be able to show
such perseverance, wisdom and courage.
Do we, the Soviet people, like everything
in the SALT II agreement? Far from it.
President Leonid Brezhnev said recently
that we do not consider the agreement to be
perfect and would prefer many of its provi-
sions to bereplaced byothers. But the agree-
ment isthe result of seven years of work and
itisnatural that theaccordembodiesmutual
This is either to continue a totally unre-
stricted arms race, which is economically
ruinous and which undermines each na-
tion's secucityand increases the danger of a
nuclear holocaust. Or we can embark upon
the road of curbing the arms race.
MAD MOMENTUM: The SALT I and
SALT II agreements symbolize the histori-
cally significant fact that both countries
have finally chosen to follow the second
road.. This road is not an easy one. One does
not need to do anything, practically speak-
ing, to continue the arms race. A pp~~rgantic,
virtually mad momer~~IKQs'~i~~td916~~1
built up, and all the mechanisms exist for
compromises. The result is not ideal from
the point of view of either side, but iE is the
best that could be achieved in the present
circumstances. The results are very signifi-
cantboth because of arms limitations-and,
in the case of the Soviet Union, even some
arms reductions-and because SALT II
creates a good basis for continuing negotia-
tions. Given the goodwill of the sides, those
can lead to new agreements making it possi-
ble to stop the arms race and start more
radical reductions. I am convinced that
the SALT II a reement as a whole can
~41~(~4r~~n'~por~~r~'A?~t8~-9.'4~Ih5
tions and in the efforts to safeguard peace
grave and dangerous for both
countries. Our people, apart from other
things, would have to conclude that one
cannot do serious business with the Ameri-
cans at all.
ENV t7LNERAgI4ITY: I am aware of the basic
arguments of those who are against the
agreement. Obviously, the agreement does
not and cannot resolve all the problems or
remove all the reasons for concern. We are
worried about the development of some I
U.S. weapons systems not covered by the i
agreement. We, like the Americans, would
like to ensure the complete invulnerability
of our ICBM's and have. even more thact
100 per cent confidence in verification. But
I fail to understand how wrecking SALT II
can help solve such problems.
Take, for example, .the issue of verifica-
tion. The agreement provides a whole sys-
tem of verification measures: special count-
ingrules, apledge not to interfere with each
other's technical means, an obligation not
to conceal telemetric data that are needed
for verification, a special commission to ,
deal with questions in dispute. Lek the
Americans ask themselves whether they
will know more about our strategic forces
without this system.
IN GOAD FAITIi: One more question: will
the Soviet Union make additional conces-
sions if those are demanded by the [J.S.
Senate as a condition far ratification of the
agreement? I would like to reiterate that we .
conducted negotiations in good faith with
representatives of three U.S. administra-
tionsand in the course of those negotiations
we agreed to such compromises which we
considered possible and admissible. The
Americans, in all probability, would not
agree to make concessions if they were
demanded by our Supreme Soviet during its
discussion of the agreement. There is no ~
reason to believe that we would behave ~
The SALT II agreement will not provide ~
disarmament and absolute security. But it
will be a serious step forward and I have not i
heard its opponents suggest anything more
constructive.
My Father went to war when he was 18. I .
.went to war when I vas also 18. ZVIy son is
now 2~, h~a~pilx, did not have to fight a
e o hornecomers from a
nuclear war, and there will be no winners.