THE LEGACY OF SALT I: SOVIET DECEPTION AND U.S. RETREAT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400390139-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 139
• Publication Date: January 1, 1979
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

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THE LEGACY OF 9ALT I:
SOVIET DECEPTION AND U. S. RETREAT
DAVID S. SULLIVAN
THE AUTHOR: Mr. Sullivan assumed the post of Legis-
lative Assistant for Military Affairs and SALT to Senator
Lloyd Bentsen (D-Tex.) after serving as a strategic analyst
in the Central Intelligence Agency from 1971 to 1976. His
service in the U.S. Marine Corps from 1966 to 1970 included
a tour in Vietnam as a Vietnamese Language and Intelli-
gence Officer. He received a Master's degree in International
Affairs from Columbia University and was editor of Revo-
lutionary War: Western Response (1971), Change and the
Future International System (1972), and the Columbia
Journal of International Affairs. The views expressed in
this article should not be attributed to Senator Bentsen.
IN BRIEF
In SALT I the United States fell victim to Soviet deceit, and to its own gullibility and myopic as-
sumptions. In essence, the United States traded off its superior AB114 technology in return for what
proved to be illusory constraints on Soviet offensive strategic capabilities. Carefully shrouding their.
ongoing and ambitious strategic programs, the Soviets negotiated ceilings that in no way compro-
mised their force goals. They used this deception and loopholes in the SALT agreements both to
camouflage and legitimize a thrust to strategic superiority that will endure at least into the 1980s.
As the debate over the ratification of SALT II gathers, the question becomes ever more insistent:
Has the United States learned from its blatant mistakes or is it destined to compound them, with
ever more dire consequences for its security?
he Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
(SALT) between the United States and
the Soviet Union are significantly
shaping the terrain that will hold the strategic
environment of the future. The SALT I con-
cords of May 1972-October 1977 have been ex-
tended for over a year. Many of their provi-
sions will be continued and expanded in the
emerging SALT II Agreement. In. the mean-
time, awesome strides by the Soviet Union in
strategic programs and weapons deployments
since 1972 have startled many U.S. policy-
makers. Hindsight' illuminates more clearly
Soviet negotiating behavior and intentions in
May 1972 as indicators of future behavior and
intentions. It is therefore vitally important, as
we approach the ratification debate over SALT
II, that we recognize keenly the lessons of the
past.
In casting this backward look, this article
advances five general propositions about the
"arms race" and SALT. The first proposition is
that SALT has not led to true or balanced arms
control. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM)
Treaty of 1972 is not a valid exception to this
statement, nor was the required deactivation of
the .210 old Soviet SS-7 and SS-S interconti
nental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) under the
Interim Agreement on Offensive Systems. The
ABM Treaty in effect limited only U.S.-ABMs;
there is no known evidence that in 1972 the
Soviets planned. to deploy more than the ABM
26 Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-F2DP88-01315R000400390139-6 Strategic Review