THE FATEFUL ILLUSIONS OF SALT II

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400380124-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 124
• Publication Date: May 1, 1979
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

111-16
Approved T1 ?1MR/Q~1/Y1G~.J~ DP88-01315800040038
Article appeared May 1979
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on page 97 -102 r I
F-1..B.J
FUL I LLJ I $
OF SALT II
A look at the hard
facts behind the most serious
foreign-policy/military-strategy
debate of the decade
- stretching the length of the Soviet
Union, from the Carpathians in
the west to the Stanovoi.Range
in the east, is a deadly constellation
of concrete- 1500 ' intercontinental
bal/istic-missilr silos, About once a
month, an SS-17 or SS-18 is test-fired
from one of them. Then, from a huge
underground "hold building," an-
other missile is drawn to refill the silo.
How many iciws are in these un-
derground buildings? We don't know.
How many additional. missiles are hid-
den in the vast Soviet landmass?Again,
we don't know.
Fox MORE THAN SiX years now, the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks de-
signed to fashion the SALT II treaty
between the United States and the
Soviet Union have produced a thick
smog of political rhetoric'and mysti-
fying mathematics. When you pene-
trate this mist, you encounter two
grave facts:
1. SALT 11 would not limit the num-
ber ofmissiles and nuclear warheads in
the Soviet arsenal Contrary to the
impression fostered by our gov-
ernment, it would merely- limit
launchers, the devices from which
missiles are fired. Accordingly, nu-
clear-weapons limitation, the prima-
ry objective of the United States
when it entered the talks, is not in the
agreement.
2. Despite our satellites, radars and
other electronic sensing devices, we
have been unable to determine the true
size of th e So viet strategic m asile fo rce.
Thus, accurate, unimpeachable data,
the very basis for a rational agree-
ment of any kind, are missing from
In the light' of these facts, the
American people, through their
Congress, must seriously question
whether an arms agreement should,
or even can, be made with the patho-
logically secretive Soviets.
Hidden Story. Common sense
dictates that the most important fac-
tors in assessing Soviet strategic
strength arc the number and charac-
teristics (range, accuracy, destructive
power) of their missiles and war-
h,-ads. From the outset of SALT nego-
tiations, however, it became clear
the Soviets would not share any
such information. And, since it
has been impossible by satellites
and other technical means to gain
complete, accurate knowledge, we I
have been forced to rely on itrmer-
feet and sometimes erroneous intelli-
gence estimates.
A satellite camera cannot see I
through the roof of a missile plant.
Furthermore, the Soviets often move
missiles out of their factories at
night, and in random batches, to
frustrate estimates of their rate of
production. And the four principal
Soviet missile works-at Moscow,
Gorki, Dnepropetrovsk and Bisk-
are frequently hidden by thick cloud
cover.
So, our common sense gave way to
a curious kind of convenience. Since
ICBM silos are extensive constructions
not easily concealed, U S. intelligence
began counting launchers instead of
missiles.,"The primary currency of
the [SALT] negotiations became limits
on the number of launchers, not
limits on missiles or their characteris-
says former SALT negotiator
tics,"
Just how wrong can be judged by
examining the. evolution of Soviet
missile forces. In recent years,. 1200
Soviet ICBMs have been removed
from their silos and replaced by
more sophisticated models. Western
intelligence sources puzzle over
what happened to those izoo "old"
-missiles. Satellite photographs reveal
no trace of where the ICBMS were
taken. (Between. 200 and 30o have
been fired in mass training cxcr-,
cises.) Some may still be nearby, in
the huge factory-like buildings at
each of the 26 ICBM complexes. Oth-
ers may be in extensive underground
installations the Soviets are known
to have been building since World
War II.
The 120o replaced missiles are
only part of the hidden story. An
ICBM must be periodically removed
from its silo for maintenance, such as
replacement of worn guidance gyro-
scopes (constantly spinning inside
the missile). For this reason, Russian
ICBM complexes keep a "mainte-
nance float" of extra missiles. In
addition, there is a "pipeline.float"--
missiles to replace damaged or mal-
functioning ICBMs. These extras
could constitute another 2000 oper-
ational IcsMS beyond the iaoo re-
placed missiles.
