CAN THERE BE A SALT III?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400400024-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: August 28, 1978
• Content Type: NSPR

WALL STREET JOURNAL 28 AUGUST 1978, Pg 10
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315ROO040040O J -i-kc
By I{SNNSSTH AMMAN,
Over the coming leglslanve season, the
Senate will a: sume center stage with its
SALT 11 ratification debate. Some observ-
er; feel there's a Food chance it will ap-
pro. ch the drama and excitement of its
2919-2u debate over the Versailles Treaty
and membership in the League of Nations.
. Ragardless of the Senate's response be-
fore the final curtain fair, SALT II Is des-
tined to become the last act In the current
era of nuclear arms negotiations. The Car,
ter administration may profesv..th*t ratifi-
cation of SALT 11 is essential for the really
serloua arms control measures anticipated
for S:kLT III. But it cannot stop the train of
history, which precludes a SALT III per so.
Technological and political forces compel a
new generation of nuclear arms negotia-
tions. one quite distinct from SALT I and II
In three key respects.
First, the measwrementx.of U.S.-Soviet
strategic force must be altered. In SALT I
and 11, nuclear launch vehicles (i.e. Inter-
continental missiles, and later, bombers)
represented the primary measure of stra-
tegic strength. This was quite convenient
since satellite photography could verity a
treaty based on this one element.
Soviet Frogreys
Strategic might, however, can no longer
he comfortably oquated' with this dingle'
measure. Due to technological break-
throughs and the dictates of SALT I itself,
recent Soviet progress has been most Im-
pressive precisely in other areas of the
strategic equation; in PIIRV)ng their mis-
siles, augmenting civil defense, launching
'sitter satellites (which threaten our com-
munications and control systems) and Im-
proving ICBM accuracy (which enables
them to more than double the destructive
power of their already awesome heavy
missiles). The U.S. in turn has accelerated
cruise missile technology.
These areas have become. essential In
appraising strategic strength. But they
defy reliable verification via satellite, a
critical consideration since no administra-
tion or Senate would consent to a nonverift-
able nuclear arms treaty with the Soviets.
To do so would be-as Dr. Johnson once
said about second marriages-a triumph of
hope over experience. It Is sad but true
that weapons technology is outpacing the
capabilities. of acceptable Intelligence
means to monitor strategic systems.
Second, the type of weapons Included in
the negotiations must be expanded to en-
compass those based In or targeting West?
ern Europe. SALT I and II covered inter
continental systems, U.S.; and Soviet-based
systems capable of striking the other.
Again technology has rendered a verita-
ble myriad of nuclear weapons with less
than Intercontinental range. These "gray
area" systems-which defy the previously
valid black/w'hlte dichotomy of strata-
gtc/tactical systems-Include Soviet weap-
ons aimed at Europe (e.g. the 58.20 mobile primarily one of arms control. it would more than minor tinkerings in their de-
missile and the Backttre,bomber) and Hu- awaken Americans from their torpor to the tense programs because of SALT. It is
rope-based systems targeting the U.S.S.R. stark fact that SALT, 'or any variant time that Americans did likewise. It this be
(e.g. air-launched cruise missiles, aircraft thereof, is simply Incapable of halting the the ultimate price for SALT I or SALT II
carriers to the Mediterranean. and nucie- Soviet strategic buildup. Indeed, since (if miraculously ratified by the Senate)
ar-armed missll* for European. deploy- SALT I the Soviet Union has deployed four
merit in the 19" now p P- 'M - RL+ A1914/deW IfA~ F~?8=0~~ a t accard" it
impact of the loss of American strategic
superiority and unrelenting Soviet buildup
is sinking Into the political consciousness of
Europeans, making them increasingly dis-
h untied at remaining mere spectators. In-
claaion In any subsequent negotiations of
the "gray area" systems, which even more
directly affect their fate, would oblige on-
stage European participation.
In short, future nuclear an y% negotla-
tt ns must be broadened In these three
ways. Even SALT ;II may have to undergo
alteration along these lines before final
Senate ratification is possible.
