HOW EUROPE'S U.S. ALLIES ASSESS THE SALT II PACT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400380053-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: May 17, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400380053-2 Ca r ( SC
THE WASHINGTON STAR (GREEN LINE)
Article appeared 17 May 1979
on page -3
Time-LiieNewsSnn-lce' -
While -the Carter administra
tion's SALT II treaty with the Soviet
Union has a large contingent of ,
critics on Capitol Hill, most of the
United States' European allies seem
at least willing to accept it, if not to
support it with enthusiasm. '
European attitudes toward SALT
are by, no means unanimous; and
many reservations remain:- But a
recent survey of European atti-
tudes toward the strategic arms
limitation treaty suggests that
while the allies are concerned with
how SALT 11 might affect their own
defense, most believe they can.
safely support it or live with it.
Following are reports from three
European capitals:
WEST GERMANY
The Bonn government, which
had profound reservations about
the SALT treaty, has shifted to a
position of solid support.
In part, the switch was due to
U.S. assurances on two points con-
-sidered vital by the government of
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. The
Carter administration pledged that
the treaty would not limit deploy-
ment of, the cruise missile and that-
the protocol to SALT II would not
prevent NATO countries from add=
ing non=nuclear cruise missiles to
their own arsenals.
At !the -Gnade}v, upe --summit
several months ago, Schmidt came
out solidy and publicly in favor of
SALT and. went so far as to warn
that Senate rejection-of the treaty
would be a major setback for de-.
tente.
At last month's meeting of the
NATO nuclear planning group in
Florida, West German Defense
Minister Hans Apel reiterated his
government's new position. Final
decisions on the particular "mix"
of Pershing II and cruise missiles,
and how many of the latter should I
be deployed on submarines patrol-I
ling Western Europe's coastal
waters, is to be made -at the NATO
ministerial meeting in Brussels'
this winter
Assess the SALT II Pad
Negotiations are expected by
then to have led to acceptance of!
these weapons systems by 33ritainj
and Belgium, ands possibly, the.
Netherlands.
Schmidt's belief in detente was
another: reason for his switch. He
had been highly critical of Presi
dent Carter's human rights cam-i
paign becatise of what Schmidt saw i
as its negative impact on East-West)
relations. A SALT treaty, as`surningi
it did, riot tndermine'West Germa-!
nys-sfiategic position; wouldTie, a`
Sclitnld'e'aide'Said, "a"'i bitfi'd' ftlce-!
'b iildingmeasure."
Britain,'Verrlt4ie:recently defeated Labor
Party"gvtit~ rrdb`d1SALP
Al primarily as a prelude - but a;
necessary one - to `a rnrorecompre-
hensive' SALT III treaty,. ln,thaf"
sense, it,w4s.felt by..the,,gpvern
meat of then-Prime Minister James
Callaghai"that much of the debate.
surrounding-.the details in SALT II
could be safely ignored- provided)
certain key options, such as the
transfer of military technology
from the United States.to:its NATO
allies,, were not prematurely.;
closed.
The.new Conservative Party gov
ernment of Prime Minister Marga-.;
ret Thatcher is likely to be less en-
thusiastic and more concerned
with resisting any attempt by the ,
United States and the Soviet Union
to restrict arms available to the
NATO allies.
Thatcher places top priority on I
extending the British nuclear
deterrent into the 21st century and
wants U.S. assistance in replacing
its aging Polaris missiles. Thus,
Thatcher strongly opposes provi-
sions that would attempt to impose
_j
a Soviet veto on the transfer of U.S.
nuclear technology to "other part-
ners."
In looking, toward replacement
of its Polaris' submarines, Britain is
interested' in building its own .-
generation of submarines and in
buying advanced U.S. Trident bal-
listic missiles, topped by British-de-
veloped multiple re-entry war-
heads:
The Conservative Cabinet also
wants options kept open so that Eu-
can obtain cruise missiles and
rope
the neutron . bomb. - Hence,
Thatcher is fiercely opposed to a
continuation in SALT III of the
SALT II protocol that limits the
range of cruise missiles to 600 ki-
lometers.
At the NATO Defense Council's
recent meeting in Brussels, British
Defense Secretary Francis Pym
emphasized the urgency of devel? f
oprnent by the Western allies of a I
counterweapon- to the Soviet SS-20.
mobile strike missiles in Eastern
Europe. Pym proposed a new gener-
ation of medium-range, land-based
ballistic missiles to be built for that
purpose. Meantime. - he said. extended-range Pershings should
be deployed in NATO countries,
To encourage West Germany to
accept new nuclear weapons on its
soil, Thatcher is prepared to con
sider accepting some of the -new
U.S. interdiction missiles in Brit
ain. A hint of this was given lost
week to Schmidt when Thatcher`
(dubbed the "Iron Lady" 'by'the,
Soviets) and her foreign secretary, I
Lord Carrington, met with Schmidt
during his two-day visit to Britain.
- "`The Iron-Lady," said a senior.
Whitehall "official;""is in" a resolute"
mood about countering the enor- I
moos Warsaw Pact arms buildup l
and expects her-NATO allies to-be
Armed with. their own nuclear
arsenal, the French take pride in
what they see as a measure of inde-
pendence from the U.S. nuclear
umbrella. Thus, the French posi-
tion on SALT, as stated recently by
President Valerie Giscard d'Esta-
CO.TIrrvFn
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ing, is that France is not concerned
about what the superpowers decide
to do with their own strategic
weapons.
Nevertheless, French analysts
agree that SALT is important be-
cause of the treaty's bearing on
European security and hence on
the time available to the French
government - following a Soviet
attack to unleash its 64
submarine-based and 18 land-based
nuclear missiles.
. One analyst believes Europe will
become a potentially more danger-
ous zone after the treaty, is signed,
because the;relativenuclear.parity.
that; would.be,.established.between
-;:the .United??States and the Soviet
Union would make, the United
States less likely to use its ICBMs%--
and.risla-massive Soviet' retaliation
- merely- to protect the NATO
allies or io avenge a Soviet military;,
incursion..
In French t~.et thi4 makes their* independent nuclear force all the
more essential =`reasoning that'
may underlie the recently an-
nounced decision to modernize
France's nuclear arsenal.
Other well-placed French
sources are less pessimistic. They
argue that the treaty should make a
positive contribution to slowing
the strategic arms race -- provided
the U.S. Minuteman missile force
does not become vulnerable in the
early 1980s to a surprise attack
from Soviet ICBMs. Should the
.Minuteman become vulnerable,
this argument goes,.the French
arsenal will be even more-impor-
tant. .
The French have made clear that
they will not participate in SALT III
negotiations that cover the "gray
areas" of nuclear weaponry - the
so-called forward-based nuclear
weapons systems located in Europe
- or that seek to reduce the grow-
ing stockpile of nuclear warheads
in Europe.
Contributing to this report were
Time-Life News Service corre-
spondents William Mader in Bonn,
Frank Melville.. in London; and,
ChristapheeRedman in Paris ,'
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