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Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update In recent years, the United States Government has learned of a massive, well- organized campaign by the Soviet Union to acquire Western technology illegally and legally for its weapons and military equipment projects. Each year Moscow receives thousands of pieces of Western equipment and many tens of thousands of unclassified, classified, and proprietary documents as part of this campaign. Virtually every Soviet military research project-well over 4,000 each year in the late 1970s and over 5,000 in the early 1980s-benefits from these technical documents and hardware. The assimilation of Western technology is so broad that the United States and other Western nations are thus subsidizing the Soviet military buildup. Western products and technology secrets are being systematically acquired by intricately organized, highly effective collection programs specifically targeted to improve Soviet military weapon systems. The Soviet intelligence services-the KGB, the GRU, and their surrogates among the East European services-and Soviet trade and scientific organizations are actively involved in obtaining this technology. Targets include defense contractors, manufacturers, foreign trading firms, academic institutions, and electronic data bases. Only recently has the full extent of illegal Soviet technology collection efforts become known. The purpose of this paper is to reveal in detail the structure of these Soviet programs, and to give examples of Soviet requirements and successes. Understand- ing the Soviet effort is a critical first step in protecting Western technology and preventing it from being turned against the West. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Overview of Two Soviet Programs 2 The VPK Program: Raising the Technical Levels of Weapons 4 and Manufacturing Equipment Ministry of Foreign Trade 20 The Trade Diversion Program: Building and Expanding Industries 24 Participants in the Second Program 25 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 5. Ruble Savings From Only a Part of Soviet Western Technology Acquisitions 12 6. Rank Ordering of Industries by Soviet Military Research Projects Benefiting From Western Technology, Early 1980s 13 7. Soviet Military Requirements Satisfied by Principal Collection Agencies in the Overall VPK Program, Late 1970s and Early 1980s 14 8. Most Significant Acquisitions Satisfied by Principal Collection Agencies, Late 1970s and Early 1980s - -- 15 9. Selected US Universities Identified by the Soviets as Sources of Needed Applied Technology 22 10. Soviet Needs for Applied Science and Technology From Selected US Universities Compared With Number of Visiting Soviet Bloc Scientists, Early 1980s 23 __ 1 1. Soviet Acquisitions of More Than 2,500 Pieces of Western Microelectronics Manufacturing Equipment, Early 1970s-Early 1980s 25 Tables 1. Summary of Results of the VPK Program, Late 1970s and Early 1980s 6 ___ 2. Selected Worldwide Soviet Acquisitions, Military Applications, and Collectors of Western Documents, Military Hardware, and Dual-Use Products 9 3. Rank Ordering of Top 100 US Defense Contractors of 1983 Compared With Their Rank Ordering by Approximate Frequency of Soviet Identification for Needed Technology, Selected Periods in Late 1970s and Early 1980s 18 4. Selected Successful Soviet Bloc Espionage Operations Against US and Other Western Defense Contractor Targets 20 5. Examples of Dual-Use Equipment and Technology Likely To Be Targeted by the Soviets 29 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update Overcoming considerable technological inferiority over the past several decades, the Soviets have built the largest military industrial manufacturing base in the world and a massive research establishment to complement it. Their objective is to achieve military- technical capabilities that are at least equal, if not superior, to those of the West. Their resource commitment is enormous by any mea- sure; it has enabled them in recent years to narrow the Western lead in nearly all key technological areas, particularly microelectronics. In materials, explosive, and sensor technologies applicable to deployed tacti- cal forces such as tanks, artillery, and antitank and surface-to-air missiles the Soviets' technology level is roughly equal to or slightly better than that of the West. They are the world's leaders in a few significant fields, such as chemical warfare and in some areas of laser research for future "star wars" applications. Nevertheless, in spite of the several decades of mas- sive investment in indigenous research and develop- ment, the prospects are small that the Soviets can reduce their dependence on a large variety of Western products and technology in this decade and the next without allowing the technological gap to widen. The main reasons for this continuing need are endemic to the Soviet system: the lack of adequate incentives, inflexible bureaucratic structures, excessive secrecy, and insularity from the West. Even if there were some major Soviet economic or managerial reforms, no real lessening oJ'the Soviet dependence on Western inno- vation is anticipated as long as the USSR perceives the need for military-technological parity with the West, or the need for superiority. Soviets, however, because of new technological leader- ship that the West has supplied them. Their depen- dence is essentially for innovation-where they will continue to look to the West-not for maintaining adequacy, which they have achieved in nearly all important military technologies. But today's adequa- cy will be tomorrow's obsolescence if technology.fails to keep pace. In May 1982 the US Congress was given a report ' identifying a massive and global Soviet program to acquire Western militarily significant technology.2 That report described the Soviets' successes in supple- menting their military research and manufacturing capabilities and in narrowing the technology gap with the West, thereby eroding the technological superior- ity on which US and Allied security depends. The identification of this Soviet program led the West to undertake greater efforts in counterintelligence and export control. Since then, it has become even more evident that the magnitude of the Soviets' collection effort and their ability to assimilate collected equip- ment and technology are far greater than was previ- ously believed. This update of the 1982 report defines the scope of the Soviet effort. It outlines how the Soviets go about acquiring Western technology and identifies examples of specific technologies they seek. It highlights details and statistics of Soviet successes-much more detail than could be revealed previously. This information was obtained directly by the United States and Allied countries. Understanding the Soviet effort is critical in designing ways to protect Western technology from being acquired and used against Western security interests. The impact of this dependence could be even more important in the 1990s than it is today. The USSR has been compelled to follow Western direction in technological change, and thus far it has been able to do this satisfactorily because of a mature technologi- cal base. The next decade is less certain for the ' Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology, April 1982. Exhibit No. 1. Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga- tions of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Second Session, 4, 5, 6, 11, and 12 May 1982. Z Western technology (hardware, documents, and know-how) in- cludes that of Japan as well as other Free World countries. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 A basic question is why do Soviet weapon designers and Soviet manufacturers need to copy design con- cepts embodied in Western equipment and associated documents? In general, Soviet weapons have histori- cally reflected a commitment to functional designs that can be easily manufactured in labor-intensive .factories and readily maintained in the field with a minimum of technical skill. There has always been a struggle between Soviet design simplicity and techni- cal complexity. Soviet weapon designers have not had to face the competitive pressures that drive Western designers to press the state of the art. Building on a mature research sector and on lessons learned from past performances of weapons in battle, the Soviets are placing more of a premium on techni- cally complex systems. Western system and equip- ment characteristics increasingly are used as yard- sticks against which Soviet technical capabilities are judged. Every major civilian or military project is compared with the best Western technology before it is approved for development. Once in development, Soviet standards mandate the comparison of the quality and technical level of hardware, at different design stages, with foreign counterparts. With their access to many details of Western weapons and dual-use equipment designs and concepts, Soviet designers are, in effect, competing with Western de- signers. That competition, supported and encouraged by the Soviet leadership, is probably pressuring the military research establishment to pay increasing attention to technically complex systems. Counter- vailing pressures for design simplicity are being ap- plied by the mamtfacturing sector, which is less responsive in adapting to technological change. All of these forces indicate continuing Soviet programs to acquire Western military and dual-use hardware and technical data. Since 1982 it has become clearer that the Soviets have two programs to acquire Western hardware and documents: ? First, Moscow has a program to raise the technical levels of weapons and military equipment as well as to improve the technical levels of manufacturing processes. This program is managed by the most powerful organization in defense production-the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) of the Pre- sidium of the Council of Ministers (figure 1). Main- ly, although not exclusively, through intelligence channels, the VPK seeks one-of-a-kind military and dual-use hardware, blueprints, product samples, and test equipment to improve the technical levels and performance of Soviet weapons, military equipment, and defense manufacturing equipment and reduce any dependency on advanced Western products. This is done in large part by exploiting and adapting design concepts embodied in acquired equipment and associated documents. ? Second, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Soviet intelligence services administer a trade diversion program to acquire relatively large numbers of dual- use manufacturing and test equipment for direct use in production lines. This program seeks export controlled microelectronics, computer, communica- tions, machining, robotics, diagnostic, and other equipment to increase the throughput of weapon- producing industries. These two programs, which apparently are adminis- tered separately, are the hub of the Soviet effort. The VPK program is principally, but not exclusively, an industrial security and counterintelligence concern for the West. It involves espionage by hostile intelli- gence officers, overt collection by Bloc officials, ac- quisition by scientific exchange program participants, and illegal trade-related activity. The trade diversion Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Figure 1 Key Organizations Involved in Managing Military Research and Manufacturing and the Acquisition of Western Technology Military policy, research, manufacturing, and the principal requesters of Western technology Military Industrial Commission (VPK) Key defense manufacturing ministries Aviation Industry Machine Building Defense Industry General Machine Building Communications Equipment Industry Radio Industry Medium Machine Building Sbipbuilding Industry Electronics Industry Chemical Industry Electrical Equipment Industry Petroleum Refining and Petrochemical Industry Committee for State Security (KGB) East European intelligence services The Military Industrial Commission (VPK) coordinates the devel- opment of all Soviet weapons as well as the Soviet national-level program to acquire Western technology. The VPK is the most powerful organization in the defense-research establishment, com- prising the top executives of the key defense manufacturing minis- tries (industries). Requests for Western documents and one-of-a- kind hardware from military equipment designers in each of the 12 industries shown above are called requirements (see figure 2). To satisfy these requirements, the VPK controls a national State Cottlmittee for Science and TechnoloBY (GKNT} Ministry of Foreign Trade Other defense manufacturing ministries State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES) fund, amounting to some half a billion rubles each year (roughly $1.4 billion in 1980 purchase power equivalents). Once approved by the VPK, requirements are selectively levied among the KGB, the GRU, and at least four other national-level collection agencies, as well as surrogates among the East European intelligence services. The State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) acts as a collector and as the central processor for the national-level program. It also monitors the absorption and assimilation of Western technology by the defense industries. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 program principally involves export control and inter- national compliance issues. Characteristics of these programs overlap, further complicating the design of adequate countermeasures: ? Both programs sometimes seek the same products. ? Soviet industrial ministries request technology and equipment through both programs. ? The collection channels overlap and in some cases the same Soviet individuals (intelligence officers and others) are involved in each program. The VPK Program: Raising the Technical Levels of Weapons and Manufacturing Equipment The VPK includes the top executives of most of the key Soviet defense manufacturing ministries shown in figure 1. Full VPK membership is given to the Ministers of Aviation, Machine Building (projectiles and explosives), Defense Industry (armor and electro- optics), General Machine Building (strategic missiles and space), Communications Equipment, Radio (ra- dars and large-scale computers), Medium Machine Building (nuclear weapons and high-energy lasers), Shipbuilding, and Electronics. It is a small but power- ful group, responsible for centrally overseeing the research, development, and production of all Soviet weapon systems. It coordinates developments between its chief customer, the Ministry of Defense, and the key suppliers, the defense-industrial ministries. As the expediter for weapons development projects, it is the principal Soviet military instrument for eliminating or circumventing the inefficiencies characteristic of the Soviet economic system. As part of its responsibility to enforce schedules and to ensure that technical and performance specifica- tions are met, the VPK translates requests for West- ern hardware and documents, principally by the de- sign bureaus of 12 industries (figure 1), into lists of collection requirements. In the late 1970s alone about one-half billion rubles (roughly $1.4 billion in 1980 purchase power equivalents) each year was reserved for purchases of one-of-a-kind Western hardware and documents. Three examples of specific requirements from the VPK lists are shown in figure 2. The first deals with the IBM 370 computer, used by the Soviets as the model for production of their own version, "Ryad," which is a copy of the IBM 370 architecture and functions. The second deals with a cruise missile computer. The VPK apparently assigned it a high priority because of major efforts under way at that time to develop long-range strategic cruise missiles, which require large-capacity digital memories for onboard navigation. The Soviets historically have had reliability and other problems in developing such computers. The third example is a US Fairchild Instrument Corporation/Xincom semiconductor memory tester. It is a good example of the one-of-a- kind dual-use product requested and acquired through the VPK program. Design concepts embodied in the hardware and associated documentation of the tester were copied to develop a Soviet counterpart. The original tester also could be used to help copy or reverse-engineer Western integrated circuits. Requirements for documents alone can command amounts as considerable as hardware; examples in- clude over 50,000 rubles (roughly $140,000 in 1980 purchase power equivalents) for documents on the US shuttle orbiter control system and over 50,000 rubles for high-energy laser developments. Over 200,000 rubles ($560,000) was approved for acquiring selected research documents on US antimissile defense concepts. Each year the VPK publishes a report based on the evaluation of the individual ministries. It includes aggregate statistics on numbers of technical docu- ments and samples (hardware) obtained, gross ruble savings, and the numbers and priority of requirements satisfied. This report is sent to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Copies also are sent to headquarters elements of the collec- tion organizations. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Figure 2 Examples of VPK Requirements, Mid 1970s -Early 1980s Requester (responsible for producing mainframe computers) Desired technology Organization charged with collection Origin or location of technology 1. Ministry of the Radio Industry 2. Technical dowmentation on IBM 370 computer models 145, 158, 168 and operating system data, not earlier than 1974. Information about new IBM projects. 3. KGB 4. US: Documents from the IBM firm. hint requirement. Priority code A-I indicates technology needed for- potential solutions of a problem in producing a future weapon system Desired technology Maximum funds allocated for collection of [his item Organization charged with collection 1. Ministries of Aviation, Communications Equipment, and Electronics Industries, A-I, Most Critical 2. Electronic components and programing devices for cruise missile digital computer memory. Samples and documents desired. 3. 170,000 rubles 4. KGB Code B-I indicates substantial reduction in time and expenditure in production of new weapons Desired technology Maximum Funds allocated for collection oC this item A nonintelligence organization also charged with assisting collection 2. Xincom monitoring and metering equipment for static and functional testing of semiconductor memory units. Sample and documents desired. 3. 4,500,000 rubles 4. Ministry of Foreign Trade, KGB The mid-1970s VPK requirement shown above targets IBM equip- ment for Soviet military research and development. The Soviets copied the architecture of the IBM 360 and 370 systems to develop their Ryad series of computers. The late 1970s requirement is a very high priority for three reasons: it is identified as "most critical"; it is needed to solve problems in producing a J'uture weapon system; and three ministries would benefit technically, economically, and jointly from its acquisition. The early 1980s requirement, for aFairchild/Xincom semiconductor memory test system, is a perfect example of the one-of-a-kind dual-use product (sample) and associated documentation requested for copying as well as for volume purchases for direct use in production lines. This tester was in fact acquired, and design concepts were copied, saving several hundred man-years of Soviet developmental effort. Soviet requirement data also include the firms and sometimes the names of persons who have the desired hardware and docu- ments. Some 3,000 to 5,000 new, amended, and reapproved require- ments for hardware, documents, or both are now issued by the Soviets each year. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Table 1 Summary of Results of the VPK Program, Late 1970s and Early 1980s ? An average of over 5,000 Soviet military equipment and weapon system research projects per year in the early 1980s benefited from Western hardware and technical documents. Over half of these projects were in the electronics and the armor and electro- optics industries. ? Innovation, new concepts, new directions, higher technical levels of research, accelerated development of more advanced weapons, and the avoidance of major pitfalls are some of the key benefits to Soviet military scientific research projects. ? About 60 percent of that portion of document and hardware acquisitions considered to be the most significant to the Soviets was of US origin, although not necessarily collected in the United States. ? About 70 percent of the documents and hardware acquired in the 10th and so far in the 11 [h Five-Year Plans, which were judged by the Soviets to be the most significant to their military research projects, probably were export controlled, embargoed, classified, or under some control by Western governments. ? In the early 1980s more than 3,500 requirements were levied each year for specific Western hardware, documents, or both, with roughly one-third satisfied each year; the other two-thirds still targeted. ? Some half a billion rubles are maintained each year for potential collections against these requirements (roughly $1.4 billion in 1980 purchase power equivalents). ? During the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976-80), over 3,500 require- ments were fully satisfied worldwide-roughly 60 to 70 percent of these being fulfilled by the Soviet intelligence services (the KGB and the GRU) and surrogates among the East European intelli- gence services. Requirements fully satisfied during the 1 lth Five- Year Plan will exceed 5,000. ? Of the 3,500 satisfied requirements approximately 5 to 10 percent were judged by the Soviets as the most significant to military research projects. The Soviet intelligence services and surrogates among the East European services fulfilled about 90 percent of these most significant requirements each year. ? About half of all VPK requirements fulfilled in the 10th Five- Year Plan (1976-80) and thus far in the 11th Five-Year Plan (1981-85) were for two industries: electronics and communica- tions equipment. Successes and Benefits The VPK program is a Soviet success story (table 1). Over 3,500 specific collection requirements for hard- ware and documents were satisfied for the 12 industri- al ministries for just the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976- 80). About 50 percent of more than 30,000 pieces of Western one-of-a-kind military and dual-use hard- ware and about 20 percent of over 400,000 technical documents collected worldwide in response to these requirements were used to improve the technical performance of very large numbers of Soviet military equipment and weapon systems. The benefits and distribution by industry of the fulfilled requirements are shown in figure 3. ? About 50 percent of the 6,000 to 10,000 pieces of hardware acquired annually and 20 percent of the 100,000 documents acquired annually are used by the Soviets in transferring Western technology into their military research projects. ? In the late 1970s about 700 embargoed dual-use manufacturing, diagnostic instrumentation, and other dual-use products were acquired each year for copying embodied designs, reverse- engineering, and probably for selected direct use as key equip- ment in Soviet military production lines. ? From 1976 to 1980 the greatest savings in research project costs, almost one-half billion rubles (the 1980 dollar cost of equivalent research activity would be $800 million), were realized by two ministries-the Ministry of the Defense Industry (armor and electro-optics) and the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. The Soviet manpower equivalence of these savings alone translates roughly into over 100,000 man-years of scientific research. These savings, however, may be biased. The ruble figures probably reflect operating costs-salaries, bonuses, and sometimes savings in elimination of, for example, test range activity, but not capital costs. Although Soviet managers generally tend to inflate savings to enhance their role, the savings estimated in the VPK program appear to be conservative. According to the Soviets, about one-third of the VPK requirements are totally or partially fulfilled annually, strongly suggesting that Western industrial security, counterintelligence, export controls, and other efforts do have an effect. But each year the number of VPK requirements grows by about 15 percent. This is a strong indication that the expanding Soviet military industrial program continues to rely on Western technical solutions and advances. It also indicates increased collection success and user expectation. