HOW NEW STRATEGIC ARMS ACCORD IS EXPECTED TO BE JUDGED BY CONGRESS AND THE PUBLIC

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400390151-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2004
• Sequence Number: 151
• Publication Date: January 23, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-013190bo4190'1'5~'
S irv~.
ON
104 YORK 'L'INES
23 J WI ARY 1979
Cif
rclwst rs.. Ex.. te
rab~gjc.ArmsAccord. oec
udged by. ~or rs an
By DREW MIDDLE MN
Spmxiat t* T?wN+*' York Timm
WASHLNGTON, Jan. 16 --- Administra.
lion supporters of the second treaty to
limit strategic arms agree with its critics
in congress and the. military establish-
ment on one point;. The treaty, when
signed, will provoke... scope will include nnoty
only the-nuclear agreement
MWtarY with the Soviet Union but
Analysis also the entire 'spectrum of
Russian Americaia rela-
tions. ,
Government officials said last week
that they were not sure when the treaty
would be signed, but they appeared tot t Strategic Institute. the strategic m
certain that the remaining differeocts. m t. Mr, Kemp wrote, "must per-
with the Soviet Union would be resolved mit tite United States the rnaintenace of.
and that the pact would the ready to be. strategic forc:es? which can be at least
submitted by spring. i ~- ?- : r. equal to those of the Soviet Union."
'
riais
.,
1972 ac=
waritess concec
with which members of - The interim agreement . oi
ficaticia, of Soviet compliance wi
in the number
butts houses of Congress approach the cepted a Soviet, advantage treao explained by. their 'Intimater- of : intercontinental - ballistic missile, newtreaty and Would theref
i knowleaie add to the
mawl_ is dge of thenegotiations and of the launcheralthough it left.. the United Administrations problems In winalagap.
s,.
probable' shape of the final agreement. States ahead in the number of warheads psous; Even of the all treat}.
mcxs tofng in
tion tins" erzcour ! std in other areas. The two treaties deal with that systems
erifics-
i
stra
rter Admin
,e Ca" aged 'substantial Congressional parties- with launchers rather than missiles..
paean in the negnti thenegoti- ticn-will be difficult. t+Iark M. itrvrenthal,
sting process in Corr A3embers of ironaresa urged for tine Congressional
to prose to. the Russian3 a in in a study p
teaaa
of Cc ?
stin
ar
us
Lib
t
h
h
f
r
g
y
s
-
r
a
e
t
ecy t
y Researcn Service o
tract with the relative sec
rounded the talks that led to the signing of reduction in their' allocation of heavy 1 cited the impact of new technolo.
eement in 1972: I.C.B ff.'s Yivxrs. 326 to 150. `Fhe United ,
cm ttie verification pttx:ess. -
f
irst agr
the
L,F -- States has no missiles whose: a ~arhea3s E,4_
- ... .. "in additiCo to the growing demands (if.
That agreement put ceilings on only According to Mr. Kemp, this proposal ,~,?.. ~~, - -_
load-based and, subm ar lno based balks. " ' . --summarily rejected by the Soviet may,"> he e ' 'there is the related,
tic missiles. The new treaty, whichwould.? Union, never again to be advanced by the problem of the constantly changing and. I
run to 1985, is to limit heavy bot~nbers as United States delegation." improving sophistication of the vneep as
`
on svitem, t , which In turn. sue-
nta
;P
th
g
e
e
medy discussed
well as ballistic missiles, and an accom- ,;;The re
panying three?yean' protocol would re- for this imbalance in strategic weapons is quires more sophisticated. means for
strict the deployment far'the. United States to deploy an ad. verification." "
Under. the new, pct,: ea vatuceci I:C.B M system of more than 200 . Others, he Mr. Kemp, cite "a p rs~1
i eat and continuing pattern of Soviet ac
.? ,v
d
i
oa
j
, would have equal' numlxra;?Of amts; Mobile miscues with ttef%V paY
to conceal weapons de*
which would require a an redsictitxr iii of between 7,c0D and 8,000 pounds. ? " designed
h Ploy t and research and dev,mlopcneat.
h
at suc
tion sources said t
I
the Soviet arsenal of 154. to 200 missiles Administra and btsmb'ers. The most; tontsov~ersial a plation could lead-to an. ltensifica He cites Soviet ~t of de+pivy~-
aspect of the 1972 accord was the paten- titan of .the nuclear arms: race that tae' meat of SS-16 and 55:20 missiles and the
tial 40 percent advantage it gave Mos +-" ireRt9 is expected to slow if rto~t stoop masking of silo doors and Less covering of
i ile9. The ;new; agreement- nuclear submarine construction with i
in total, mass STABU-M . ;:. _
s s r CaIrSB3.
wold put a ceiliisgtit 2,ZO -ore each sides Stability In the context of the new NATO
b
u strategic aeiesgs There- would also
e treaty mem~ that as a result of the treaty The' protection of allied security identical
such the on selected r s missiles th neither aide would be tempted by nuclear ests under the new treaty is a prime ob-
? ? . - jective of most senior officers and marry
ries such as the number of missiles with :
ch a fi st strike
l
.
aun
superiority us
multiple warheeids. e - ". N > state Department officials. ? .
The new agreement Would take the ' United States strategic theory is based
etra nuclear force capable of a _ Their anxiety is that treaty constraints,.
to
P
ms moll
first step toward limiting ar retaliatory .second strike. For this, the on the range or deployment of cruise mss.
roust tae reasonably siles will create a schism in NATO, whose
ration. Although the 1972 pact did
Nav
A
t
F
y
?
e ar
or
d I Air
thee neviaccort n- - mention the subject, ! sure that their nuclear forces will not.toe Powerful members, West Germany; i
posses limited arms on the mc~isiuisa- t crippled Ina first strike: ,r : .: ..Britain and France, believe that the long I
tion of existing g armatsd staCal>