CIA NO THREAT TO LIBERTY, BUT CLEARER DEFINITION NEEDED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01350R000200110007-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2004
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: August 5, 1967
• Content Type: NSPR

t ~ ; P. e e I s ~~ r? e r by the ena oc Li;e i ~scnn do
G~.r OLK, Vi".1"1'1!A administration our reputation,
,EDGE.-STI:R '? ~ayg ~e Z ja ?M 4 a??N was such that we got credit for
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Approved a 2 4 / . IA-Ruroo-01350R000200
142,250 that happened in many coup-
tries, whether we were actually
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;copyright 1967
Roger Hilsman V
responsible. In Southeast Asia,
1? for example, there was hardly a
;l single country in which it was
It ,not widely believed that the CIA
had been behind some major
event. Even in France, our oldest
dally and friend since it helped us
in the Revolutionary War, news-
c papers published the charge That
the CIA supported the OAS gen-
erals in their. attempted coup in
1961 against President Charles
de. Gaulle-and Frenchmen be-
lieved it.
The CIA is not a threat to our f And again in 1965, when the
The real problem of the CIA, the inherent ten-'
liberties and never has been. It lions in r French government protested
is composed of dedicated officers conducting secret intelligence in a free society, that an American pho-
of extremely .high standards of is explained by Roger Hilsman in this excerpt from to-reconnaissance p 1 a n e, had
integrity and patriotism. Should his booh,V'To Move a Nation." He writes that Allen flown over French atomic energy.
;anyone attempt to subvert the Dulles' justification of the CIA's methods is funda- 44 installations, French newspapers
agency to purposes that would mentally right. This is the sixth of eight installments charged that it had been sent,
threaten our there deliberately on an intetli-
from HiIman's 'book appearing' in the Ledger-Star.
society, it would be } Bence mission, just as the U2 had
members of CIA who would be Hilsman was an undersecretary of state in the Kennedy been sent over the Soviet
the first to sound the alarm. administration.
Union-and Frenchmen believed
But the real problem of CIA, ., Y "'i """.... ig"'"-"'?-"r to } it. Too heavy reliance on the
In Iran a Mossadegh and m ' he answer to every kind of prob
the inherent tension in conduct- techniques of secret intelligence,
Guatemala an Arbeuz came to Lem, and American agents be-,
ing secret intelligence in a free over through the usual process- came as ubiquitously bus as in sum, so corroded one of our
Eaeiet emains, P b s~ y major political a~9ets, the bclie?
yr r. " avae invent, ho writes, ? the Cdamiuziists.
Allen Dulles justifies secret in- 'in American intentions and in- .
and not by any Communist coup tenrit as.to nullify much of the
telligence gathering activities- as in Czechoslovalfia. N e i t h e r,: But covert action was really b y' espionage and the use of devices man. at the time disclosed the nothing more than a' gimmick. ~'gain' .
such as the U2-on the grounds intention of creating a Commu- In very special circumstances, it taut if it is granted that the Un-
of national survival. The Com- nist'state. When this purpose be-, was a useful supplement, but no- ited States has both a right and a
munists are avowedly out to came clear, support from outside thing more. duty to use the methods of secret
"bury" us, and they make exten- was given to loyal anti-Commu- ; . intelligence to d e f e n d itself
sive military preparations in the nist elements in the respective . It is one thing, for example, to' against an avowedly hostile
utmost of secrecy. These facts countries.... In each case the help the shah's supporters in Communist p o w e r, there are
alone, Dulles argues, justify our danger was successfully met. Iran in their struggle 'against, some advantages to having the
taking the measures necessary :,There again no invitation was Mossadegh and his Communist; kind of centralized intelligence
;z,to uncover those preparations. extended by the government in allies, but it is something else, s e t u p which CIA represents.
'Dulles justifies our covert pol- power for outside help." again to sponsor a 1,000-man in- , Without this centralization, for
itical activities on similar.'. In both these arguments, it vasion a g a i n s t Fidel Castro's. example,. there would be contin-
grounds. As long as the Commu- seems to me, Dulles is funda- Cuba, where there was no effect uous diasters ' in the field of
nist countries continue to use mentally right. So long as the tive internal opposition.. It is one: clandestine collection activities. t
subversive means to bring down Communists themselves are op- thing, again, to give a covert
non-Communist regimes, those only antagonistic to the rest of boost to, say, the Philippines':: Competing intelligence serv-
who oppose the Communists the world, as they openly and:' Magsaysay, a n a t u r a I leader.; ices would inevitably stumble
must be prepared to meet the avowedly are, and so long as; with wide popular support, in a' over each other with ridiculous
ting it successful they:use the techniques of sub-; ' bid for power in the midst of ; a n d dangerous consequences.
threat. But mee '
ly, Dulles argueting it means that our version to bring down govern- Hukbalahaps, and it is something ,? ' Without this centralization, intel-
intgliige'nce services must play ments, which they do and whiel quite different to try to create a ligence priorities would be devel-
their role early in the struggle, " . --- ~ ^`._" , _ -.... ?. Magsaysay by covert efforts, as oped by each individual service
adva- we did in the 1950s with Gen., and department, instead of by'
and avowedl
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the plotting and organizational: . cate doing, then the countries to Phoumi Nosavan in Laos. the whole of the United States
stage which they are so hostile have .government, which permits a ra-
" . both a riht and a duty to use But it was some time before tional measuring of costs as
To act," Dulles writes, "one the methods of secret intelligence these distinctions became clear.; against gain not only in monc-
-must. have the intelligence about to protect and defend themselves . Covert action was over-used asi tary but also in political terms.
the plot and, the plotter and have. -where those methods are of- ' an instrument of foreign policy,,
ready the technical means, overt feotive and appropriate and for and the reputation of the United; ~ Finally, without this cen'traliza-
and covert, to meet it." which there is no effective and.' States suffered more and more.! tion, the CIA would not have
Citing the .Truman and Eisen appropriate alternative. ;.'Covert" is usually defined not; been able to bring about the tru-
hower d o c t r i n e s which laid ` as completely secret, but as ly national intelligence estimates
down policies that the United: .The trouble has been, of "plausibly deniable." But while' that it ha's, especially on the big
States would conic to the aid of ' course , , that these qualifications one action might be "plausibly questions of Soviet missile and
countries threatened by.commu- have not always been observed.; deniable," several hundred are, nuclear strength, the Sino-Soviet
nism whose governments re- In the past we have too often not. And where one action, con- dispute, and Communist inten-
quested help, Dulles goes on to used secret intelligence methods: sidered in isolation, might seem. tions, and probable reactions, in
enunciate a doctrine of his own. when they were not effective and; worth the cost of slightly tarnish- which all the different services
and departments have educated
He argues that covert political appropriate or when there were, ing our image abroad, the cumu-
I Iative effort of several hundred,
action should be used to foil effective and appropriate alter-I i each other. And the alternative
Communist attempts to take prOv 1 o k~ta8 @n 40/1 o G - WTn011 6002oo''T?F 1?15bcen competing esti
a country with or without a re- ' tion" in particular became a fad,, : mates t at would have torn poli-
quest for Help- cy asunder.