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Figure 3 Rank Ordering of Soviet Industries by VPK Requirements Fulfilled, by Rubles Saved, and by Hardware Received, 1976-80 Rank by requirements fulfilled Electronics Communications Aviation Radar and computers Chemical Shipbuilding Nuclear industry and lasers Projectiles and explosives Petroleum and petrochemicals About 50 percent of the VPK requirements that were fulfilled during the 10th Five-Year Plan for Western hardware and docu- ments were satisfied on behalf of two defense industries~lectron- ics and communications. These are key areas where the Soviets' need for militarily significant technology and the West's need for better controls are greatest. The four industries receiving the most Western military hardware and dual-use products were electronics (over 6,000 pieces of equipment, a large percentage involving microelectronics), chem- ical (almost 4,000 pieces), petroleum/petrochemicals (over 1,500), and communications (over 1,500), ranked in that order. The top four industries saving the most rubles in research project development costs in terms of manpower and other re- sources were the armor and electro-optics industry (almost 20 percent of the 1.4 billion rubles saved in research project costs) and the aviation, communications, and electronics industries. These four industries consistently appear to be the Soviet leaders in requesting, absorbing, and generally getting the most use out of Western hardware and documents. In some cases, such as in the armor area, the Soviets are using Western technology not to catch up, but to enhance a capability that already is equal to or better than that of the West. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Five Years Gained in Developing the Next Generation of Fire-Control Radars for Soviet Fighter Aircrc~J't The Soviets estimated that by using documentation on the CIS F-18 fighter their aviation and radar industries saved some,fwe years of development time and 35 million rubles (the 1980 dollar cost of equiva- lent research activity would be $SS million) in project manpower and other developmental costs. The man- power portion of these savings probably represents over a thousand man-years of scientific research e./.fort and one of the most successful individual exploitations ever of Western technology. The documentation on the F-18fire-control radar served as the technical basis for new lookdown~shoot- down engagement radars for the latest generation of Soviet,f~ghters. US methods of component design, .fast-Fourier-transform algorithms, terrain mapping ,functions, and real-time resolution-enhancement techniques were cited as key elements incorporated into the Soviet counterpart. Moreover, F-18 and F-14 documentation served as the impetus for two long-term research projects to design from scratch a new radar-guided air-to-air missile system. The documentation also was instru- mental in formulating concrete specifications to de- velop new Soviet airborne radar countermeasures equipment against the F-18 and F-14. Significant acquisitions of Western technology in- clude documents on fire-control radars for the F-14, F-15, and F-18 and documents on US ballistic missile defense concepts (table 2). In terms of broad defense programs, Soviet strategic missiles, air defense, tacti- cal forces, and weapons manufacturing capabilities have benefited the most from the VPK program. The annex has several hundred examples of specific Soviet weapons and military equipment benefiting from Western technology. Western technology collected each year in the late 1970s and early 1980s aided Soviet military industries principally in four ways. Ranked by priority, the VPK program: ? Redirected Soviet technical approaches in about a hundred projects each year for ongoing weapon systems and key military equipment, or resulted in the improvement of the weapons manufacturing processes. ? Initiated several hundred new short-term and long- term research projects each year on technical topics that had not been under consideration. ? Raised the technical levels of several thousand developmental projects each year involving military equipment, manufacturing, or design procedures. ? Eliminated or shortened phases of more than a thousand military research projects each year. This contributed to a substantial reduction-in a number of cases, two to three years-in time needed to produce more technically advanced weapons and military equipment. The benefits vary from project to project. Western technology has assisted the Soviets in reducing their weapon acquisition cycle by up to two years for research projects in an advanced status. Acquisition of Western documents, for example, helped the Soviets cut by two years the time spent on researching a new generation of fuzes for munitions with a large kill radius and for self-aiming aviation cluster munitions. For projects in an earlier stage of research, the cycle can be reduced as much as five years. This considera- bly shrinks overall research time, reduces the amount of resources devoted to weapon system research, and allows diversion of those resources to other Soviet military research projects. A wide range of Soviet data demonstrates that bene- fits to military research projects have increased signif- icantly from the late 1970s to the early 1980s (figure 4) and have applied to thousands of research projects in all key defense industries. Measured in rubles, the Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Table 2 Selected Worldwide Soviet Acquisitions, Military Applications, and Collectors of Western Documents, Military Hardware, and Dual-Use Products _ Western Technology Acquired Strategic Missiles Documents on Cruise Missiles Using Radar Cruise Missile Guidance Terrain Maps Documents on Heat Shielding Material for Reentry Vehicles Documents on Ballistic Missile Defense Concepts Air Defense F-14, F-15, F-18 Documents on Fire-Control Radars US Phoenix Missile Documents Semiactive Air-to-Air Missile KGB Infrared Radiometer Reduced Infrared Signature Aircraft KGB Fiber-Optics Systems Aircraft and Missile Onboard Communication GRU Systems New Air-to-Air Missile General Purpose Naval And Antisubmarine Warfare Aircraft Carrier Steam Catapult Design Aircraft Launching System for New Aircraft GRU Documents Carrier US MK 48 Torpedo Documents Antisubmarine Torpedo GRU System Acoustic Spectrum Analyzer Submarine Quieting Powerful Acoustical Vibrator Submarine and Ship Sonars GKNT, GKES, Academy of Sciences Space and Antisatellite Weapons Documents on Systems and Heat Shielding of the US Space Shuttle Transit Naval Navigation Hardware First-Generation Space-Based Naval GRU Radionavigation System US NAVSTAR Navigation System Documents Digital Signal Processing for Counterpart Others Satellite System High-Energy Chemical Laser Documents Space-Based Laser Weapon KGB System 101 Processing Equipment Digital Processing and Video for Space-Based Others Reconnaissance; Missile, Bomb, and Remotely Piloted Vehicle Command Guidance Tactical Forces International Radar Conference Documents Synthetic Aperture Radar for Aircraft Detection GRU Ground Support Equipment for US TOW Anti- Countermeasure System GRU tank Guided Missile US Copperhead Laser-Guided Artillery Documents Laser-Guided Missile Documents Portable Antiaircraft System KGB Infrared Imaging Subsystem Designs Fire-Control System of Future Tank KGB Millimeter Radar Documents Antitank Missile Pressure Measuring Instruments and Documents Advanced Modeling for New Artillery Projectiles KGB, GRU Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Table 2 Selected Worldwide Soviet Acquisitions, Military Applications, and Collectors of Western Documents, Military Hardware, and Dual-Use_Products (continued) _ Western Technology Acquired Manufacturing and Technology Kevlar 49 Fiber Documents for Missiles Complete Set of Manufacturing Equipment for Printed Circuit Boards DTS-70 Printed Circuit Board Testing System __ Fiberglass Manufacturing Technology Computer Disk Memory Systems Bubble Memory Technology Technical Documents on Tests of Cold-Rolled Steel High-Accuracy Three-Dimension Coordinate Measuring Machine savings doubled between 1976 and 1980 (figure 5) and still are expanding in the 11th Five-Year Plan. The statistics on benefits also point to a massive diffusion of Western technology into Soviet military equipment and weapons. Figure 6 shows how the more than 5,000 military research projects benefiting in the early 1980s were distributed by industry. According to these rough indicators, the electronics, armor and electro-optics, and aviation industries are benefiting the most from Western technology. Overall, the acquisition of Western technology per- mits the Soviets to field more sophisticated, versatile, and effective weapons. The basic time for fielding these advanced Soviet weapons, though, remains about the same. It also provides new military capabili- ties and allows additional resources to be used for the development of additional advanced weapons con- cepts. The acquisitions also serve to lighten somewhat the burden of continuing growth in Soviet research and defense spending. Copied for 11 Production Assembly Lines for Ministry of Foreign Trade Strategic Missile, Armor and Electro-Optics, and Radar Industries High-Pressure Airtanks for Submarines KGB, GRU, Ministry of Foreign Trade Ministry of Foreign Trade, GKNT, GKES, Academy of Sciences Soviet copying and reverse-engineering of Western military and dual-use equipment are major character- istics of the VPK program. indeed, the majority of VPK requirements for "technology" appears to be for hardware only. In the late 1970s alone, the Soviets acquired about 700 embargoed one-of-a-kind dual-use products each year principally in the area of manufac- turing, inspection, instrumentation and test equip- ment, including key microelectronics production and test equipment. These products were used for making Soviet counterparts or possibly were for use as key manufacturing or test equipment that completed pro- cess lines. Examples included computer-controlled integrated circuit testers, aircraft engine vibration control systems, and narrow-band analyzers for sub- marine quieting. These practices indicate Soviet deficiencies are in the design, testing, and integration of technologically advanced military systems, not in basic research and applied science. They fall short in the engineering of a Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Figure 4 Technical and Time Benefits to Thousands of Soviet Military Research Projects From Western Technology late 1970s Total=over 4,000 Projects whose research stages were eliminated or shortened Projects whose technical approaches were redirected Projects whose technical levels were raised New research / projects started The benefits to the Soviet military research establishment from acquisitions of Western technology are far greater than previously believed. Virtually every Soviet long- and short-term research project for military systems-well over 4,000 in the late 1970s and well over 5,000 in the early 1980s-is benefiting from the docu- ments and hardware of at least a dozen Western countries. (See figure 