INTERNATIONAL DRUG CONTROL PROBLEM: LAW ENFORCEMENT VS INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION COLLECTION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00365R000200050038-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 9, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2001
• Sequence Number: 38
• Content Type: SUMMARY

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(1) To establish and maintain a national narcotics intelli-
(2) To ensure the. proper dissemination of narcotics -
related intelligence data to officials at all levels of Government with responsi-
bilities in the drug abuse area; and
(3) To ensure the maximum feasible enforcement effort
to prevent drug abuse in the United States.
b. ONNI is designed primarily as a service organization. It will
be a central repository for narcotics - related intelligence data, classified and
unclassified, collected both domestically and abroad by all components of
the intelligence community as well as by non-intelligence agencies. The
ONNI will process, study, interpret, and evaluate these data and prepare
them in suitable form for dissemination to all agencies - Federal, state and
local - concerned with the narcotics program and authorized to receive such
information. ONNI will endeavor to look for patterns and will study the
narcotics problem as a whole. It will also make recommendations as the facts
appear to warrant on such matters as shifts in emphasis. In addition, ONNI
will translates intelligence needs into specific requests to the operating
agencies to meld in with their total collection requirements.
c. ONNI has no collection or law enforcement responsibili-
ties. Its major function will be to provide comprehensive intelligence support
to criminal investigations, to other current enforcement activities and to
those who establish policies with regard to efforts to control the interna-
tional drug traffic.
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computerization of name data and BNDD's recent initiation of a priority
program to computerize the name data in its files should assist in this area.
3. These files have also revealed a lack of certain basic
information on informants, contacts and modi operandi of narcotics
networks. This information gap results in part from a failure to debrief
informants uniformly with intelligence requirements in mind. Attempts
should be made to ensure uniform debriefing of informants on key
narcotics-related information both by U.S. law enforcement representatives
abroad as well as by indigenous police services. This effort would be
materially assisted by the development of a handbook for use not only by
U.S. Special Agents but also by officers of the host government's local
services. Techniques, procedures and formats for reporting both operational
and substantive information derived from these debriefings should be
standardized.
H. Washington Coordination
1. The above paragraphs have discussed primarily the problems
which are encountered in the field by U.S. agencies trying to combat illicit
narcotics trafficking and smuggling. To a large extent, however, these
problems stem directly from Washington where the whole effort should be
pulled together. The complexity of the situation is compounded by the
number and diversity of U.S. Government elements which are involved in
some phase of narcotics activity. Some of these ignore or fail to understand
the need for coordination and act unilaterally in furtherance of their own
missions, some of which are disparate, some overlapping. And differences of
opinion exist as to how and where their resources should be employed and as
to who has the responsiblity for certain actions in connection with illicit
narcotics activities.
2. So far, of the various U.S. Agency actions against the
narcotics problem more have been taken in reaction to ad hoc pressures than
as part of a coordinated U.S. Government effort. An example of such ad hoc
Washington action which has had continuing repercussions in
misunderstandings in the field was a joint cable of 23 December 1972 which
was designed'to set forth the role of CIA in relation to BNDD and Customs
in the narcotics intelligence collection effort, but instead left this open to
varying interpretations and adaptations by the missions. Fuller staffing in
Washington leading to more definitive guidelines would have prevented many
problems resulting from differences of interpretation of this cable. Attempts
have been, made to clarify these differences, not only through numerous
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