HELMS OF THE CIA: INVISIBLE MAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01350R000200050016-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 17, 2004
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: October 14, 1979
• Content Type: NSPR

Approved For Releasi:I- 0q(A19111~ JRbEIAbDP88-013
14 October 1979
Helms of the
The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard
Helms and the CIA.. By Thomas
Powers. 393 pages. Knopf: $12.95.
The writer on intelligence affairs faces
many-of the same difficulties as the intel-
ligence~ officer. The information he re-
ceives'may be wrong: or incomplete or
self-serving. Even if every bit of it is accu-
rate,-he may still be lacking that final
piece; the last fact, that could change the
picture's focus and. meaning.. Worse, he
may not know there is anything missing at
all:, -,x
Thomas- Powers,. in his ' introduction :to
this-solid, insightful study of the Central
Intelligence Agency and, theman who,
headed it for seven crucial years, admits.-
encountering a? "chronic incompleteness"
as he attempted to piece together his ac-
count of the CIA's activities ~ over. the
years: In a fascinating passage'describing
the personality types who inhabit the
shado" world of espionage types who
are not, of a piece, as might be imagined
by an-outsider, but who are often profes-
sionally and personally cool-or'even hos
tile to one another and whose clashes have,
shaped -much of , the: CIA's, history -
Powers consciously or unconsciously gives
an echo of his own difficulties in writing
about them. Here is his distinction be-
tween the spy and the analyst. ;'
"Whereas spies are, obsessed with the.
missing pieces, the analysts are devoted to. ,'.
patterns. The spy (and the counterintelli-
gence specialist, whose mentality is that
of the spy -cubed) is haunted by the possi-
-
bility`he has- been denied the one clue.
which '*xplains all. The analyst is con-
vincedsthe pattern willalways jump- the
gap",
While researching his book,, Powers no
doubt shared. the spy's obsession. with-'-71'
faith in patterns in order: to synthesize:
what be had been able to learn..(There's;
no reason to think' he found any'occasion
identifies, whom he calls the-adventurers.,
man who served longerthan Helms as CIA
the adventurers dominated the
director
,
agency's early years.- Their _spinta was:,_
morally. careless,". Powers writes:, "The
adventurers thought of the world. as being
- infinitely plastic. they thought_they_could
from the. top."):a~tx .a "
~visibIe'
Ultimately, of course, it is the analyst's
role the writer must fail back on. His
judgment and instincts must in the end fill':
in for the missing puzzle pieces,. just as then,
reader has only his judgment and instincts
to assess the writer's.
An example is, the continuing question.;
of who authorized CIA attempts to assassi .
nate Fidel Castro. ,The record as estab-
lished by Senate investigators and by his ?
own researches, contains no documentary',,-
evidence to prove that the attempts were
-ordered by the Kennedy administration
Yet Powers, properly making an informed
guess that-would have been inappropriate
for an official inquiry, speculates convinc-
ingly that the attempts would- not":have
been made without presidential sanction..
Powers's researches were, of course,'
helped immeasurably by the flood of CIA-
secrets that has been 'released in recent
years. The Senate report is only one book
on a shelf that now includes several. by `:
disaffected CIA officers such as Victor
Marchetti, Philip Agee, Frank Snepp and
John Stockwell. The disclosures of recent
years have given a far clearer picture
than was ever available before of the
.agency's activities and methods
The exposures help the investigator not
only by their own mass of detail, but also
because they prompted many loyalists to
reveal additional facts. that might better
explain and justify agency actions. Helms
and other past and present CIA officials
obviously discussed matters rather can-
didly with Powers that they would never
have spoken of if their adversaries hadn't .
f done so first.
Indeed, Powers accumulated so much
detail it occasionally overwhelms his abil-
ity to- organize it. On the whole, though,..
the story is well told. Written with balance.
and.with fairness, it may be the-best single:
history;- of the CIA to-- appear so: far;'
Powers is particularly good at explaining
the attitudes and reasoning processes in-?
'volved in the intelligence business; the,
passage quoted above on the differences
between the spy-and the analyst is one ex
rect the agency and the man,-who bore the
1970s revealed past excesses,' is less suc-
emerge with some clarity - and not with '
out, some surprises for the reader is a. I
picture of Helens's beliefs and values .;
Not only as director but throughout his
career, Helms was the "pure" intelligence
officer. He was on the other side from the
flamboyant 'political operators, Powers }
reports, not because of any moral scruples
but because he believed anything that
made the agency visible would undermine
its chief purpose: collecting other nations'
secrets-and protecting its own. It's ironic;
in a sense, that he stood in the, target cir- .
cle when critics zeroed in, on agency ex-
cesses.
But in another sense..ielms was a
proper target. He symbolized not an intel-
ligence agency out of control, but political
leadership that had slipped off the moral.
rails. For Helms did the bidding of his po-:
litical superiors even when it ran contrary
to his own judgments on what 7ould be in
the agency's or the nation's! interests.:,
Helms remained convinced, even when he
himself was faced a charge of perjury be-
fore a Senate committee (he finally
pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge
of failing to testify "fully and-complete-
ly"), that he had behaved properly and
honorably throughout.. Powers demon-
strates persuasively, though not without.
sympathy for Helms, that the real issue of
his career was political misuse of the CIA
misuse which Helms not only did not
prevent,but did not even try, to resist..
ARNOLD R. ISAACS
Approved For Release 2004/10/13 : CIA-RDP88-0135OR000200050016-2