6 for a breakout of how these projects were distributed by industry.) device, technologically advanced by Western stan- dards, into a useful piece of militarily applicable hardware producible in large quantities. The profile of the VPK program (as well as the trade diversion program) can be used to better define militarily critical technologies as well as better ways to counter Western losses. Both appear principally aimed at acquiring products and technical data. Both show that protecting dual-use products is just as important as protecting the related design know-how. Equipment sales divorced from the transfer of know- how do have long-term significance for the Soviets. The evidence indicates that equipment transfers, both large batch acquisitions and individual samples used Early 1980s Total=over 5,000 Projects in the VPK program are divided into the four major categories shown above. Projects with redirected technical ap- proaches and new projects represent the most significant benefits through adoption of innovations and new directions for military systems. Major pitfalls are thus avoided. Projects whose technical levels were raised and those whose stages were eliminated or shortened represent improvements in the military state of the art of the Soviet Union and an acceleration in the time when more advanced subsystems are ready for new and future weapons. for copying embodied design concepts and for reverse- engineering, generally outstrip acquisitions of "tech- nology" in quantity and are of more immediate value to the Soviets. VPK Collectors and Sources Analysis of reliable data indicates that in the VPK program the Soviet Bloc intelligence services (the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff (GRU), and their surrogates among the East Europe- an intelligence services) are the collectors most often tasked and the most successful. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Figure 5 Ruble Savings From Only a Part of Soviet Western Technology Acquisitions Million ruhlcs Ai lout 1.4 hilliun ruhles in saving, on selected prujerts during the IUth Five-Year Plan The above savings generally are conservative estimates by the Soviets resulting from the elimination of stages of military research and design projects, the reduction in time to carry them out, and the adoption of new technical approaches. The savings are not cumulative. That is, a 20-million-ruble annual saving from the acquisition of US and other Western fiberglass plastics production technology used in manufacturing high-pressure air tanks for submarines was counted for one year only, the year of acquisition. Roughly 400 million rubles ($640 million) were saved in 1980 for only a portion of the Western technology acquired. Most of these savings were in long-term military research projects for weapons of the late 1980s and early 1990s. They therefore were most likely given in terms of manpower savings. By this measure several tens of thousands of Soviet man-years of scientific research effort were saved in 1980. Soviet collectors have easily acquired many types of Western integrated circuits (ICsJ for reverse engineer- ing. Indeed, most Soviet ICs can be traced to a Western original. One of the best examples is their KR5801K80A microprocessor, which is a modified version of the Intel Corporation 8080A 8-bit micro- processor used in many US military systems. In this case, the Soviets even copied the equivalent US part number to avoid confusion (note the KRS 80 IK 80A versus the US 8080AJ. Furthermore, the evidence clearly shows that Soviet ICs known as LOGIKA-2 and series 133/1 SS were directly copied from the Texas Instruments 5400/7400.1~amily. These ICs have been used in Soviet strategic and tactical military systems since the mid-1970s to provide important qualitative im- provements. The more advanced Western fabrication equipment acquired by the Soviets in recent years has been used to produce copies of sophisticated Western ICs for their latest generation of weapons. 'the Soviets succeed in acquiring the next generation of materials, equipment, and parts, their military capa- bilities will continue to improve in the area that is the major strength of the West-quality. During the late 1970s and early 1980s the Soviet intelligence services acquired, through their own ef- forts and those of the surrogate East Europeans, about 60 to 70 percent of all materials collected in the overall VPK program each year (figure 7). More important, these intelligence services were involved in collecting worldwide about 90 percent of the informa- tion judged by Moscow as most significant and used The USSR's practice of reverse-engineering, however, may soon run into problems. As US and Japanese ICs become more complex, reverse-engineering will re- quire: (aJ tracking hundreds of thousands of connec- tions; (6J understanding how they all fzt together; and (cJ mastering the complex processing steps used in production. Thus, copying such circuits will require not only much more sophisticated Western equipment but also much more time to duplicate each circuit, causing their overall microelectronics gap with the West to widen. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Figure 6 Rank Ordering of Industries by Soviet Military Research Projects Benefiting From Western Technology, Early 1980s Average yearly percent of all research projects that benefited Note scale change Electronics Armor and electro-optics Aviation Missiles and space Projectiles and explosives Communications Chemicals Radars and computers Electrical equipment Shipbuilding Nuclear industry and lasers Petroleum and petrochemicals The assimilation of Western technology into Soviet industries conducting military research is considerable. The greatest benefi- ciaries were the electronics and armor and electro-optics industries, which accounted for over 50 percent (equaling thousands) of all military research projects benefiting from Western technology in the early 1980s. Projects whose technical levels were raised Projects whose research stages were eliminated or shortened ? Projects whose technical approaches were redirected plus new research projects started The general distribution points out the rather broad effect that Western documents and hardware have just on raising the technical levels of Soviet military research. This is particularly true for the top three industries, where advanced technology and innovative design concepts play a significant role in weapon developments. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Figure 7 Soviet Military Requirements Satisfied by Principal Collection Agencies in the Overall VPK Program, Late 1970s and Early 1980s GKV~I~. GKI~S Auidrm~ ul Sciences Ministrc of Forci;,m l~cidc The distribution shows that the KGB and the GRU (and their surrogates among the East European intelligence services) were the main collectors in the overall VPK program. They were involved in satisfying roughly 60 to 70 percent of all VPK requirements completely fulfilled during the late 1970s and early 1980s. (Per- centages do not add to 100 because several agencies contributed to fulfilling some of the same requirements.) Although not evident from the above data, both the KGB and the GRU significantly increased their efforts in the early 1980s in many hundreds of military research projects (figure 8). Both the KGB and the GRU levy some of the VPK requirements on surrogates among the East European counterpart services. The KGB probably owes a high- er percentage of its collection to these East European civilian intelligence services than does the GRU to its East European counterparts. All use human assets worldwide. O Yearly avera~c in late 1970s I Yearly average in early 1980s because the average number of requirements fulfilled so far in the early 1980s(llth Five-Year Plan)increased about 50 percent over the late 1970s. The State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) and associated collectors surprisingly were the third main collecting entity, satisfying arelatively large percentage. Figure 8 shows, however, that they were credited with satisfying about 5 percent of a selected subset of acquisitions, those judged by the Soviets to be the most significant to their military research projects. Coordination with the East European services is con- ducted through the liaison functions at both KGB and GRU headquarters as well as through KGB and GRU advisers in the various Warsaw Pact intelligence services. Since the mid-to-late 1970s the surrogates Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Figure 8 Most Significant Acquisitions Satisfied by Principal Collection Agencies, Late 1970s and Early 1980s The KGB and GRU were involved in collecting about 9U percent of the Western acquisitions fudged by the Soviets to hl the most beneficial w their military dcveloEment projects (late 1970s and early 1980s.~ Average ycudy percent of acquisitions judged by the Soviets to he the most significant Ministry of Foreign Trade GKN"I', GKES Academy of Sciences In contrast to figure 7, which shows results for the overall VPK program, this figure shows the main collection agencies for a selected subset of acquisitions-those judged by the Soviets to be the most significant to their military research projects for the periods indicated. The Soviet intelligence services and surrogates are the key collectors in the VPK program. Their approximate 90- percent association with the most significant acquisitions (100 percent less the percentages from the categories labeled "nonintelli- ? Single agency acquisitions KGB and GRI; KGB and GRI~ with others ~~ Nonintclligcnce service involvement Bence service involvement" and nonintelligence "single agency acquisitions") indicates the West has a counterintelligence and industrial security challenge. About 60 percent of the acquisitions were of US origin (but not necessarily acquired in the United States). The several hundred acquisitions for each period in the statistics above are a small subset of those acquisitions shown in the statistics for the overall VPK program. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 among these services have played a major role in the overall VPK collection program, often in return for Soviet economic concessions to their countries. The intelligence services of East Germany, Poland, and Hungary are among the most successful in acquiring Western classified data and export controlled products. During the late 1970s and early 1980s the GRU probably fulfilled two to 10 times as many VPK requirements as the KGB for the important defense- industrial ministries of: ? Communications Equipment Industry (defense and satellite communications systems-10 times. ? Machine Building (projectiles and explosives}-five times. ? General Machine Building (strategic missiles and space vehicles five times. ? Medium Machine Building (nuclear industry and lasers two times. ? Radio Industry (radars and large-scale comput- ers;~two times. The GRU probably is more successful because of its overall scientific orientation, its bolder operational style, its increased collection opportunities that reflect a wider variety of technology-related cover positions overseas, and its clearer understanding of collection objectives. The KGB. The First Chief Directorate (foreign intelli- gence) of the KGB conducts science and technology collection operations through its headquarters compo- nent known as Directorate T. Directorate T probably has approximately 1,000 officers, with nearly 300 on foreign assignment. The officers on foreign assign- ment are organized into components known as Line X, and most of them are scientific specialists by both academic and professional training. The largest KGB complements are probably in Bonn, Cologne, London, New York, Tokyo, and Vienna. (Paris was one of the largest until mass expulsions in 1983.) Line X officers abroad typically occupy such cover positions as science attaches in a Soviet embassy or equivalent positions in the commercial or economic