Beware a "Breakout." The-possi-
bility of such hidden missiles raises
the question of what the Soviets plan
to do with them. A close examina-
tion of Soviet capability and strategic
doctrine provides a sobering clue.
When American ICBMs are
launched, equipment in their silos is
heavily. damaged by takeoff blast.
580 i l s r ction crews would ;
31
eNdc repair a Minute-
SALT II. . Approved For Rele1 'S101Tlll~ h XdPh$ 1
the wrong currency.
CONTINUED
 Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400380124-3
man silo to fire another missile. !
This is accepted because of our belief
that a nuclear war would be one
great, fiery "spasm" with no second
round.
The Soviets have a decidedly dif-
ferent view: A nuclear war is to be
fought and survived-no matter how
destructive. The U.S.S.R. therefore'
emphasizes the re-use of missile
launchers. The latest Soviet missiles
are encased in a canister with a
compressed-gas generator. The gas l,
pops the missile out of the silo before
the engines ignite to send the missile.
on its way, leaving the silo undam-
aged. With this "cold-launch" tech-
nique-an American idea once
turned down by our Defense De-
partment, then picked up by the
Soviets-U.S. missile experts esti-
mate that the Soviets could launch a
second ICBM from the same silo in as
little as two hours after the first.
When our negotiators brought up
the reload-refire matter in the SALT II
talks, the Soviets agreed not to devel-
op, rest or deploy a "rapid" reload
system-but only after insisting that
their launchers did not fall into this
category. Nevertheless, satellite and
other intelligence indicates that
about half of Soviet silos have been
or will be fitted with cold-launched.;
missiles (SS-17s, SS-18s and newer
ICBMs now being developed).
Many defense analysts are deeply
concerned that the potential hidden
storehouses of Soviet ICBMs, backed
up by this refire capacity, may enable
the U.S.S.R. to achieve a "breakout"
-a sudden deployment of weapons
that, as the Congressional special sub-
committee on SALT put it, "could'
quickly tip the strategic advantage"
in their favor.
Added Worries. Even by the con-
servative estimates used in SALT If,
the Soviets will have at least
7000 thermonuclear warheads by!
1985. Breakout could suddenly add
many more. The United States
stopped production of enriched ura-
nium for nuclear weapons in 1964,+
hoping the Russians would follow
suit. Instead, the Soviets increased,
production and continue it today.
And, though our atmospheric sen-
sors give us a general idea of Soviet
nuclear-weapons-material produc-
tion, without their cooperation we
have no exact knowledge of how
many warheads they are stockpiling.
silo, cranes and service vans at a
launch site. But the uncooperative
Soviets play cat-and-mouse with us
by disguising equipment, encoding
the telemetry coming from a missile
and even hiding its true flight char
acteristics by adding or subtracting'
weight.
Our detective work has recently
become even morcdifficult. The sale
of the operational manual of our
KH-1 I satellite to the Soviets by a
CIA employe has enabled them to
take steps to elude the satellite's'
photographic and electronic sensing
equipment. And the U.S. pullout
from Iran, where we operated an
extensive array of radar and sens-
ing devices, has severely hampered
eavesdropping on prime Soviet test,
ranges.
Intelligence analysts are proud of
our surveillance technology, but they t
feel we may, have been oversold on it
by those eager to promote arms
control. Some spy-satellite cameras
can pick out objects the size of il.pic,
plate. But the cameras can't pene-
trate darkness or clouds. And 11 11
covering the huge Soviet landmass,;
satellite analysts must look. where
they think they will find something.
In the mid-197os the Russians con-
structed four gigantic radar installa-
tions, possibly the largest in thr }
world, near the Arctic Circle. It
was two years before our satellites
`detected all of them,' and then
only after a tip from a defector.
Vast numbers of such Soviet mili-
tary installations have been spotted
by satellites, but remain shrouded in!
mystery. More than 150 'heavily
guarded, ~ Pentagon-size structures,
obviously of high military value,
have been pinpointed all over the.
Soviet Union. But what goes on
inside them?
The limitations of our surveillance
systems make many experienced in-'
telligence analysts incredulous at the
smooth assurances of the State De-
partment and the Arms Control and,
? Disarmament Agency that we will be
able to "verify" SALT H.
