THE RUSSIANS EXPECT ARMS CONTROL TO FAIL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400400033-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 9, 2004
• Sequence Number: 33
• Publication Date: November 17, 1977
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Release 2005/01/12 : CIA-RDP88-01315R000400400033-1
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17 November 1977 Cpp j
.4-hu x-IUSSIC"a'.11S.",
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LT`_GEN.
DA1 iELi
GRAHAM.
-U.S. ARINY (RET.) '
i'Lenin. `the revered mentor of. all good Com-
munists once said;"Treaties are like pie crusts
made to be- broken. He was responding to, com-
plaints that the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk which he had.
negotiated during World War I with - the Central
Powers was detrimental to Russian interests. e.g. it.
set up an independent Ukraine. He make these
words come true as soon as Germany was beaten
and' in 1918-he *repudiated the treaty. The?Soviets
therj signed new treaties delineating the boundaries
of the USSR with the Baltic States Finalnd
Rumania Czechoslovakia Germany and Poland.'
As soon as the Kremlin felt strong enough to break;
those treaties. all were broken and all or part of
those countries annexed to the Soviet Union.
These broken agreements are but a sampler of the':
Soviet view of treaties as "pie crusts." One recent
.example is the Soviet scrapping of the Montreux.;:
Convention concerning the passage of warships..4
through the Dardanelles. That convention denies`
passage through?those strategic straits for the air=
.craft 'carriers of all nations This was fine for the
Russians in 1936 when they had no aircraft carriers;.
It prevented naval power of the Western countries'
from entering the.Black Sac. But in the early 1970s
when the USSR had acquired aircraft carriers they
broke the treaty. They correctly judged that the other
signatories would lack the will to enforce the treaty
and. now regularly pass carriers through the Dar- .`
dan& Ies.?,., :.,..:.... r, ....;
Against this' continuing background of `Soviet
cynicism about treaties it is astonishing to see the
(United States Government and a highly- vocal seg. ?.`,
s?ment of public opinion so determined to trust the"`.
;.future of America to the signature of Leninist Soviet'
leaders' in ' arms -control treaties. Following' suit
Western .,businessmen and financial institutions
.enter Into agreements with the Soviets as if the old
maxim. "a deal is a dean" carries weight with the
Marxist-Leninists with whom they bargain.
' The arms control enthusiasts not only choose to.
.Ignore the ample historical evidence of Soviet
cynicism about treaties they blind themselves to the
ominous current evidence from the massive Soviet
arms buildup that the Kremlin considers SALT
agreements as "pie crusts." It is quite clear from
U.S. intelligence that the Soviets are preparing a
be
.breakout.. capability In ?stragegic' nuclear ar-
maments. In the missile field -- despite U.S. in-
sistence that mobile intercontinental ballistic mis-
sites (ICBMs) are contrary to the principles of SALT I
-- the Soveits have developed and are deploying
them. Furthermore At+ltfr~ipags)sFI~2[ 2'd9S
counted in SALT neg t ations.
The Soviets have developed a mobile three-stage
'solid fueled ICBM, the SS-16. But. they are deploy- I
Ing it minus one stage which rr akes it a less-than-
intercontinental range missile. Intelligence experts
expect the Soviets to IijoId about 1, 000 such missiles
over the next several years. When this deployment is
complete the Soviets will have the capability to in-
crease their already ominous advantage over us in
ICBMs to over two to one (2 600-plus Soviet mis-
siles to the U.S. 1,0541 by the relatively' simple
means of strapping on the third stage.
. In the strategic bomber field the Soviets have an
even more easily executed "breakout" capability.
The Soviet equivalent of the B-1,. the Backfire has
been in production for several years and is replacing
older strategic bombers in the Soviet Long Range
Aviation units. There is absolutely no disagreement
amon LI.S.'Intelli a agencies tha the c -fire
has a capability to drop nuclear bombs on the
.tte&LStates. But the Soviets enormous y assists-ir
by S:_arms centre a~sf..,;hi !r- p- tmt?
managed to at our arms controllers to exclude this
: supersonic aircraft from the SALT numbers gam"i5n
the roue s t at oscow does not intend to use the
61ac ire againstst t Ste' eanw iiie tt era aging sub-
sonic `B=5a er counted.) '
Bas _aue1aec about how man Soviet Backfire'
bombers will be decd_oXed ranria between 50t? nd
700. Their status as threats to trio 'Um a States
depends only on the orders to their craws: Their
effectiveness could be essential. They can reach.
most targets in the United States without refueling.
.Thus the Backfire represents an almost instant
breakout capability which would give the Soveits
numerical superiority in intercontinental, nuclear
bombers. Worse yet the Soviet bombers would have
easy-going against feeble U.S. air defenses -while
U.S. bombers would be. confronted by "massive
Soviet air defenses.
There is more to the story of Moscowc'si
.preparations bor the breaking of the SALT "pie
.crust"? but suffice it to say that-With their new
mobile', missiles and new strategic bombers . the
Soviets will be able to scrap the SALT treaties five
,years from now and.-do so to their . enormous
strategic advantage. - = ; ' ? '? N.
Given the cancellation stretch-out and neglect of ,
our own strategic capabilities by those who prefer to 1
ignore the lessons of the past and the realities of the
present we may In five years find ourselves unable
to reenter the competition fast enough to prevent
overwhelming Soviet superiority. When and if the
1/12 :` or t ew 81 ~r3"tb"Mm n acqu esce.