sections of Soviet missions or an international organi- zation. Other preferred cover positions for these offi- cers are as officials in various Soviet trade missions or as members of scientific or other academic exchanges. Such positions provide easy access to the types of information targeted by the VPK or to foreign person- nel who could provide such access. Cover as an "acceptance engineer" at a company with a Soviet contract is also a preferred way to acquire proprietary secrets. The GRU. The Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff has emphasized the collection of military scientific data since the earliest days of Soviet military intelligence. Unlike the KGB, the GRU has no headquarters component specifically charged with managing scientific collections; rather, this function is part of the overall responsibilities of four geographic operational directorates. GRU head- quarters does, however, have a scientific information analytical directorate that supports scientific collec- tion efforts. The GRU does not have a separate cadre of career scientific specialists in the field; instead, most GRU officers have technical backgrounds and education as well as years in a military specialization. Approxi- mately 1,500 GRU officers serve outside the USSR. For all of them, scientific collection is an integral part of their responsibilities and a high priority. The GRU probably has a higher percentage than the KGB of officers with cover positions that provide more access to Western scientific targets and more methods of transporting export controlled products and technical data to the Soviet Union. Some of these positions similar to those of the KGB's scientific specialists are in scientific or commercial sections of Soviet missions or international organizations and various foreign trade offices. In addition, the GRU officers often have positions in Aeroflot (the Soviet airline) and Morflot (the Soviet merchant marine). All Soviet military attaches are GRU officers, of course. The GRU, however, does not seem to use cover positions in academic and technical exchanges to the same extent as does the KGB. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Selected Sources. US Defense Contractors. Moscow views US and Allied defense contractors with their proprietary and government security controls as difficult targets. Ac- cordingly, the KGB, the GRU, and their surrogates among the East Europeans are the collectors primari- ly tasked to operate against them. Of the top 100 US defense contractors for 1983, nine of the 10 most frequently cited by the Soviets as sources of needed technology were in the aerospace industry (table 3). The next group most frequently identified was the chemical and petrochemicals industries. Although the Soviet Bloc intelligence services are the primary collectors of scientific and technological in- formation in the VPK program, it is estimated that about 90 percent of the roughly 100,000 documents acquired each year worldwide are unclassified. About 10 to 20 percent of these unclassified documents are either under proprietary corporate, export, or other government controls. The Soviet intelligence services and their surrogates among the East European ser- vices probably provide Moscow with about 10,000 technology-transfer-related classified documents each year from the West. Analysis and operational obser- vations indicate that only a small percentage of these are collected through Soviet intelligence service oper- ations in the United States. Analysis of hostile intelligence activities indicate that in recent years the surrogates among the East Europe- an intelligence services possibly have been more suc- cessful than Soviet intelligence against priority de- fense technologies in the United States. East European services have had considerable success not only in the United States, but elsewhere because: ? They are generally perceived as a lesser threat than the Soviets. ? They often may not be perceived as operating in a surrogate role. ? In some countries, including the United States, they operate under less severe travel restrictions. ? Some, especially the Czechoslovaks and the East Germans, probably find it easier to operate in the West European cultural and commercial climate. Recent examples of Soviet Bloc espionage operations against US and other Western defense contractor targets are presented in table 4. As a result of various coproduction arrangements and contract bidding among foreign firms, the availability of much US defense contractor technology overseas in US subsidiaries and in other firms has increased. This enables Soviet Bloc intelligence to seek priority US technologies in many countries around the world. Commercial Data Bases. Unclassified technical docu- ments from all countries-including engineering ana- lyses and research results-are targeted by Soviet intelligence and other collectors because of their value to Soviet engineers seeking creative designs and alter- native engineering approaches. For example, from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, NASA documents and NASA-funded contractor studies provided the Soviets with their most important source of unclassified mate- rial in the aerospace area. Soviet interests in NASA activities focused on virtually all aspects of the space shuttle. Documents acquired dealt with airframe de- signs (including computer programs on design analy- sis), materials, flight computer systems, and propul- sion systems. This information allowed Soviet military industries to save years of scientific research and testing time as well as millions of rubles as they developed their own very similar space shuttle vehicle. The individual abstracts or references in government and commercial data bases are unclassified, but some of the information, taken in the aggregate, may reveal sensitive information concerning US strategic capa- bilities and vulnerabilities. Numerous unclassified US Department of Defense and contractor documents are sought by the Soviets from the Commerce Depart- ment's National Technical Information Service. Doc- uments dealing with design, evaluation, and testing of US weapon systems-the Sidewinder air-to-air mis- sile, the F-15, the Redeye shoulder-fired antiaircraft missile, the B-52, and others-are in the data base. The public and private document clearinghouses- established to efficiently index and disseminate the results of government and government-sponsored mili- tary-related technical research-are a fertile ground for KGB, GRU, and other collectors. In recent years, the growing use of electronic data bases has provided the Soviets with an even more efficient means of identifying and procuring such unclassified technical information needed by Soviet designers. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Table 3 Rank Ordering of Top 100 US Defense Contractors of 1983 Compared With Their Rank Ordering by Approximate Frequency of Soviet Identification for Needed Technology, Selected Periods in Late 1970s and Early 1980s Dollar Company Soviet Dollar Company Soviet Value Identification Value Identification Rank Rank Rank Rank 1. General Dynamics 8 40. Soberbio .. . 2. McDonnell Douglas 5 41. Pan American World Airways _----.- 32 3. Rockwelllnternational 4 42. ____ Harris _ __ 32 4. General Electric 1 43. _-- Todd Shipyard .. . 5. Boeing 2 44. Eaton 31 6. Lockheed 3 45. Goodyear Tire & Rubber 17 7. United Technologies (Pratt & Whitney) 11 (Goodyear Aerospace) 8. Tenneco 31 46. Guam Oil & Refining .. . 9. Hughes Aircraft 15 47. Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) 31 10. Raytheon _--- 23 48. Sanders Assoc. _ _ 32 _ 11. Grumman 21 49. Waterman Marine .. . l2. Martin Marietta 7 50. Signal Co. (Garrett) -- __ 19 13. Litton Industries 20 51. Royal Dutch Shell Group 23 14. Westinghouse Electric 6 52. Motorola 25 15. [BM 19 53. North American Philips (Magnavox) 27 16. LTV 24 54. E Systems .. . 17. FMC 30 55. Hercules - -_ 24 18. RCA 27 56. Morrison Knudsen .. . 19. TRW 26 57. - -- Mobil 29 20. -- - Sperry 17 58. Ogden ... 21. Honeywell 12 59. Morton Thiokol 19 22. Ford Motor (Ford Aerospace) 22 60. Gould - _ -- - 32 23. __ General Motors 14 61. Congoleum _ .. . _ 24. AT&T ...a 62. Caterpillar Tractor 25 25. EXXON 28 63. Emerson Electric 30 26. Northrop 19 64. Control Data __ 30 27. Allied (Bendix) 9 65. Standard Oil of Indiana 30 28. Maersk Line Ltd ... 66. Coastal .. . 29. AVCO 16 67. Penn Central -- .. . 30. GTE 32 68. Aerospace ___- 24 31. __ _ - Textron 32 69. Fairchild Industries 25 32. Singer 23 70. HBH (Hughes Air~Bendix~Holmes) .. . 33. Texas Instruments 16 71. MIT 13 34. - Hughes Helicopters - - ... 72. Burroughs - ---_ 24 35. General Tire & Rubber (Aerojet) 15 73. Pacific Resources .. . 36. ITT 31 74. Johns Hopkins University 32 37. Standard Oil of California 30 75. Oshkosh Truck .. . 38. Teledyne 27 76. Gulf Oil 30 39. Motor Oil Hellas ... 77. Ashland Oil 31 a An ellipsis indicates that no targeting for specific technology or hardware was noted during the sampling period to rank these companies; this is not a complete indication that there was no hostile targeting of those companies. Other companies not among the top 100 are known to have been identified by the Soviets for needed technology. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Table 3 (continued) Dollar Value Rank Company Soviet Identification Rank Dollar Value Rank Company Soviet Identification Rank 78. Mitre 90. Gulf States Oil & Refining 18 79 Rolls Royce Ltd. 30 91. SAI .. . 80. Du Pont _ 10 92. Sunstrand 81. Williams International 32 93. Kaman 82. Reynolds Industry 29 94. Kuwait Petroleum . . 83. Duchossois Thrall Group (Chamberlain) 29 95. Harsco ... 84. NIIndustr Norris Y ( ) 96. Lear Siegler 30 85. Sam Whan ... 97. Varian Associates 29 86. _ Computer Science .. 98. Southern Union 87. Xerox ... 99. Cubic 32 88. Brunswick 30 100. _ Digital Equipment 29 89. Hewlett Packard 27 In the VPK program the Soviets issue general guidance to collec- tors to acquire selected information on, for example, a system (the US Space Shuttle) or a subsystem/technology (electro-optical guidance techniques of the US Maverick or TOW missiles). They follow up this guidance with specific "requirements" and allocate funds for particular pieces of hardware (MK 46 torpedo: more than 1,250,000 rubles (more than $3.5 million), or a U-2 aircraft radio: more than 50,000 rubles), or a document (K-250K-D gyroscope: more than 20,000 rubles), or a dual-use product (excimer laser: more than 20,000 rubles). The government agencies, companies, or contractors that have such information or products are specified. The rank ordering in this table is representative of the number of times a company was specifically identified as a source of needed information and hardware during a selected period. Duplicate numbers beginning with Soviet rank 15 indicate ties in the number of times identified. The data available give a rough indication of large Soviet ongoing needs for innovation in specific aerospace design concepts and hardware as well as for chemical technology and manufacturing equipment. One solution appears to be to thoroughly screen all candidate data base entries and keep sensitive govern- ment information out of the public data bases or limit its availability to US and Allied defense contractors. Unfortunately, this may also inhibit the United States' own national research effort by restricting the ready availability of such information. Scientific Coil/erences. Collection of information from professional and academic conferences on applied science and technology has also contributed to the success of the Soviet program. At least 35 conferences worldwide were identified in the VPK program as potential sources of specific data in the late 1970s to assist in solving military research problems. These included conferences on materials, missiles, engines, lasers, computers, marine technology, space, micro- electronics, chemical engineering, radars, armaments, and optical communications. The Soviets judged some of the data acquired from these conferences to be among the most significant contributing to their military projects. Conferences in the late 1970s and early 1980s (and Soviet evaluation of the data) ranked in order of significance were the: ? International Radar Conference (improved circuit designs for synthetic aperture satellite radars and aircraft over-the-horizon radars)-Collector: GRU. ? Conference on Integrated Optics (assisted in identi- fying ways to produce a qualitatively new Soviet category of integrated optical devices for fiber- optics communications~Collector: KGB. