STEIN AND DAY BOOK FOR EARLY 1977 TO UNCLOAK THE WORLD'S SECRET INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88-01350R000200440004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 16, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 21, 2004
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: August 23, 1976
• Content Type: NSPR

STAII
Approved. ror Release04'~CIA $7$~01350R.- 00200440004-2
ook for Early 191.x'? .to UnofoaKt
ecret Intelligence Activities.
"Some 'of' the best sellers in recent
years dealing with intelligence secrets
were about only one aspect of covert
activities, as secrets about one opera-
tion or another were released. FitzGib-
bon is handling an entire century of cov
world wars-plus all the preparation be- without exception; journalists involved British, Stein says. "I encountered this
forehand and the aftermath that fol- 'An the war effort were not privy to the one on my last trip to England," he re-
lowed." Sol Stein talked to PW about innermost parts of wartime secrets, par- calls. "I read it straight through in one
Constantine FitzGibbon's early 1977 ticularly the Ultra Secret.. The logic day. I bought it the same day." FitzGib-
book for Stein and Day, "Secret In- .being pursued. there was simple. In bon researched his facts in England,
telligence in the Twentieth Century their civilian"lives, journalists. dis- France and the other countries whereof
FitzGibbon, author of several novels geminated information as a matter of he writes. "But I don't know how he re-
(`,`When the:''Kissing Had to Stop" course. It was decided by those in con- searched the very solid information he
i s" Stain admits
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uss
ould be
as
'rho-s) has- turned this time to the fact. even Allen Dulles, the man who book likely to cause difficulties with.
... this }he brings a perspective of his not told certain things about the Ultra? nel? "The truth is always sensitive,."
the
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of the Ultra team and served both in the says. Dulles was operating out w ow
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rom Sharing
phistication that many journalists COV- prevent 111111
. , ering the subjectjust don't have." knowledge. When Dulles wrote his. cret intelligence activities that have fol- r
-umoon privaceiy tnal we rnrinsn Knew Icuyaulll1g vcn.auav,
When the Japanese fleet, thought to be really a stand-off."
heading. toward Alaska, altered course 3In a comparison between British/
and'steai .1.
med toward Hawaii just prior American and Soviet intelligence, Fitz-
to'the-'bombing of Pearl Harbor. The Gibbon offers an intriguing analysis.
,
British' reportedly informed the Ameri- With our two-party system and with
can officials of this diverted sea route the kind of games we play, two-sided
suggesting a. potential threat, but the usually, we often see our enemy's ene-
gence organizations-Russian, French, gaps in his first-hand experience going on everywhere as you read this. ;
'.American: British German--that have Stein thinks. of FitzGibbon's work as"
manyof'`the facts FitzGibbon unveils -whom in the name of covert activities,:
'
ob
f th
Wh
e authors
?.:
en aancu a some o
in the bOOK. dispute Commonly held
servations about the methods utilized-'
notions .41
"'One of_ the more. startling incidents by these agencies weren't a bit scary,
FitzGibbon reports is his conversation he comments, "It is frightening to see-,,
with a British intelligence officer, Cav . that just about all countries are doing
endish-Bentinck; The officer told Fitz- this, acting like this, but it's also rather
ing things, in view of certain current . The Russians, on the other hand, are
crises,"Stein continues, "is FitzGib- adept at triangular warfare: They excel
bon's view :of the, CIA. He quotes in their national game, chess. An under-
U.S. failed to act. my as our friend. We tend to think tin-
"-"For me, one of the most illuminat- complicatedly. It's either us or them.
p`.'''from the book, "It [the CIA] was lum= standing of the knight's eccentric
should not be responsible for the'OSS- The author apparently does not shy
type activities it was assigned. FitzGib- from expressing his own viewpoint.
bon considers that the CIA was forced "Throughout the book, he is giving the
to ape the unhappy experiences of its facts," Stein says,. "but as he's doing
early German counterpart and, subse- it, he's critiquing them."
nnentiv- matters got out of control. Although FitzGibbon was born in the
Approved-for Release 20iQ4/10/13 ?:-CIA-R13P88-013508000200440004-2
abroad:-' FitzGibbon also remarks that ing and even leads to an acceptable ne-
a secret espionage aaencv. which is cessity ofthe. sacrifice of a-man to win.
what the. CIA was organized to be, ' the game:1