CIA'S TURNER CONFIRMS IRANIAN SALT INTELLIGENCE LOSS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400390069-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 69
• Publication Date: April 18, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400390069-4
ARTICLE AFFF_ RED DEFENSE SPACE BUSINESS X)AZLY
ON PACE [ , _ 18 APRIL 1979 1^ `'
CIA'S TURNER CONFIRMS IRANIAN SALT INTELLIGENCE LOSS
Testimony to Congress by the director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Adm. Stansfield
Turner, confirms what defense officials were saying earlier this month (Defense/Space
Daily, April 6 -- the intelligence gathering capabilities that were lost with the closing of
the Iranian electronic facilities cannot be replaced before 1984, only a year before the
SALT II agreement would expire.
Turner made his disclosure in a closed door hearing of the Senate Intelligence Com-
mittee last week, the hearing referred to by Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-Ariz.) when he de-
nounced the Administration plan to fill the Iranian intelligence gap loss by using modified
U-2 monitoring aircraft (Defense/Space Daily, April 17). The New York Times reported
that several members of the. committee were upset by Turner's testimony.
Last week Turner dodged reporters' questions on the issue of the Administration's
claim of adequate U. S. verification capability for the SALT agreements. He said it was
not the role of the director of the CIA to judge whether an activity by the Soviet Union
would constitute a violation of a treaty, but a policy function to be performed by the Presi-
dent (Defense/Space. Daily, April. 16).
In a statement issued last week, Adm. Turner said:. "Verification of the SALT treaty
is a policy function ultimately performed by the President of the United States with the-
specialized advice of any individuals and agencies.
"Intelligence and monitoring of the treaty is only one of those inputs. The role of the
director of Central Intelligence is to monitor Soviet performance with respect to the
provisions of the treaty, not to judge whether an activity constitutes a violation of them.
"He gives his best estimate of our national capabilities to monitor the quantity and
quality of the Soviet weapons controlled under the agreement. It is his responsibility to
advise the policy makers on how well he can monitor each of the terms of the treaty.
He will provide full details of his estimates of monitoring capabilities to the Senate in
the course of its debate. "
Several senators, as well as intelligence experts, have challenged the Administration's
claims that it can adequately verify the Soviet Union's compliance with the provisions of
the SALT II agreement, following the loss of the Iranian intelligence stations.
Goldwater, one of the most recent to speak out on this issue, says the Administration's
plans for making up. the loss of the Iranian stations, such as the modified U-2 monitoring
aircraft, do not make sense -- "'If they are so determined to get SALT II approved by the
Senate, why can't they please come forward with some ideas that make sense and that
will work?" .
Sen. John. Glenn (D-Ohio) has taken issue with the Administration on the verification
problem, to the extent that the President asked Glenn to censor his public discussion of
the issue because of its sensitivity, while Rosalynn Carter was armed with a speech
challenging Glenn's willingness to debate the subject publica1' (Defense/Space Daily,
April 11).
The issue, among others in the SALT agreement, has pushed Sen. Howard Baker (R-
Tenn. ) into a "leaning" position against the SALT II treaty. Baker recently said there
is "no way you can legitimately say-that treaty can be verified" (Defense/Space Daily,
April 13).
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Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400390069-4