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Table 4 Selected Successful Soviet Bloc Espionage Operations Against US and Other Western Defense Contractor Targets ? Conference of the Aerospace and Electronic Sys- tems Society of IEEE (helped technical solutions to existing problems and improved the characteristics of aloes-altitude target detection radar)Collector: KGB. ? International Conference on Radar (assisted devel- opment of signal processing for passive jamming suppression methods and for radars to detect distant aircraft targets)-Collector: GRU. ? International Conference on Nontraditional Energy Transformation Systems (refined directions of re- search on space-based nuclear reactors~Collector: KGB. ? Conference on Millimetric and Submillimetric Equipment (assisted in design solutions for millime- ter wave proximity fuzes~Collector: KGB. ? Symposium on Solar Energy Conversion (increased efficiency and decreased costs for electron beam deposition of coatings on solar components for space vehicles-Collector: GRU. Saved the Soviets several tens of millions of rubles in research efforts; advanced Soviet technology by about five years by permitting them to implement proven de- sign concepts. Currently undergoing trial. -- __ Passed information on various antiaircraft missiles. Provided dozens of documents on potential US ballistic missile defense programs, ICBM basing modes, and related technol- ogy. Afforded Soviets a unique look at potential US future systems concepts. Passed information on the "Tornado" air- craft produced by the European Panavia consortium. According to Soviet estimates, the information ob- tained by the KGB and GRU from these conferences alone, particularly the first three, produced savings of millions of rubles in long-range military research projects-savings roughly equivalent to 100 man- years of effort. The fact that numerous professional and scientific conferences are specifically identified as valuable sources in advance by the VPK indicates their exploitation is not fortuitous, but carefully planned. Ministry o,~Foreign Trade. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade administers and operates hundreds of foreign trade organizations and firms around the world. This global presence and the ministry's official duties related to technology and transportation make it a practical cover organization for hundreds of KGB and GRU officers involved in technology acquisition efforts. These officers conduct overt and covert collec- tion operations and channel the results through their respective intelligence organizations for accountabil- ity in the VPK system. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 In addition to providing cover for intelligence officers, the Ministry of Foreign Trade is also a major inde- pendent collector in the VPK program and attempts to pursue most of its assigned VPK requirements on an overt basis. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, it helped fulfill about 15 percent of all fully satisfied VPK requirements (figure 7). More important, it fulfilled 9 percent of those satisfied requirements identified as "most critical." Also during that period its role was specialized, focusing largely on the acqui- sition of microelectronics manufacturing equipment and communications dual-use products. In view of this, it is not surprising that throughout the 10th and thus far in the 11th Five-Year Plans the Ministry of Foreign Trade was assigned to collect the largest percentage of samples (a yearly average of approxi- mately 30 percent) as opposed to documents. The ministry also has a major role in the illegal trade activities discussed later in this report. Overt and Academic-Related Collectors. The Soviet Academy of Sciences is another collector in the VPK program. So too are the State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES). Although these organizations are involved principally in overt collection of information for nondefense industries, they also are involved in worldwide overt collection of information and technical data in response to specific VPK tasking for military research projects. Some- times they are tasked jointly with the KGB and other collectors to satisfy these requirements. These three collection agencies, especially the Acade- my of Sciences and the GKNT, operate in the West in a milieu of scientific, academic, and business confer- ences. They and others help send approximately 2,000 Soviet Bloc citizens to the United States each year in a nontourist status. A portion of those visiting proba- bly respond to high-priority VPK requirements. Addi- tionally, many Soviet scientific personnel have been co-opted to some degree by the Soviet intelligence services to provide assistance to VPK and other collection activities. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Soviet scientif- ic collection directives identified numerous universi- ties worldwide that had needed information. Perhaps as a vote of confidence in US academic research, the number of US academic centers targeted has in- creased from about 20 to over 60 during this period. The universities cited as sources for both applied military-related technology and for civilian scientific data include some of the finest in the United States (figures 9 and 10). The majority of information sought at universities for the VPK program was applied technology and engineering, and not fundamental or basic research. Carnegie-Mellon, Cincinnati, Kentucky, Massachu- setts Institute of Technology (MIT), Michigan, and Wisconsin were among those universities (as well as defense contractors) identified in the VPK program as sources for information on new high-strength, high- temperature alloys, such as titanium, on lightweight structural alloys, and on powder metal processing. California Institute of Technology, Harvard, and MIT were targeted for techniques, methodologies, and results for evaluation of strategic concepts on space, aviation, and missile systems. California Insti- tute of Technology and MIT were also cited as sources for transonic, supersonic, and hypersonic aerodynamic research, as were the Polytechnic Insti- tute of New York (Brooklyn), Princeton, and Stan- ford. Kansas, MIT, Ohio State, and Penn State were identified for data relating to electrohydraulic control systems applicable to aircraft, helicopters, and the Soviet version of the US Space Shuttle. Research applicable to future high-energy laser and particle beam weapons was sought from MIT, Denver, and Princeton. As illustrated in figure 7, the three overt and academ- ic-related collectors rank third in the overall VPK program, satisfying about 20 percent of those require- ments that were completely fulfilled by all collectors. On the other hand, figure 8 shows that while their overall contribution to Soviet military research collec- tion is large in volume they accounted for about 5 percent of the technology judged most significant by the Soviets during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Acquisitions included information on developing and manufacturing composite materials for missiles and space systems; automated control designs for highly Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Figure 9 Selected US Universities Identified by the Soviets as Sources of Needed Applied Technology Various Periods During the: ? 1970s 0 1980s ? 1970s and 1980s Penn Staten-- p grin Indiana ?Cincinnati W Va T`. l ( o NYU L - ?Dregon Wyoming QStanford Utah ? Nebraska? State ? Berkeley arare o Colorado Denver Kansas Vanderbilt "~"?'"""? e ~ Clemson; Over the past decade or so about 40 percent of the US universities shown above were identified in [he VPK program as sources of applied science and technology principally for Soviet military aerospace developments. The State Committee for Science and Technology also issues requirements against US universities, but principally for fundamental research for both Soviet military- and civilian-related science developments. Known Soviet collectors at US and other Western universities include those from the intelligence services, scientists within the Academy of Sciences, and scientists from the State Committee for Science and Technology who come to study in the United States. Many of these collectors are also involved in spotting and assessing US scientists for potential recruitment as agents. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Figure 10 Soviet Needs for Applied Science and Technology From Selected US Universities Compared With Number of Visiting Soviet Bloc Scientists, Early 1980s Total number of visit applications (early 1980s~ Massachusetts Institute 374 of Technology l arnegie-Mellon 62 University Harvard University 123 University of Michigan 112 California Institute 76 of Technology O Soviet high-priority military research needs Primarily civilian scientific needs ? Known visits by Soviet Bloc scientists Actual visits by Soviet Bloc scientists with backgrounds related to Soviet needs for information for high-priority military research projects The above US universities, as well as Stanford, California at the number of VPK-identified military research needs and the Berkeley, Cornell, and the Illinois Institute of Technology, were number of visiting Soviet Bloc scientists with backgrounds related identified by the Soviets more often than others during the early to those technical areas. There is, however, little data indicating 1980s as sources of technology needed for high-priority military that specific scientists were tasked to acquire information for Soviet and civilian research projects. There is a rough correlation between military research projects. