SKULDUGGERY, THE SATELLITE AND SALT

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP88-01315R000400400011-5
Release Decision: 
RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 16, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 9, 2004
Sequence Number: 
11
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
December 3, 1978
Content Type: 
NSPR
File: 
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PDF icon CIA-RDP88-01315R000400400011-5.pdf117.62 KB
Body: 
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 CIA-RDP88-01315R000#0041L5I1_~ `TIC 2 PEA WASI TGTON STAR 3 DECEMBER 1978 Early this year a junior clerk in the CIA doing night duty at the operations center in Langley,. Va., spotted a manual on a desk. stuck it into his briefcase, and took?ft: home. On March-2, he sold this document to a Russian. in .Athens .for $3,000.: Now listen carefully.....: - . .: ==ti Returning to the United St ites;'the young,. man wrote to. a:: foriuer? col- league-irr'CIA advising.hirr%;that.ihe Soviet Union had offered`money'.to in- duce the.. clerk- to :transmit.; secret inforrriation. This bizarre: communi- cation: alerted the:agency,. to? one.al- most certain, and'=ahother probable, piece.of bad news.: The first was. that the young clerk. had, already turned something. over . to=.:=the. Russians. Why?'-'Because- even the KGB_has traditions; and_one?of them, very well established, is that cash- is paid: not. for prospective, butfor past services. The KGB. ini the words of Michael Ledeen in.:Newt;York Magazine, does not buy "on spec:" But if the clerk. William Kampiies is. his name;; whose-letter suggested that it might be useful to=the.agency if he trans mitted :"disinformation'. to the--Rus- sians, i.e. information' designed to- KG B ow the off the track.. took. a. C k ; 1: Gr j 1- t`t - t l step which would clearly lead to an accurate even than the photograph investigation of him as someone who themselves on which we have bee had almost certainly. already com- relying. which:.are dropped by para mitted a crime, why did the KGB en- chute from our workhorse satellites courage him to make the offer?-In ef= intercepted , by airplanes, and de. feet; to burn him. The. supposition is veloped in our laboratories. - - that;the .CIA would in: due course It is bad enough that the Soviet have;,disc'overed the identity of the Union now knows what are the far stole,-document, and: that....the. clerk. reaches of` our surveillance technol- who:stoleit must be thought to have, ogy, but what is worse is that anyone been:r'the, man solely responsible. whor. knows. what it is we have, and Why '::'Because there was -= is..- how we bring it off; can reason effort- someone else, higher. up, in the lessly into. how- tomake it: inopera agency';mho: was critical to the entire. tive. :. = Y operation..-The word they use in the spy world is a "mole." s- The:. KH-l I; for all .its .extraordi- :; nary sophistication; is, one .learns, .What-' *e did, find.out: 'was what 'forlornly' vulnerable All you -need to Kampiles.gave to. the Russians, sim- :.know is just how it:works in order to ply put, probably the most-important develop something which causes it to piece. of technological information -become instantly inoperative:".t. stolen from the agency since: 1960 - ...Now the bearing of this develop. the. supersecret KH-11 manual'. What ment on- SALT II', is crucial, because the KH-11 does is transmit:?.d1rectly, 'SALT II, -like -its predecessor; .de-, from.a-distance-as:great a& 300 miles '.pends entirely on the verifiable good above:rthe earth. electronics signals .:::faith of the---contracting partners.. A that: can distinguish between.` ugly-;'provision of the SALT Treaty called and 'handsome Russians,.. even -or no.effort' by either party to dis- through: cloud 'cover. That: informa- 'simulate; or to get in the way of the- tion is.,reproduced on a digital receive other party's instruments of detec- ing set'which'composes facsimiles of tion.. Needless.. to-say;.: -the : Soviet the photographed information more Union cheated, a& former. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird revealed in an article for-.the. .Reader's::Digest early in the year.-But they cheated on the ground.-They*did-not attempt to interfere with our-satellites. There would. not be??much point ini doing so unless they'-were- prepared: to.:go to: war. And they did not have-the con-: clusive technology to knock oursatei-` litesdowry. _-".- ? - . - :'. :w .:_.~;-r.:. - But now- that- they--,are _on. to- ou'r` KH-11,:which was' the "wild card~in: our surveillance- system; -giving.us'z that incremental protection*, indis;4 pensable to our well-being. the Soviet Union can get-on with-its 'killer'satel-= lite. program, lookingtforward to-the hypothetical'=day wheys-it carr'simtul-:- taneously?' knack'`down-the- conventional satellites; and blindthe~ KH=11: -`So that we_havec-prima facie evi dente that there is- infiltration in the, CIA; and we-have a factor in respect of SALT II that raises questions as to the feasibility of any understanding whatever. There are men in America: who would trust. the - Russians, even without invulnerable systems of vest!. fication- One ho es they are not run- Approved For Release 2005/01/12: CIA-RDP88-0131$ Q14 r".