THE KEY SALT ISSUE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400390032-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 32
• Publication Date: April 23, 1979
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

ARTICLE AYPEA~c Ed or Relea~W{/12 ? CIA-RDP88-0131cDnnnA0n rh1 ~ `'((:SBA ti,
ON k'AG 21 Anril 1979
U.S. KH--II satellite passes I over Soviet territory,
carries out `close-look' photography and Jettisons f111Th .
10
FAZ ME D" 4 SA A ~ 1' 7 955 V, Z
fan the United States trust the Soviet
UNon?
One U.S. diplomat who has been labor-
ing through the protracted negotiations for
a second-stage strategic arms limitation
treaty (SALT II) has definite views: "No.
Absolutely not. No. No. No."
The question of Soviet trustworthiness--'
and America's ability to verify compliance
with a SALT pact---dominated debate last
week as Administration spokesmen said
once again that an agreement was at hand..
NEWSWEEK learned that one issue block-
ing a treaty, the definition of a "new type"
of missile, has been resolved, leaving in
dispute only the Soviet practice of encoding
test data. But a mix of new issues-ranging
from the compromise of a surveillance
satellite's secrets to the loss of two electron-
ics eavesdropping stations in Iran-raised
new questions about America's verification
abilities. As one U.S. official put it: "`The
Soviets will take advantage of everything
they can. It is up to us to get a treaty that
they cannot exploit at any level."
The U.S. failed to get that kind of treaty
the first time around. At SALT I, U.S.
negotiators asked for a variety of ways to
monitor Soviet compliann,ce, includin on-
site inspection of missilb~lll?srt4d21?itF
Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger set-
tied fora clause saying merely that neither
side would interfere with the other's "na-
tional technical means of verification." For
the U.S., these include spy satellites, recon-
naissance planes and monitoring stations
along the Soviet border (sketch). In the last
few months, a number of seemingly unre
lated developments have convinced many
Americans that this network of electronic
eyes and ears on Soviet activity is
insufficient:
w U.S. negotiators objected to a new Soviet
method of coding the information beamed
back to earth from their test missiles. This
scrambling of test data-which in SALT
'gobbledygook is called "encrypted telem-
etry"-became one of the handful of issues
that have stymied completion of the SALT
II treaty.
w By paying a mere $3,000 to a former
Central Intelligence Agency clerk named
William Kampiles, the Soviets obtained a
copy of the technical manual for America's
sophisticated KH-11 satellite.
? The revolution in Iran shut down two
electronic monitoring stations that were
used to eavesdrop on Soviet missile tests.
SALT opponents also seized on a report
Rublished b e
in . .
grate Soviet deception stretching bmk to
the SALT I negotiations. Sullivan argues
tithat the Russians insisted on vague defini-
tions of such terms as "heavy" missiles in
the first round of talks-or simply lied
about their capabilities at that time.
. In a speech sponsored by the hawkish
Coalition of Peace through Strength, Lt.
Gen. Daniel Graham, former director of
the Defense Intelligence Agency, said. that
the compromise of the KH-I I satellite and
the loss of the Iranian listening stations
robbed the U.S. of a "24-hour tip-off
process that is absolutely critical to verifi-
cation" of Soviet compliance with SALT
II. "When this Administration tells you
that we can duplicate [the Iranian posts'
intelligence function] in Turkey, that is
fraudulent," Graham charged. He claimed
that the Caucasus Mountains block the
signals from the crucial early stages of
Soviet test flights. And at a breakfast
meeting with reporters, Sen. Howard Ba-
ker of Tennessee said that he was "leaning
against" SALT II. "I don't think there is
any way you can legitimately say that
treaty can be verified," Baker said. -
'VERY SERIOUS DOUBTS': The most public
clash over SALT verification came when
Sen. John Glenn of Ohio-who said he
hoped Carter would eventually produce a
treaty he could sign-aired his reservations
at the ch 'steni f t e Trident submarine
4%. 92, of his speech, Glenn
observed: "With the recent loss of our in-'-
 telligence-gathering capability in Iran, very NO LOOPHOLES?: The Administration ar-
AppromeditbrslRefehmi 06 diQIA-RIDRSSWli3Mf @o040AA(low&4stakes
to verify" SALT II. He had also planned to in SALT I and that this time there won't be
outline three proposals that would "place any loopholes. NEWSWEEK learned that
both nations on the same comparable moni- the Administration has completed plans to
toring base." Both passages were dropped compensate for the monitoring capability
from the delivered speech, but only after a lost with the shutdown of the Iran stations,
half-hour telephone call from Jimmy Car- and that the President is satisfied that the
ter. Carter was furious that Glenn would new arrangement insures adequate verifica-
suggest his own bargaining points while the tion of Soviet compliance. "It doesn't get it
negotiationswere still underway. "There'sa all back," an aide said, "but it's sufficient."
law," said one senior White House aide, Optimists in the Administration still be-
"that the President is charged with negotiat- have that they will be able to persuade the
ing treaties, not senators. This could blow necessary 67 U.S. Senators that SALT II is
the whole damn thing." airtight. Maintaining public support, they
The White House persuaded Glenn to concede, will be tougher. One gambit-under
drop the offending passages, and tacked are- consideration at the White House is the
buttal onto the remarks of Rosalynn Carter, release of one or more satellite photo-
who was also present. "As sure as I'm stand- ? graphs--a possibility made more attractive
ing here today," Mrs. Carter said, "I can tell by the fact that the Soviets now know how
you that when Jimmy signs a SALTtreaty, it the satellite works. "But some officials be-
will be verifiable:' "It is my feeling," she lieve that the photographs,. which must be
added, "that 'premature public debate on subjected to avariety of exotic treatments
issues such as this can be very damaging." before they reveal their secrets, would be
That argument-that the Administra- less than impressive to the untrained eye.
tion cannot respond to critics without jeop-- How much of the U.S. reconnaissance and
ardizing the negotiations themselves-has monitoring capability will the Administra-
"been seized upon by White House aides. tion reveal in order:to ratify SALT II? "To
"There are answers to all the charges," the Senate, everything," said one Adminis-
complains one of them, "but they're three tration official last week. "With the Ameri-
categories above top secret. We can't even can people, it's going to be tougher. People
debate some of this stuff in a closed session are going to have to trust their elected
of the Senate because it's so sensitive." officials."
DAVID BUTLER with DAVID MARTIN,
ELEANOR CLIFT, THOMAS M. DeFRANK
and JOHN J. LINDSAY in Washington
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400390032-4