RUSSIANS SEEN ABLE TO REPLACE MISSILES UNDER WEAKENED PROVISIONS OF SALT II
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP88-01315R000400390099-1
Release Decision:
RIFPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date:
December 3, 2004
Sequence Number:
99
Case Number:
Publication Date:
April 11, 1979
Content Type:
NSPR
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Body:
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R00040039
ARTICLE APPEARED THE WASHINGTON STAR (RED LINE)
ON PAGE.,_,,,__L _.__ 11 April 1979
SOVIETS COULD USE NEW W EAPONNS
'.';~ $ U.{l1 LLtbfl U4. Vile G,,.v, w ?.+ ? .--?- --- - - - - II11Ctear Warneaa iIIai is iOSNea Oul uy
ents have been so whittled down} in SALT II ne?
proyet
".as it.hur.
c
i
l "b
ii
us
ont
nenta
the inter
gotiations that the Sovieto will be able to replace their ties toward earth:
,missile force with new" weapons, according to official + By specifying a new "type," Brown
'` ualified the treaty restriction in a
This is viewed by the 'sources, some.of .the}nSALT si~;nificant way that has not been pub-
,critics,,as. detracting' significantly from." administration sic; lledout.
claim$ that the new strategic arms limitations treaty will". In sspet, sources say, thete is no limi-
constrain not only the quantity but the quality of nuclear
tation to developing and deploying
Successive comproinise in SALT ne-
gotiations have now left limits that
will control the dimensions, launch
weight and throw-weight of missiles.
Launch weight is important-because,
of the amount of fuel carried and;
therefore range, and throw-weight'
determines the size and explosive;
power. of warheads. 1
w These sources say the constraints emerging front the new missiles within the limits of the
"negotiations are not sufficient to prevent the Soviet de- meaty
ployment.of new generations of improved missiles, so This is worrying _ ___some officials in.
long as they fit within the general limits of existing ones.;. the intelligence communtty'who are
The sources familiar with SALT negotiations are un?' responsible for assessing.future pros-,
heovieL-erican strafe-
-' will ing to become publicly involved in a dis~rute on the pe_'ct or t
"subject, however, because of the White Houses major po; gic balance. It is not clear, however,
litical investment in' promoting the adyanttiges of the just what might be the long-term ef-
;:new treaty and playing down any shortcomings. It claims fects on the balance of the Soviets'
that the agreement prevents significant improvements. being ICBMs able to within the lidevelopmitscompletely new,
.
in'further missiles. When it took over the long-running
xA MAJOR administration goal had been to get the. r. $pviet' Union to match the U.S. decision to quit building SALT negotiations two -years ago, the
'successive generations of land based missiles. `I he new Carter administration tried to win
treaty is: intetided to achieve.that; but its success is now Soviet agreement to a number of pa-
' uncettaiii r'' ' i t. t 3 rameters intended to block any re-
`; .. The administration's campaign to`sell SALT II featured placement of existing, land-based,
major speeches last week by Defense Secretary Harold. intercontinental missiles beyond one
'Brown and National Security Adviser zbigniew. Hrze agreed new missile for each side.
zinskl: y ;.
8r,, Brzezinski,said a major accomplishment of SALT.II s , THERE IS NO restriction on new
,that it :`limits each side to developing'and deploying one: submarine-launched intercontinenta ~
;completely new ICBM'(intercontinental ballistic missile)::: missiles except limiting them to 14 re-
:'before 1985." Since t#le treaty is to expire Dec. 31,1985, he! entry vehicles apiece.
aleaut before 1986, The United States has-not built a
~: '-? .: , , : ~ ,
"This provision will inhibit the qualitative expansion" new land-based intercontinental mis-
.r "df `the arms race','! Brzezinski said. He has been emphasiz- sale since the Minuteman was started
.,~ ng for two years the great importance of restricting the 'some two decades ago. During that
improvement of missile quality so that resources di. period, the Soviet Union has de-
;averted from larger quantities of them: would not be used veloped two new generations of mis
Ito make the limited numbers more deadly. sales and is nowworking on another
The tentative treaty now specifies
that each country will be permitted to'
..'flight test and deploy one "new.type"
ICBM smaller than the big' Soviet SS-
113. But -the Soviets have consistently
refused to accept tight limitations on
their test launchings - and,-there-
fore, on what might be deployed as a.
result of testing: , x
The result in negotiations has been
to whittle away the limitations that
the United States sought in order to
get limits that would freeze existing
Soviet missiles to match the U.S.
freeze on Minuteman, *plus the one
exception. The'U.S.,exception is the
NIX missile. The administration has
Approved For Release 2005/O l2e; tP bPr8@_9k0j O 390099-1
ment to' protect it from Soviet attac . ,
d., roVill
BROWN SAID the treaty will "limit
each side to one new ICBM type, with
a maximum of 10 re-entry vehicles."