THE SALT DELAYS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400380068-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 68
• Publication Date: May 14, 1979
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R00040 0 18r6
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ON PAGE:--._
TI'IE SALT
During a visit to Iowa sixteen months ago,
Jimmy Carter ventured the guess that a
SALT II treaty with the Soviet Union
would be completed "in a few weeks." Last
week, the President was off to Iowa again,
and again he declared that "we are at the'
final stages of negotiation [on] SALT."
In what has become a familiar litany,
other American officials said that an agree-
ment in principle was nearly at hand. But
although Washington and Moscow clearly
wanted a new accord on strategic arms
limitation, taking the last step had proved.
to be far more difficult than either side
expected.
The basic provisions of the new treaty
have been established for two
years, ever,
since President Carter abandoned his futile
attempt to make major changes in the 1974
treaty outline agreed to at Vladivostok by
Gerald Ford and Soviet leader Leonid
Brezhnev. In essence, SALT II will initially
set a ceiling of 2,400 missiles and bombers
for each side, of which 1,320 can have
multiple nuclear warheads (MIRV's). But
the treaty is more than ten times as long as
SALT I and is vastly more complicated,
since it attempts to restrict the quality of
nuclear weapons, not just the raw numbers.
And in recent months, a number of unex-
pected last-minute problems have cropped
up. Among them:
THE FINE PRINT: "The last 10 per cent is
always the toughest to negotiate, especially,
with the Soviets," a veteran Western diplo-
mat in Moscow said last week. Just when
the treaty seemed to be finished in De-
cember, the Russians proposed that cruise
missiles be limited to one warhead each.
The U.S. finally agreed, but by then a
number of items that had once been consid-
ered wrapped up began to come untied.
When Secretary, of State Cyrus Vance and
NEWSWEEK
14 May 1979
Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin
meet this week, they will try to resolve what
appears to be the last issue. SALT II limits
MIRV's to ten warheads each. The-Soviets
want to exempt from that limit dummy
warheads used to confuse defenses. Even if
that question is laid to rest, however, there
is no guarantee that some new problem
won't emerge.
VERIFICATION: The loss of two U.S. moni-
toring stations in Iran has persuadgd many
senators that the Russians can cheat on'
SALT II if they want to. The verification
issue got fresh attention last week when
U .S. officials confirmed news reports that
ttaa 'men ear convnctec-[ofspying in 1977
ha sod Moscow data on U.s. satellite sys-
tems tthat-monitSoviet strategic moves.
At a news conrznc- e, Carter promised
again that SALT II would be "adequately
verified from the first day it is effective."
The Soviets know, he added, that "if we
ever detect any violation ... it might very
well escalate into a nuclear confrontation."
As it happens, the Soviets are being unusu-
ally cooperative these days (box, page 65).
Recently, they promised that they would!
not encode electronic data from their mis-l
site tests if that impedes U.S. verification of
SALT 11.
BREZHNEV'S HEALTH: Strangely, the Sovi-
et President's recent illness has not slowed
down the arms negotiations; in fact, re-
sponses to U.S. proposals are arriving more'
quickly than ever before. "It used to take a
week or so, and now it's been taking only
two or three days," says a top Administra-
tion official. But Brezhnev's fragile health
has added a fresh complication: when and
where he can hold a summit meeting with
Carter to initial the treaty.
In the past two decades, Brezhnev. has
suffered at least two heart attacks and a
stroke,, according to Soviet sources. This,
year, he has failed visibly. His speech is so
badly slurred that it is often incomprehen-
sible, even to his longtime interpreters. His
walk is a stiff legged shuffle, and aides are
constantly at his elbow, alert for a possible
stumble. Brezhnev's eyes appear to have
difficulty focusing. His mind seems to;,
wander and his attention span in official
meetings is said to be less than an hour. "In
my opinion," said one Western diplomat in
Moscow last week, "Brezhnev is in no
condition to negotiate with the President
of the United States or any other high
official."
Originally, Carter wanted to hold five
days of wide-ranging talks with Brezhnev.
Now, one Administration planner frets.
"Everything you hear about Brezhnev is
that there's no one home upstairs. Who
Carter's going to have the discussions with,
I don't know." No. one, apparently. The
summit will probably last only two days-.--
in mid-June, most likely-and will be limit-
ed to formalities.
The last two superpower summits oc-
curred on Soviet soil, but now Brezhnev is
incapable of a return visit to the U.S.; his
doctors will not allow him tofly. Forweeks,
both sides have been considering neutral
ground in Western Europe. Vienna is a
possibility, and recently Stockholm has
emerged as another front runner. In either,
case, Brezhnev would be assured of a rela-
tively easy trip-and a perfunctory ceremo-
n
th
t ..-l,4 be his last hurrah
y
a
FAY SVILLEY with LARS?ERIK NELSON and -
ELEANOR CLIFT in Washington
and FRED COLEMAN in Mos4ow
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400380068-6