ARE WASHINGTON'S DAILY NEWSPAPERS KEEPING YOU INFORMED ABOUT SALT II?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400380120-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 120
• Publication Date: May 1, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

BTICLE AppE .Approved For RelegAgyZQQW/1.E -RDP88-01315R0 40(8 -
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ON pAGE__~
re Washington's Daily
ewspapers Keeping You
reformed About SALT II?
The Washington Starrep+orted
nothing of'what Gen. Graham
said, although it mentioned .,.li
(two days. later) that Graham
made "attacks on the draft treaty."
.The Washington Post
reported nothing of
what Gen. Graham" said
On April 11, Lt. Gen. Daniel Graham, former Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,. was
one of seven experts on U.S. Defense Intelligence who addressed an American Security Council
news conference with more than 50 reporters.
Here is what the former head of our defense intelligence said*
i*
NOT EVEN SALT I SCAN BE VERIFIED
The New Y ork T'iane re ortterd;
p
1The accord could not be- verified.
Lieut..Gen. Daniel 0.: Graham, a former
director of the Defense Intelligence Agen.
cy, said the loss of electronic listening
posts in Itan and the Soviet Union's ac-
quisition of a manual describing an ad-
vanced photo-reconnaissance satellite'.`
had made it impossible to guard against'
Soviet efforts to cheat: He said the Gov-
ernment's assurances 'that the United.
The Baltimore Sun Reported:
Lt. Gea. l aniel Graham, retired director of 'the De-
feiise'lnteft genre Agency and a. coalition co-chairman,
said officials "push themselves, to the point of fraud" in
trying to persuade that the, treaty can be verified.
He cited Russian acquisition of.th,e technical. manual
for the KU-11 'reconnaissance satelfit,, from which they
learned that the vehicle carried' ainerar and, equipment
to relay pictures to ground stations (At?foi er'Central In.
telligence Agency employee was convicted 6f espionage in
the case). The KH-I I was our best hope for venficatian,"
General Graham said.
He scoffed at administration claims that airborne spy
equipment can replace-the lost Iranian monitoring sites..'
SALT II Treaties. cannot be verified and in 'fact,
iven the loss of intelligence capabilities over the
t .year, - SALT I cannot be verified. Why? Be-
ause for one thing we have lost the secrecy that was
nvolved in the KH-11 program, which was the best,
rogram we had for verifying the SALT Treaties--
old by ex-CIA employee Kampelis to the Soviet
nion- for three thousand dollars. The Soviets never
new until they got that manual that in fact that-,
atellite took pictures.. As a matter-of fact when
F, hey saw how that thing 'operated, they obviously
thought that it was collecting signals, and "signals
can, as they have proved in the past, be taken-care
of by encryption of telemetry and other means ..At
least for a year I could count on thel fact that the
Soviets `,wouldn't know. what that satellite wasl
doing: This, would have been a strong supporting,
reason to say .`Yes, we've got a good shot at verifi-
cation." So that. loss was critical,- no matter what
the Administration says about it.._,
cameras zero' in on crucial rocket tests, he said. The gen-
eral said spy planes cannot replace the Iranian sites, and
11 satellites that~could replace them cannot be developed in
Other coalition leaders assailed the, t reaty s failure to
put limits in the Soviet Backfire bomber and the SS-20 - I 1
miealln ;`. a
 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400380120-7
* THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE LOSS IN !
IRAN:
Probably more critical was the loss of those faci-
lities in Iran, which looked down upon the two most
important geographical entities in the Soviet Union,
as far as verification is concerned. It kept a 24-hour
watch, with all sorts of detection devices, all sorts
of intelligence capabilities, on the, place where the
ICBM missiles are launched, and the place where,
the anti-ballistic missiles are launched, or tested by
the Soviet Union ...The 24-hour watch was ex-
tremely critical not only because of what it gathered
directly, from the Soviet testing, but because, that
represented the tip-off which we in intelligence then
used to tell other satellites to zero in on a test that
-.was about to take place or to notify aircraft based
in Alaska to get out and watch for events at the end
of the trajectory. And thus those facilities were,
absolutely critical for verification:. When .this
Administration tells you they can. replace those
capabilities in Turkey, that is fraudulent. You can
not do it because the Caucasus mountains stand be-
tween Turkey and those ranges which were so criti-
cal to verification.
* CARTER-ADMINISTRATION FRAUD
When the Administration says they can fly air-,
planes up there and?do it. fraudulent! There's no
way you can keep an airplane up there 24 hours a
day. Nor is there. any way you can load those tons
and tons of equipment that were necessary to the
Iranian sites on an airplane, -let alone a U-2.
When they tell you they can'replace it with satel-
lites, I'll tell you this; I've been in the business of
putting up intelligence-collecting satellites, and I
'can tell you without anybody gainsaying me that if
today if we. knew precisely what we wanted the en-.
gineers to do, and if it`were technically feasible to
do so, and we said get to work on putting up satel
lites to replace those lost in Iran, there is no ..way
that those satellites could be`producing evidence,
information pertinent to the implementation of this.
treaty until the end of the, treaty period. So that is
fraud that they're putting out, They're putting out,-
fraud because they desperately know that, these
treaties cannot be verified.
* ENCRYPTING (putting into code) TELE-
METRY (signals as to operation of missiles, from
boxes on the missiles-which signals can- be inter-
cepted): ,
They also tacitly agree that one of the positions
that is still to be negotiated with the Soviet Union is
whether or not they-shall or shall not continue to
encrypt their telemetry. from theer missile tests.
They've admitted by their own actions in Geneva
these days that that is not true.
When they make this an issue with the Soviet
Union, how can they then say, as we've said all
along, that things are perfectly verifiable? If it were
true, why bother the. Soviets to get them to stop
something that they have been doing for. four years,,.
that .we. have not complained is. interference with
our national technical means of verification?
* THE. CARTER CRITERION FOR VERIFI
CATION---AND HOW- THE ADMIRAL CAN
MEASURE UP TO IT
If .one believes. that essential equivalents, or
strategic parity, or whatever, term they may be using
next year, may be "tolerable inferiority"-if you
extract the definition .that is suggested by President
Carter himself in his State of the Union message
that one Poseidon submarine can do. so. much
damage that it in itself represents strategic equiva
lence; then what difference does it-make how much
the Soviets cheat on SALT? You could meet the'.
requirements for adequate verification. today with-
out any intelligence capability whatsoever.:.-.
So small wonder that-Turner will come forward
and say Quote Yes, we can adequately verify the
SALT agreements; unquote,:, L , ,.
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