USE --- OR MISUSE --- OF INTELLIGENCE TO SUPPORT POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01315R000400400053-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 8, 2004
• Sequence Number: 53
• Publication Date: March 24, 1976
• Content Type: NSPR

Has an o d-art reached a new peak under Kissinger?
category of insinuations that make
the rounds," he comments.
Several other officials and con-
gressional sources point in the direc-
tion of that senior official's opera-
tions, if not at him personally, as one
of the major areas of the selective
intelligence use that he denies.
General policies are framed on the
basis of. overall intelligence evalua-
tions. Decisions are made on what is
generally desirable for the United
States, like a cease-fire in Vietnam,
a strategic armaments limitations
trey `y (SALT) with the Soviet Union,
an interim Sinai settlement in the
Middle East, or a new weapons sys= 11
tem.
But then new developments, newly
received information an old situa
tions, or fresh analyses of problems 1
can sometimes poke holes in policies.
Awkward facts that argue against
decisions can appear. If the decision
was a controversial one in the first
place, as many major policies are,
then new facts can reopen and
threaten to change it.
The tendency, ? therefofe, some-
times is.. to-'try to adapt the intelli-
gence to the policy, rather than the
other way around some officials say.l
..%"'re."keyhole questioning" method 1
is putting very -tightly defined re-' 1
quests for specific answers to the
intelligence community,:-.primarily
.'.to the CIA - withnut giving the con-
text in, which-, the answer is going to
be used or allcw ing any surrounding
circumstances to,~,.be considered.
These amount to loaded questions.
IF THE FIRST 'question draws an
answer that does not weep, to justify-1
the policy course already decided
upon, then another one is framed,
"just three degrees to one side,
enough to force another study, in
hopes of getting a different answer,
one official explained.
One source calls it "keyhole ques-
tioning."
The way a number of present and
former government officials describe
it, auestions are framed by the
administration so narrowly as to
elicit responses from the U.S. intelli-
gence community that will support
predetermined" policies.
There are other techniques for the
selective use of intelligence, too.
Sometimes a branch of tie adminis-
tration re ects. intelligence findings,
insisting that some factors have been
ignored, until finally.a useful finding
is made.
What several ottacials call "play-
ing the intelligence game" is an old
bureaucratic art.
They say it was brought to a new
peak of refinement anti' a new fre-
quency of use when- Dr. Henry A.
Kissinger was the presidential advis-
er on national security, and it contin-
ues with Kissinger as secretary of
state in charge of arms control ne-
gotiations with Moscow. Other parts
of the bureaucracy also play the
game.
A senior administration official in-
volved in the reorganization of thc.
U.S. intelligence community under.
President Ford's Feb. 18 executive
-order says the changes now being
-made will not prevent such abuses or
intelligence.
MATERIAL STILL can be ordered
from the CIA, the Pentagon's De-
fense Intelligence Agency, the State
Department's Bureau of Intelligence
ana Research, and other parts of the
community in ways that will fit it
into top policymakers' preconcep-
tions.
One senior official involved in
major policy decisions, who de-
scribes himself as "an avid consum-
-r of intelligence," says he is una-
.vare of leading questions being
Submitted i.o the intelligence com-
-nu5- ty. "These charges fit into the
This can go on for some 1 l~9 ! 6 co t'f (ii r;
time, until finally the in-
mula
f
or
qquirer hits upon a
that yields an answer that .> L
'
then can be used in bui?ed
cratic debates to support
the policy. Earlier ques-
tions and answers are
quietly forgotten. .
A current case in point
involves a Soviet supersonic
bomber with the Western
code name of Backfire.
When Kissinger arranged
the preliminary agreement
for a second SALT treaty
with the Soviet Union in
November 1974, Backfire
was not included within the
limitations. The Pentacon
objected that the plane has
the capability at striking
the United States. from
C 31 Wt,e n etviv e. I
Soviet territory, and there-
fore had to. be counted.
Moscow denied that it was
an intercontinental bomber,
arguing that it was proper-
ly excluded from the agree-
ment.
This objection has been a
major stumbling block in
turning the agreement into j
the treaty that Kissinger
and his top advisers seek.
for overall policy reasons.
They have argued in the
National Security 'Council
that Backfire slid not de-
serve to be counted.
Backfire also has been a
problem within the Penta-
gon, since it affects arms
programs of the United
States.
Eight intelligence studies
of the Backfire's range ? .:t
potential have been made.
mach one showed that it
cou;d reach the United
States.
According to one source
who reflects suspicion'- of
Approved
Approved For Release 20
`t'714 I. F r~~'z7'D17 P -91 C7 04 4?005~ 9 0/ IJ S C?
2i A'[arch 1971, l Gc/1 ",?,a;, U- -Ae
By Henry S. Bradsher
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