Over the long haul, such expanded nego-
tiations. will prove vastly more confounding
Regardless of the Sen-
ate's response before the
f iri'al curtaim falls, SALT II
is destined to become the
last act in the current era
of m4clear arms negotiations.
and Intricate than even the tortuous SALT
process to date. I=:votal negotiations on
technically perplexing matters in such a
multilateral framework-one Involving a
dozen nations on the Western side alone-
will prove a staggering diplomatic task In-
deed. The long-dormant troop reduction
talks in Europe (MBFR) offer little
groupda for optimism.
What it such expanded negotiations
were to prove infeasible? What If the SALT
process were flung on the dungheap of his-
tory, as the Soviet propagandist phrase
goes?
Many would justifiably lament the loss
of a continual, high-level forum for the su-
perpowers to discuss this critical topic.
SALT would be missed as` a means
whereby both sides admit. strategic parity
so that neither claims superiority. If
adroitly handled, SALT could have proven
marginally useful in enhancing crisis sta-
bility, reducing the arms race and warm-
ing relations a degree or two with Moscow.
The end of SALT would In fact sound the
death knell of detente, 1972-style, because
SALT now stands as the sole remnant of a
once-trumpeted network of relations bind-
ing together the superpo'wers' fate and wel-
fare.
But the mourning period for SALT may
be fleeting. The International atmosphere
would be healthier, though decidedly not
cheerier, without the sanctification of
SALT. A stable U.S.-Soviet-'truce based on
mutual distrust Is preferabiip tb aberrations
of friendship accompanied by unsavory po-'
litical and military Soviet conduct.
The burial of SALT would resurrect
U.S. strategic programs as first and fore-
most a matter of national security and not
This vastly Unequal momentumfof U.S.
U.S.S.R. strategic programs will not van-
ish; the CIA now estimates Soviet strategic
spending at three times that of the U.S.
with no relief In Night.
The demise of SALT could prove most
valuable In ending a series of Egregious,
American delusions on Soviet intentions.
The series dates hack at least to the
spring of 1965 when a proud Defense Secre-
tary McNamara beamed during an Inter-
view that the Soviets have deelded that
they have lost the quantitative" strategic
arms race and, better yet, '?are not seek-
ing to engage us in that contest." Lest the
point be missed, he added: "There Is no In-
dication that the Soviets are seeking to de-
velop rr strategic nuclear force as large as
ours." Now Mr. McNamara's successor
must reckon with Soviet strategic equality
if not superiority. According to a compel-
ling Defense Nuclear Agency study, the
U.S.S.R. today leads the U.B. in 33 of 41
categories of strategic power.
Such delusions continue apace. Last
April, Secretary Vance waxed eloquent on
how conclusion of a SALT It accord "will
begin to change the whole character of the
[Soviet-Americanl relationship, put it on
the right track again something SALT t
failed miserably to do and the far more dtt-
blous SALT II is palpably Incapable of
achieving. Last July, he raised the ante yet
higher by claiming that suspension of the
SALT talks would increase "the danger of
mutual annihilation." To take the Secre-
tary's logic seriously, one rnLW imagine a
Senate turndown of SALT It conceivably
provoking an enraged Kremlin to unleash
the nukes. One hopes the Soviets are more
prudent.
Mr. Carter's Rhetoric
Mr. Carter assumed office vacuously
considering SALT It imperative to betin
"eliminating nuclear weapons from the
face of the earth." The President now por-
trays SALT as an alternative to "the re-
sumption of a massive nuclear arms race'
which would be exceedingly costly for both
Moscow. and Washington. Such- rhetoric
flies in the face of more scrupulous analy-
sis. A recently published CIA report, for
example, concludes that SALT II "would
not, in Itself, significantly alter" future So-
viet defense spending. Such spending is ex-
pected to grow 4%'5% per year-much as
it has done over past decades. regardless of
poor harvests, Industrial setbacks, the
chilling of the Cold War or the warming of
detente.
Stich delusions are distinctly Amerleaa.
The Soviet Union, for all Its innumerable
sins, cannot be condemned for their props.-
gallon. Unlike the Americans. Kremlin
leaders have been most circurmpect In
their claims for SALT. Again unlike the
Americans, Russian military and strategic
writings mention SALT peripherally it at
Third, the number of actors on the under development, and a new bomber.
stage of nuclear arms negotiation`s must= The, U.S. meanwhile has tested and can- ? Mr. Adelrnan aunt assistant to the Secre-