Raging Controversy. The Admin-
istration says SALT iI is the "center-
piece" of American foreign policy,
an important step in stopping the
"arms race" while preserving strate-
gic "equivalence." But SALT II critics
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One highly placed intelligence
source in " ashington says, "Alto-
gether there could well be twice as
many warheads in the Soviet arsenal
as our SALT negotiators believe will
be deployed."
An added worry is the SS-16 ICBM.
The Soviets have used two stages of
this large missile to create a smaller,
mobile one-the SS-20. Although a
protocol to SALT II would prohibit ;
deployment of a mobile ICBM system:
before 1981, at least zoo SS-20s have
already been deployed.
The Soviets claim this is an
"intermediate-range" ballistic mis-
silo, poised mainly against NATO
forces in Europe, but one group of
these missiles has been spotted in the
center of the Soviet Union at an:
apparent ICBM installation. And ana-r,
lysts arc wary of Soviet claims that
the SS-20 is not of intercontinental
range. Our.monitoring indicates that
when the Soviets tested it they load-
ed on zooo pounds of ballast. If this
unnecessary weight was eliminated,
the missile could easily be of ICBM.I
range.
And the SS-16 itself is a subject of
concern. Many SS-16 first stages'
were built, but then disappeared.
These first stages could be quickly
mated to the two stages that make up
the SS-20, thus throwing another;
large ICBM into the strategic balance
at some critical moment. Moreover,
an SS-16-in fact, all Soviet ICBMs-
need not be fired from a silo, They
could be launched from virtually any
pre-surveyed (for guidance) site,
even from inside a building with a
I-low many SS-16s and SS-20s are
there? We don't know.
Cat-and-Mouse Game. The Sovi- +
ets can precisely gauge our missile
force simply by attending appropri-
ations hearings on Capitol Hill, read-
ing the aerospace press or looking at
easily obtained maps showing the
nine Air Force bases where our ICBMs
are located. By contrast, trying to
learn about a new Soviet missile
involves imprecise, long-range de-
tective work.
For the most part, we rely on
radar tracking of test firings and the
reading of intercepted telemetry-
the flow of electronic information
sent back to the ground by the
missile itself. Experts further at-
tempt to get a "thumbprint" of a
Cn1?TTr-T 'r
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point to the steady decline of U.S.
strategic strength and the dramatic
growth 'of Soviet power that have
accompanied the protracted negotia-
tions. They see the lack of true
constraints in the treaty and the
concomitant American trend of uni-
lateral arms limitation (cancellation
of the B-1 bomber, delay of the MX
missile) as ensuring the Soviets,
within the next half decade, the
capacity to destroy our ICBM force
while using less than half of their
missile force.
Yet the real problem with SALT
lies outside the treaty--in the great
unknown concerning true Soviet
ballistic-missile and warhead pro-
duction. It seems almost inconceiv-
able that the United States has
allowed so many years of negotia-1
tions (and U.S. concessions) to go by
without obtaining the most rurli
mentary information from the Sovi-
ets about their missile production: A
rational revelation of their strategic
inventory-and. the certain means of
confirming the figures--should have
been the premier and absolutely
non-negotiable demands of the Unit-
ed States. Unless that great unknown
is pierced, SALT it limitations on
"launchers" are meaningless, and
neither an elaborate treaty hoe
the interest of Moscow in true
"peaceful coexistence" can be count-
' cd upon.
Truth or Consequences
The Soviet doctrine regarding the utility of nuclear weapons is quite
different [from ours]. As we arc Finally beginning to realize, the Soviets are
not interested in mutual deterrence and nuclear stalemate. To the Soviets,
clear nuclear superiority is the ultimate weapon of coercive diplomacy
through which they think they could achieve checkmate without having to
fight either a nuclear or a conventional war.
The debate over SALT' II presents a unique opportunity for telling this
truth. If, mesmerized by'old illusions about disarmament and new ones
about detente, we accept the treaty, we will he taking not a step toward
peace but a leap toward the day when a President of the United States may I
have to choose between the surrender of vital national interests and nuclear
holocaust. But if we see the SALT II treaty for what it truly is-American
acquiescence in the Soviet drive for overwhelming military superiority-we
will give ourselves a last chance to restore the strategic balance that is the
only guarantee of peace in the nuclear age. ' .
-Former Under Secretary of State Eugene V. Rostow In Commentary
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