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 accurate coordinate-measuring machines for quality control of weapon components and subassemblies; information on automatic control systems for optimiz- ing rolling mills; acoustical data for developing low- frequency sonars for submarines; and information on aerial photography, magnetic recording systems, and lasers. The Trade Diversion Program: Building and Expanding Industries Numerous sources and data indicate the existence of a program separate and administratively different from the VPK program, but comparable to it in scope. This second program is characterized not by requirements for one-of-a-kind equipment, but by illegal and legal acquisitions of relatively large numbers of dual-use products for Soviet military programs. These products are requested by the defense industries for direct use in manufacturing lines to increase the throughput or output of plants or for designing future equipment. Often manufacturing cells, complete production lines, or even entire plants are sought from the West. Much of this equipment and technology falls into the areas of computers, microelectronics, numerically con- trolled machine tools, robotics, and material fabrication. This second Soviet program is probably less struc- tured than that of the VPK, but just as rigidly monitored because of the large amounts of hard currency necessary. This is the Soviet program that appears to be largely responsible for orchestrating and managing most of the worldwide trade diversions, particularly in the areas of computers and microelectronics. Computers and Microelectronics Major Soviet diversion efforts are targeted at micro- electronics fabrication equipment and computers; nearly half of detected trade diversions fall into these categories. Using unscrupulous Western traders who employ license falsifications, deceptive equipment de- scriptions, dummy firms, false end users for illegal purchases, and smuggling, as well as assistance from intelligence operations, the USSR has acquired at a minimum several thousand pieces of major microelec- tronics fabrication equipment during the last 10 years (figure 11). The equipment acquired through these efforts is largely responsible for the significant ad- vances the Soviet microelectronics industry has made thus far, advances that have reduced the overall Western lead in microelectronics from 10 to 12 years in the mid-1970s to four to six years today. Western microelectronics manufacturing equipment has been applied throughout the entire production process- from materials preparation to the final testing appara- tus needed for sophisticated production lines. In fact, total design and fabrication lines may have been acquired from single diversion operations. Volume purchases, legal and illegal, characterize the second Soviet program. Examples of microelectronic products that the Soviets illegally acquired from the United States, Japan, and other countries in one year during the early 1970s include 30 sophisticated crys- tal pullers, 99 diffusion furnaces, three integrated circuit (IC) testers, and 10 mask aligners. The next year they diverted 24 crystal pullers, 64 diffusion furnaces, three photorepeaters, three pattern genera- tors, three epitaxial reactors, and an IC tester. Such purchases have been used directly in assembly lines for military production. In the future, large quantities of test equipment for sophisticated very-large-scale integrated (VLSI) circuits will be a major target. Volume purchases of materials are also part of the second program. Before 1980, the Soviets purchased hundreds of tons of electronics-grade silicon (not under export controls at that time). This is the raw material needed for integrated circuits for both mili- tary and civilian uses. The silicon originated primarily from the United States, West Germany, and Japan. After the sale of electronics-grade silicon to the USSR was restricted, Soviet acquisitions continued through worldwide diversions. Future acquisitions of silicon very likely will begin to concentrate on the very high-quality silicon produced in the United States, West Germany, and Japan for use in producing VLSI circuits. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Figure 11 Soviet Acquisitions of More Than 2,500 Pieces of Western Microelectronics Manufacturing Equipment, Early 1970s -Early 1980s Oxidation, lithography, and etching Doping Packaging Testing Over the past few years the Soviets have virtually completed their entire building construction program for manufacturing military microelectronics components. To equip many of these buildings with advanced production equipment, they acquired more than 2,500 pieces of major Western controlled and uncontrolled micro- electronics fabrication equipment covering the entire spectrum of manufacturing operations. They acquired this equipment from the Integrated circuits intended for direct use in Soviet systems are usually acquired from the United States and Japan by trading companies in various parts of the world, and then shipped in huge numbers to Soviet and East European destinations. As many as 100 million circuits may be shipped in this manner every year. In direct monetary value, volume acquisitions through illegal trade probably far exceed those of the VPK- directed effort. The Soviets have diverted thousands of different items of high technology in the past two decades, totaling perhaps billions of dollars in hard- ware value alone. Most of these illegal acquisitions have been facilitated or conducted autonomously by unscrupulous traders. The manufacturers of high- technology production equipment have rarely been knowingly involved in diversions; indeed, they have often been victims. United States, Japan, and Europe, and diverted it through many parts of the world. Years of illegal acquisitions of large numbers of dual-use products through worldwide trade diversions have enabled the Soviets to narrow the microelectronics technological gap with the West from 10 to 12 years a decade ago to about four to six years today. The Soviets have arranged most diversions through Europe, but their use of Asia as a diversion route is growing. Over 300 firms in more than 30 countries have been identified as engaged in diversions. Many more companies probably exist-some involved in only a few operations and quitting or disbanding before becoming well known or vulnerable. Participants in the Second Program The Soviet intelligence services and the Ministry of Foreign Trade are involved in various ways with most of this illegal trade, some of which is conducted through ostensibly normal trade channels. The Minis- try of Foreign Trade and industrial ministries operate a large network of foreign trade organizations, com- mercial offices, joint companies, and foreign procure- ment offices whose staffs know the hardware markets Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 and act as ready contacts for technology traders and diverters who may volunteer their services to the Soviets. They are also quite adept at spotting opportu- nities for diversions and obtaining controlled Western products. These functions are performed by legitimate Soviet trade officials, intelligence officers under trade cover, and trade officials working directly for intelli- gence officers. Many of the 141 Soviets expelled from 25 countries during 1983 were assigned in some capacity with the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The Soviet illegal trade program appears to be admin- istered and managed in the trade ministry's Main Engineering and Technical Administration (GITU). Although it is a component of the ministry, GITU is staffed and managed largely by intelligence officers, organized into separate KGB and GRU groups by their respective headquarters. Its subordinate Depart- ment for Technical Cooperation with Foreign Coun- tries is similarly staffed and managed. GITU report- edly exercises some supervision over all technical Soviet foreign trade organizations and all technical joint trading companies. The GITU staff has grown from about 12 in 1970 to about 70 in 1983. Its subordinate Department for Technical Cooperation with Foreign Countries num- bers over a hundred. The intelligence officers assigned to GITU, and to the Ministry of Foreign Trade in general, blend into a number of roles in carrying out their assignments. Soviet intelligence service person- nel (as well as their East European surrogates) are in embassy commercial sections, trade missions, consul- ates, commercial organizations, and joint stock com- panies in the West. Moreover, intelligence officers have been identified as employees of foreign trade organizations in the Soviet Union and their offices elsewhere in the world. Although GITU is largely a Soviet intelligence service domain (with the GRU probably filling most cover positions), that does not mean that all trade diversion operations are conceived of and supervised on a daily basis by intelligence officers. Some evidence indicates that the GRU is involved with more trade diversion operations than the KGB, but it is unknown if this is by design or rather a practical manifestation of the high proportion of foreign-trade-related GRU cover positions. Legitimate Soviet trade officers in Warsaw Pact countries are also involved in trade diversions, and not merely as intelligence co-optees. Use of Diverters-for-Hire One of the most effective and secure trade diversion methods used by the Soviets is the contract or broker diverter. Contractor diverters work for set or negotiat- ed fees; broker diverters receive a commission, usually a percentage of the equipment purchase price. Both are individual traders or businessmen with some affiliation to high-technology manufacturing or trade circles. They are very knowledgeable of high-technol- ogy markets and product availability and either vol- unteer their services to the Soviets or are spotted by Soviet assets in the West or in the USSR. Some have global expertise and connections; some specialize in operations in a few countries or a few technology product lines. In some cases, the Soviets have used diverters with known track records of trading almost exclusively, or in high volume, with the East Europeans. Whether a volunteer or selected by the Soviets, a potential contract or broker diverter is generally screened to determine the scope and depth of his contacts, range of trade abilities, and access to perti- nent high-technology markets and manufacturers. In some cases such an assessment may be a rigorous one, in others perhaps only superficial. A most important quality, however, is the ability to deliver goods as scheduled, for close to the agreed prices, without complications or risks to the Soviet customer. Although many Soviet intelligence officers are in- volved with negotiating and contracting with di- verters, this procedure is not a classic intelligence operation and is analagous to an intelligence "recruit- ment" in timing only. The diverter does not accept intelligence discipline as would an "agent." Indeed it makes little or no difference to diverters if they are dealing with intelligence principals as opposed to trade officials, save for the need to avoid the suspi- cions of espionage. Additionally, most diverters proba- bly do not enter into a permanent relationship with Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 their Soviet principals, but rather into one that is only for the duration of one or a series of formal or informal contracts for specific products or services. Although there are dissimilarities among contract or broker diversion operations, there are some character- istics that seem consistent: ? The Soviets incur minimal, if any, risk or legal liability. Many, if not most, contracts are scheduled, briefed, signed, or verbally agreed to in Moscow or another convenient denied area or are obscured by the conduct of legitimate overt business. ? Little or no contact is maintained with the diverter. This seems especially true of diverters operating on behalf of a Soviet intelligence service. ? For the most part, the diverter has autonomy in operational decisions, including arranging front or- ganizations, product availability, purchase, ship- ping, storage, and delivery. At times diverters also perform initial professional setup, testing, and ser- vicing of equipment. In so doing they rely exclusive- ly on professional overt and covert colleagues. ? Fees are negotiable. The Soviets will pay lucrative, but not outrageous prices. Fees can also be raised during the course of the diversion if more costs or risks are entailed by the diverter. ? Payment is generally through letter of credit depos- ited by the Soviets to the diverter's bank account. The use of contract or broker trade diverter opera- tions by the Soviets minimizes, if not obviates, the risk to their intelligence residences and trade officials while simultaneously assuring the application of pro- fessional business and trade diversion know-how to the technology acquisition task. Because of the low Soviet profile in these operations, more vigorous law and trade control enforcement may be more effective in stemming contract diversion than counterintelli- gence responses, although both efforts clearly have an important role. Richard Mueller, a West German citizen, is wanted in that country and in the United States for many cases involving illegal exports of COCOM-controlled computers, microelectronics, and other products to the USSR. His involvement with illegal technology acquisition on behalf of the Soviet Bloc dates back to the early 1970s. By 1978 Mueller's deals were made almost exclusively with Soviet foreign trade o.