TRYING TO SOOTHE SALT'S CRITICS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400400026-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: March 13, 1978
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R0004004 1.. S 4 L7-
ARTICLE APP,.4RED
ON PAGE 2
TIM1;.
13 March 1978
Trying to Soothe ALT'S Critics
The Administration claims the Soviets are playingfair
R 4 e have had five years of moni-
If Loring Soviet compliance with the
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, and
{ the record to date has been generally
good."
So insisted a U.S. arms-control ex-
pert last week as the Carter Admin-
istration stepped up its efforts to soften
opposition in Congress to a new SALT
treaty. The old pact expired in October,
but the U.S. and Soviet Union have agreed
to continue abiding by it while negoti=
ators in Geneva bargain on a SALT 11
treaty.
If they reach an accord, it will have
to be ratified by the Senate .before tak-
ing effect. But fears persist on Capitol
Hill that the Soviets have underhandedly
violated the old SALT agreement and can-
not be trusted to keep a new one. In-
deed, former Defense Secretary Melvin
Laird accused Moscow of exactly that
in. a recent article in the Reader's Digest
titled, Arms Control: The Russians Are
Cheating!
In an 18-page report given to the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee last
week, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance ad-
mits that the Soviets have taken full ad-
vantage of loopholes in the old treaty and
operated at its uppermost limits. None-
theless, the report concludes that Moscow
has not committed any clear-cut viola-
tions Of SALT I.
The report is based largely on the
supersecret proceedings of the Standing
Consultative Commission in Geneva,
which is a joint U.S.-Soviet grievance
board for monitoring SALT I, and the
National Security Council's Verification
Panel. By making the information pub-
lic, the Administration sought to refute
Laird's charges, . as well as those made
by other SALT opponents. The chief
points:
- In 1973, the U.S. suspected (presumably
on evidence from spy satellites) that the
Soviets were violating the treaty by build-
ing new missile silos. When challenged,
the Russians explained that the instal-
lations were actually new bunkers for mis-
sile technicians and thus not prohibited.
According to the report, further inves-
tigation by U.S. intelligence sources de- report is a real whitewash. We intend to
termined that the Soviets were telling
the truth.
- In 1973 and 1974, the U.S. spotted
the Soviets using an antiaircraft radar
system to track one of their own mis-
siles in flight. The U.S. questioned wheth-
er the Soviets were illegally converting
antiaircraft defenses into an antiballistic
missile system. But the Soviets maintained
go over it line by line."
The debate over SALT was heated up
even more last week by new evidence of
possible Soviet transgressions, ones the
Vance report does not. address. According
to some Defense Department analysts,
Moscow is operating 64 ballistic-missile
submarines-two more than the ceiling
set by SALT I. Other U.S. analysts argue
that they were using the radar only to i that . because the two extra. subs have
test the rocket's navigation system. Still, not yet been sent out on patrol, the So-
notes the report, the radar activity ceased viets have not exceeded the limit. More-
"a short time later." over, three additional new Soviet Delta-
I,- In 1974, the U.S. thought that the So- class missile subs have been. rigged and
viets might be breaking the treaty by tak-
ing steps, not spelled out in the report,
that could enable them eventually to con-
are ready for sea trials, but they also
have not been used on patrols. Thus, I
says a US. Navy intelligence officer,
ceal installations from U.S. spy satellites. "right now it is official judgment that no
When the U.S. complained, the Soviets . hard evidence of Soviet violations exists.
stopped the activities. though we do agree that they are push-
. In 1975, the Soviets began deploying ing right out to the edges."
monster SS-18 super-rockets, which can
carry as many as eight independently tar-
getable warheads, despite a treaty pro-
vision that forbids the converting of land-
based "light" ICBM launchers into vehicles
for "heavy" ones. But since SALT I does
not define "light" and "heavy," the Ad-
ministration decided that there was no
violation. The report promises that this
loophole will be closed in SALT U.
The report also discloses that the So-
viets questioned whether the U.S. was vi-
olating SALT I on five occasions, though
all of the queries were later withdrawn.
In one case, the Russians objected to tem-
porary shelters used to protect U.S. Min-
uteman missile silos from rain and snow
while they were being rebuilt, beginning
in 1973. After the U.S. reduced the size
of the shelters by half, the Soviets dropped
the matter.
Senate supporters of SALT predictably
praised the report. Said Democrat John
Culver of Iowa: "It should lay to rest at-
tempts to undermine arms-limitation ef-
forts." Added Democrat Gary Hart of
Colorado: "Tile U.S. has been vigilant."
But opponents, who are led by Wash-
ington Senator Scoop Jackson, were far
from satisfied. Said an aide to one prom-
inent Senate skeptic: "The compliance
At the same time, as the Administration
was trying to soothe U.S. critics of
SALT, President Carter was warning the
Soviets that their military intervention
in Ethiopia was straining relations with
the U.S. and jeopardizing SALT It's chanc-
es. He carefully noted that. the Admin-
istration was not linking the war in the
Horn of Africa with the arms-limitation
talks. But, he added, Soviet actions could
"lessen the confidence of the American
people in the ... peaceful intentions of
the Soviet Union." Carter's point: alarm
in the Senate over Soviet intervention in
the war between Ethiopia and. Somalia
might cause any SALT treaty to be re-
jected. In short, only the Russians. can
keep SALT 11 from getting caught be-
tween the Horn and the Hill. a
Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400400026-9