DECEPTION ALLEGED IN FIRST ARMS TALKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400390104-4
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 104
• Publication Date: April 9, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

ARTICLE AF?W-1W
ON PAGE -_,21-0
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Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-01315R009&U03~9Q104;z4
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NEW YORK TIME S I," 3
9 APRIL 1979
e* 14 1,
DECEPTION ALLEGED.
IN FIRST ARMS TALKS
Ex-Analyst at C.I.A. Says Russians
Misled Nixon and Kissinger,-,
'By DREW MIDDLETON
A former analyst for the Central Intelli
gence Agencyhas charged that President
Nixon and Secretary of State Henry.A:
Kissinger were deceived by the Soviet
Union during negotiations for a limitation
on strategic weapons, and that as a result
they granted concessions and overlooked
.loopholes that enabled the Russians to
camouflage an expansion of nuclear
David S. Sullivan.makes the charges, in
t e nteat- issue :of: Strategic Review,
Which iS a taxuexem>t:-Institution? . that
relies largely on public support and is the
-organ of the United States Strategic Insti-
tute.
Mr. Sullivan was a C.I.A. analyst from
1971 to 1978. He now is legislative assist-
ant on' military affairs and' strategic
weapons Issues to Senator Lloyd M. Bent-
sen, Democrat of Texas.; , ? .
After citing specific instances of Soviet
"deceit," Mr. Sullivan asks whether the
United States "can learn from.its past
mistakes"and apply those lessons to cur-
rent negotiations for a second-stage limi-
tation treaty.
Article Based on secret Analysis
According to qualified sources, the ar-
ticle in,. Strategic Review is based on a
highly classified analysis written by Mr:
Sullivan when he was, in the C.I.A. The
use of such reports is up to the Director of
Mr. lssinger, at a Congressional
briefing on June 15, 1972, made clear the
American interpretation of Article II and
the Administration's definition of a heavy
missile. He cited as safeguards a specific
statement in the agreement "that no mis-
rile larger than a heavyweight light mis-
sile that now exists can be substituted."
He also asserted that a provision forbid-
ding . changes in silo configurations,
meaning underground basing and launch-
ing sites, was a safeguard against the in-
'
troductionof heavy missiles. ' .
T A similar problem arose over the ceil-
ing:on Soviet?submnrine-launched ballis-
y emissiles proposed ,by -the yUnited
tic
i states. .. ?'Y Y
The Russians argued that because they
ilacked' forward submarine bases com-
parable to those of the United states
;Navy in Guam, Spain and Britain, they
should be allowed.larger limits than the
:United States.
Mr. Kissinger accepted the position. He
told a Congressional committee that "be-
cause of the, difference in geography" the
Soviet Union required three nuclear mis-
sile submarines to two American nuclear
submarines.:to be able to keep an equal
number In battle-ready positions.
The article reports, however, that the I
Sovit+r - fJntpA- ?had s already ` completed
development of. the long-range SS-N-8~
submarine-launched missile, which
"would be fired at most United States tar-
gets without leaving its home ports." It
has been deployed since 1972... Ban on Mobile Missiles
President Nixon and Leonid I. Brezh-1
nev, the Soviet leader, were involved in!
negotiating a formal ban on mobile inter-!
-continental ballistic missiles. Mr. Sulli-
van said that the leaders promised each
other that their countries would not build
land-based mobile intercontinental
ballistic missiles. But he notes that Mr.
"Brezhnev refused to write that promise
into the interim agreement..::
Mr. Sullivan, citing "public, sources;"
asserts that the Russians "have produced
and covertly stockpiled" about 100 mo.
bile SS-16's. Mr. Sullivan argues that the
-intermediate ? range. mobile : SS-16 can
easily be upgraded to an intercontential
missile. . r F
The covert stockpiling, the author con-
tends, gives the Russians an equivalent td
a proposed American multiple-aim-point
system of mobile missiles before deploy-
ment of such missiles has been planned or
production begun.
The Russians; Mr. Sullivan adds, have
camouflaged and concealed all SS-16 pro-
duction and development from American
intelligence.
#ilp#gr~dillc~eaNnfi8 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400390104-4
to deal with the most' important United
States goal in SALT I:: constraints on
. Soy _et heavyICBM's.".
Central, intelligence, and no senior.offi-
clals at the C.I.A. were willing to ctom--
went on the Sullivan report. : ;~ +'E ? ,'
Mr. Sullivan. offers three examples of
'what he calls Soviet deception during the
first round of strategic arms discussions.:.
The first instance of deception, he says:,
-involved, what are described as "heavy"
ICBM's, intercontinental ballistic, ms-
sales. In May 1972, the Russians were al=
ready producing a heavy ICBM -the. 55-
19. But the United States proposed, in Ar
ticle It of the strategic arms agreement,
'ghat both parties undertake not to convert
the launchers. of older: missiles into'
t launchers suitable forbeavylCBM's. ?
The Russians could not agree to this
stipulation while they were in the process
of deploying the SS-19, according to Mr.
Sullivan.,.So they refused to agree on a
definition of.a heavy ICBM,. "leaving a