NSC TALKING POINTS RE OVERALL DEVELOPMENTS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP88B00443R000100260006-0
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
August 24, 2007
Sequence Number:
6
Case Number:
Publication Date:
October 26, 1984
Content Type:
REPORT
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Attachment | Size |
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CIA-RDP88B00443R000100260006-0.pdf | 199.98 KB |
Body:
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NIO/LA
26 October 1984
NSC TALKING POINTS
Overall developments in Central America continue to be generally
favorable to US interests in the region, but problems do remain:
El SALVADOR
In El Salvador, reports indicate that
the insurgents are anxious to reacn a negotiate eMemen with the
government because they no longer believe they can win a military victory in
the foreseeable future, and because the future degree of Cuban and
Nicaraguan support is in doubt.
Cuba nas ong been pushing the Salvadoran insurgents to
negotiate with the government to gain sufficient political and
military space in which to maneuver. Cuba reportedly is giving
first priority to consolidating the Sandinista revolution, and
it is prepared to reduce its support to the insurgents, if
necessary, to give the Sandinistas a better chance of survival.
-- This report is consistent with an earlier report that the Cubans
told Panamanian Defense Chief Noriega that Nicaragua has first
priority, and that the Salvadoran insurgency could be renewed
once the Nicaraguan revolution is consolidated.
The Salvadoran insurgents themselves are now hopeful of negotiating
some form of agreement with Duarte that would allow them to rebuild their
damaged political and labor organizations, particularly in San Salvador and
other major cities. Furthermore, if they can obtain a ceasefire which would
postpone or prevent major offensive actions by the Salvadoran armed forces,
it would give them more time to strengthen their military forces while
expanding their political activities.
-- Shortly after the La Palma meeting, the insurgents broadcast a
number of "maximum goals" for the talks. These goals were much
less ambitious than previous demands, and included such items as
the release of all political prisoners, the right to organize
government workers and peasants into unions, and full access to
the media by all labor and popular organizations.
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Thus although President Duarte now has the insurgents on the military
and political defensive, he will have to be careful not to make any
concessions to the insurgents that weaken his own military efforts and give
the leftists too much political breathing room inside El Salvador. He
especially should not agree to a ceasefire proposal that leaves the
insurgents armed and in control of major base areas, because this would
probably precipitate a revolt by his own military.
Turning to the situation on the ground, the death of Col. Monterossa
is a real loss to the Salvadoran Army and a blow to its morale.
Nevertheless, the appointment of Col. Mendez as a replacement is a good one,
and the Army should be able to resume offensive operations without
significant pause. The insurgents tried to take advantage of the loss by
calling for a popular uprising, but this fell on deaf ears. Meanwhile, the
major insurgent radio station in eastern El Salvador has been shut down as a
result of military action.
-- The guerrillas have tried to focus new attention on the urban
sector to make up for their setbacks in the countryside.
Student groups, labor unions, and other popular sector
associations are preparing for strikes and protests to take
advantage of the political opening. Terrorism probably will
also escalate as the guerrillas, frustrated with their defensive
posture in the field, seek to weaken the government's image and
intimidate the public by fomenting unrest in the cities.
NICARAGUA
In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas also are on the political and military
defensive, and their economic problems continue to mount. They appear
determined to push ahead with their elections on 4 November, despite the
withdrawal of the major democratic opposition party, primarily to legitimize
their regime and reduce US options to interfere in their domestic political
affairs.
to
elections were mainly for "show"--to convince the international
community that Nicaragua was a good, pluralistic democratic
country. He said the Sandinistas had also managed to avoid the
mistakes of Castro by not attempting immediately to collectivize
agriculture or enforce doctrinaire reforms. He added, however,
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that the ultimate intention was to eliminate the private sector.
He said they were attempting to create a coherent ruling party on
Marxist-Leninist lines, and had turned to the Soviets for guidance
and assistance. Once a disciplined party was created, it would be
possible to dispense with the temporary supporters of the
revolution.
reports that in response to urgings by 25X1
Venezuelan Socialist Carlos Andres Perez to the Sandinistas to open
up the elections and cut their blatant ties with the Cubans and
Soviets, Sandinista leader Sergio Ramirez responded harshly. He
said the Sandinistas had always been Marxists, and that they would
not change their affiliation now that they were in power. He added
that the leadership is prepared to sign the Warsaw Pact and openly
align themselves with the Cubans and Soviets, if necessary, to
ensure their security and military needs.
The above reports should dispel any illusions about the ultimate
intentions of the Sandinistas to establish a Marxist-Leninist regime.
Managua may hope that early elections will reduce the options of the US to
interfere in its domestic political affairs by having a "legitimate"
government in place which would not be subject to the subsequent
"democratic" election provisions in the draft Contadora Treaty. In effect,
the Contadora Treaty would serve to ratify Nicaragua as a democratic state.
The Sandinistas would then be able to write their own constitution and
consolidate the regime at their own pace.
The greatest Sandinista fear would probably be that the elections fail
to bestow the necessary legitimacy on their regime to gain international
recognition and prevent US interference. In particular, there is a danger
to them that one of the Contadora countries may condemn their elections and
question Sandinista legitimacy to sign the Treaty.
Meanwhile, the anti-Sandinista insurgents continue to carry on
militarily despite the cutoff of US aid.
-- Recently,,,the insurgents have begun to attack the northern city
~
Sandinista T'to-deploy aircraft tanks, and artillery in
defense, ndt,ate the Sandinistas b ,,,,,-25X1
suffered heavy l ossesf ae""he insurgents may not tek,the
town, they have ajxdy shown they remain a major f r e to be
Y
Finally, the Sandinistas continue to get financial aid fro1n various
sources to alleviate their economic difficulties.
-- Although Mexico has suspended shipments of crude oil, it is
continuing delivery of refined products in return for cash
downpayments, and has accepted barter deals to pay off past
debts.
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-- Libya has provided Nicaragua with $100 million recently, and
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reports that Nicaragua will be the focus for 25X1
Libyan aid to other regional radical groups during the coming
year. Chile, El Salvador, and Colombia will be special targets
for destabilization.
Attachments:
A. Contadora Talking Points
B. Concern of Presidents of the Core Four Contadora
Countries Over the Nicaraguan Elections
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