CI RECRUITMENTS/DEFECTIONS OF CUBANS DURING PAST THREE YEARS (1981 THROUGH 1983)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000100330021-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 4, 2007
• Sequence Number: 21
• Publication Date: January 14, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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The change in structure contributed substantially to improving the'
timeliness and .relevance- of ,TfiteIIiVe -e~- _lys, s- -i-n--th it created a single
point of contact in the analytical element of CIA for senior policymakers.
Other organizational changes:
- The creation of new analytical centers for high priority issues,
including technology transfer; terrorism, insurgency and political instability;
and foreign counterintelligence analysis.
- CIA's Arms Control Intelligence Staff has been revived and strengthened.
It had slipped into a reactive mode that was slow to respond to requests and
unimaginative in helping policymakers deal with new arms control issues, both
on Soviet negotiating behavior and on monitoring issues. New leadership of
the staff from within CIA as well as expanded resources have turned this
situation around and given the staff a key role in helping to articulate
intelligence implications of US and Soviet proposals as well as providing
additional support on compliance and negotiating behavior issues.
Changes in National Estimates. As of 1980, the national intelligence
estimate had reached the nadir of its fortunes as a means of conveying
authoritative intelligence community views for policymakers to the President,
the National Security Council and other senior policymakers on key issues.
As few as 12 national estimates a year were being completed. The estimates
were long in preparation, long in text and played virtually no role in policy
formulation.
As of the end of 1983, this situation had been turned around. In 1983,
more than 75 NIEs, SNIEs and interagency intelligence memoranda were published.
The preparation time on key special national estimates on time-urgent subjects
was reduced to as little as a few days. The estimates are timely, policy relevant
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and address issues--such as Lebanon, the Persian Gulf, El Salvador, INF and
narcotics--of key importance to the President and his senior advisors.
Estimates have been prepared on subjects such as missile defense, the Soviet
approach to arms control and deception and camouflage that have not been
addressed in national level intelligence publications in decades. Some
subjects, such as the Soviet reaction to INF deployment, have been addressed
quarterly for over a year by the Community. Other improvements include:
- The team of National Intelligence Officers now represents a more
desirable blend of senior officers drawn from the Department of Defense, the
uniformed military, CIA's clandestine service, NSA, the private sector and CIA's
analysis directorate.
- There has been great stress on the presentation of differences of
view rather than lowest common demoninator compromise language. Differences
of view are all treated equally in the text of estimates rather than minority
viewpoints being relegated to footnotes. Such differences are encouraged.
- In order that senior policy officials can be informed of the
results of key estimates quickly, the key judgments are now prepared separately
and forwarded to the President and members of the National Security Council
the day after NFIB approval. This results in the unusual (and not altogether
unwelcome) situation that key figures are informed of the conclusions of
important estimates before their subordinates.
- Estimates on many subjects (such as Soviet energy and Mexico's
future) now include a list of indicators so that policymakers as well as
other readers can see what developments the intelligence community will be
looking for as evidence that developments are proceeding as projected or
according to some other scenario.
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/03/26: CIA-RDP88B00443R000100330021-5