>~cials; some of these officials were intelligence officers under cover. For his network, Mueller uses numerous dum- my and front.f~rms and meets with his Soviet princi- pals in Moscow to mask his activities. At one time he had more than 75 firms operating in Austria, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. Between 1978 and 1983 Mueller delivered to the Soviets advanced computers, peripherals, and micro- electronics manufacturing equipment worth at least several tens of millions of dollars. Perhaps Mueller's best known operation was his attempted diversion to the USSR in late 1983 of seven large US Digital Equipment Corporation VAX computers and related hardware and software. The VAX series of super minicomputers are valuable to the Soviets because of their computer-aided design (CADJ applications for microelectronics fabrication. This equipment was purchased in the United States for Mueller's dummy firms in South Africa and West Germany. Much of it was seized by Sweden and West Germany enroute to the Soviet Union. Other Diversion Methods Soviet foreign trade officers also attempt to make small Western firms dependent on Soviet legal orders over a period of years. For such firms, who are not contract or broker trade diverters, the occasional Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Soviet request for illegal purchases or a support role in a larger illegal trade operation appears difficult if not impossible to refuse. Indeed, some firms may even be drawn into complicity or support for Soviet diversion operations unwittingly or gradually. It has long been a concern in the West to limit the expansion of Soviet foreign trade organizations abroad because of the opportunities they offer for this type of diversion activity. Although it has become more difficult for the Soviets to conduct this type of activity, Moscow continues to keep these diversion channels open. The Soviets also acquire technology to modernize manufacturing through another mechanism, the so- called acceptance engineers. They are assigned as quality inspectors on a long-term basis, usually a year or longer, to Western firms engaged in manufacturing items for Soviet end users. These may be intelligence officers or Soviet personnel who are co-opted to steal proprietary production or technical data. They also use this opportunity for agent spotting for immediate or future exploitation. Use of acceptance engineers for collection is especially practical in countries with advanced manufacturing technology. Companies in Western Europe and in Japan have been targeted with this approach. The West needs to better organize to protect its military, industrial, commercial, and scientific com- munities, keeping two objectives clearly in view: ? First, it must seek to maintain its technological lead over the Soviets in vital design and manufacturing know-how. ? Second, it should strictly control key dual-use prod- ucts, including computer-aided design and manu- facturing systems, large volumes of automatic test and inspection equipment, and, most important, the automatic test equipment that can alleviate acute Soviet qualitative deficiencies in the manufacturing of weapons and military equipment. The ultimate goal should be to deny the Soviets access to Western documents, hardware, and technologies that will accelerate their military programs and si- multaneously cause Western defense efforts and costs to increase. Soviet dependence on the West for tech- nological innovation in military research and develop- ment and in modernizing Soviet production industries is broad. It is particularly important in microelectron- ics and computers, and extends to key areas that include command, control, communications, and in- telligence (C'I), computer-integrated design and man- ufacturing, and materials fabrication (table 5). The United States and many other Western govern- ments have begun to better recognize that their military and dual-use equipment and technologies have been improving the performance capabilities and manufacturing standards of Soviet weapons. Several positive steps have already been taken by the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, including selec- tive expansion of the COCOM' list to deny the Soviets key items. Although the emphasis has varied among countries, most have undertaken individual programs to stem diversions and losses that include some of the following: ? Increased awareness programs, highlighting the magnitude, tactics, and detriment to Western secu- rity of the Soviet efforts. ? Improved export control efforts and enhanced law enforcement capabilities. ? Counterintelligence programs specifically targeting the technology transfer activities of hostile intelli- gence services and their Soviet co-optees and agents. ? Industrial security awareness programs conducted jointly by counterintelligence services, security ser- vices, and corporate security professionals. ? Soviet Bloc scientific visitor controls designed to screen high security risk visitors and, in the process, strengthen the spirit and integrity of academic exchanges. ? Better review of government open publications in the prepublication or predistribution phases. In general, a more difficult operational environment for Soviet intelligence has resulted worldwide. 'The Coordinating Committee (COCOM) was established in 1949 to serve as the forum for Western efforts to develop a system of strategic export controls. It is composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Portugal, Norway, the Netherlands, Luxembourg, Japan, Italy, Greece, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Canada, and Belgium. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Table 5 Examples of Dual-Use Equipment and Technology Likely To Be Targeted by the Soviets ? Advanced Integrated Circuits - GaAs Devices - Memories - Microprocessors and Peripherals - Very-High-Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) Devices ? Automatic Integrated Circuit and Printed Circuit Board Testers ? Chemical Vapor Deposition (CVD) Equipment, Especially Metal- Organic CVD Systems ? Computer-Aided Design (CAD) Systems ? Integrated Optics ? Ion-Beam and Plasma Etchers ? Ion-Implantation Equipment ? Lithography Equipment, Especially Electron- beam, Ion-beam, and X-ray Systems ? Molecular Beam Epitaxy (MBE) Systems ? Semiconductors - III-V and II-VI Compounds - Heteroepitaxial Materials - Specialized Crystal Pullers - Quality Silicon for Very-Large-Scale Integrated (VLSI) Circuits ? Array-Transform Processors ? Artificial Intelligence Systems ? Data Display Equipment ? High-Density Disk Storage Systems ? Internal Memories ? Software Development Systems ? Stand-Alone Mainframe Computers ? Supercomputers ? Superminicomputers ? C'I Software ? Computer Networking Systems ? Telecommunications - Fiber-Optics Transmission Systems - Digital Switching Systems - High-Speed Modems - Satellite Communications Systems - Terminal Displays ? Computer-Aided Design Software, Methods, and Equipment ? Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAM) Software ? Computer Numerical Controls for Metalworking Machines ? Coordinate Measuring Machines ? Finite Element Analysis ? Flexible Manufacturing Systems (FMS) ? Plant Control Software ? Robotics ? Metals and Alloys ? Composites - High-Strength Fibers and Filaments - Carbon-Carbon Manufacturing ? Ceramics ? Materials Processing - High Temperature Resistant Coatings - Isostatic Presses - Lasers for Surface Conditioning and Material Processing - Material Joining and Bonding Equipment - Nondestructive Test and Evaluation Equipment - Precision Shapers and Formers - Vacuum Furnaces, Including Those for Single Crystal Growth The worldwide diffusion of advanced products and high technology, however, clearly has increased Soviet collection opportunities. To take advantage of this, the Soviets can be expected to intensify operational acqui- sition efforts by: ? Expanding their use of contract diverters on a global basis. ? Increasing their dependence on surrogates among the East European intelligence services; increasing use of client states such as Libya, Vietnam, and North Korea. ? Increasing their exploitation of any vulnerable US and Western defense weapon system coproduction arrangements in Allied countries. ? Relying more on third-country espionage operations targeting US personnel and technology (mostly han- dling covert assets in areas outside the United States). ? Exploiting Third World trade entities dealing with US high technology (the Soviets contend that corpo- rations, officials, and security services in those countries can be easily victimized). Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 ? Attempting broader online access to US and other Western data base systems directly from the Soviet Union. For effective countermeasures to keep pace with the evolving Soviet acquisition programs, in particular the highly effective operations of the KGB, the GRU, their surrogates among the East Europeans as well as unscrupulous traders, the West should accurately anticipate Soviet tactics. Western countries should continue to improve and modify their responses. In particular, the West needs to improve and refine its knowledge of Soviet military-technical needs and factor this knowledge into meaningful and practical, multilateral export control lists. Most important, how- ever, must be increased multinational coordination of Western programs-for example, a systematic pro- gram among the Western customs services aimed at preventing the illegal export and diversion of militari- ly significant equipment in the face of what clearly will be a geographically expanding Soviet acquisition threat. Much can be done to stem losses because much is known about Soviet efforts; it is not an insurmount- able problem. But the Soviets' appetite for Western technology will continue to be voracious. They will continue to exploit any weaknesses in Western export controls, as well as policy differences among the COCOM countries, to acquire the technologies need- ed by their military programs for the late 1980s and beyond. This effort is more difficult and costly for them than at any time in the past. The stakes are high and the Soviets know it; they will devote whatever resources and manpower are required to fulfill their most critical military collection requirements. The West can do no less if it is to succeed in protecting itself as well as frustrating their efforts. All in the West- governments and private industries-will need to participate. Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Projectiles and Explosives Armor and Electro-Optics Several Hundred Examples of Soviet Military Equipment and Weapons Benefiting From Western Technology and Products There are hundreds of examples of Soviet military equipment and weapons of the 1980s and 1990s that have benefited or will benefit from the technologies and products of at least a dozen different Western countries. New and advanced technical directions will be incorporated into some of the weapon systems, subsystems, and equipment in each industrial area given below. The equipment in many projects will have their technical levels raised or project completion dates shortened principally because of the copying of design concepts embodied in Western technical documents, one-of-a-kind military hardware, and dual-use products. Four New Fighter Aircraft Reusable Space Shuttle New Tactical Fighter of the 1990s Air-to-Air Missile (US Phoenix-Like) A Supersonic Aircraft Fire-Control System for Three Fighters Ground Attack Aircraft Gas Turbine Engine Airborne Command Post Ramjet Engine Reduced-Infrared-Signature Aircraft Four Transport Aircraft 100-mm and 152-mm High-Explosive Shells 203-mm Artillery Shell Sabot Design for Armor-Piercing Tank Round Armor-Piercing Tungsten Penetrator Shell 23-mm Gun Aviation Cluster Bomb Remote Mining Shell Delivered by Artillery, Rockets, and Aircraft Large Caliber Artillery Shell Casing Small Caliber Ammunitions Noise-Detonated Fuze Microelectronic Radio Fuze Millimeter-Wave Proximity Fuze High-Efficiency Proximity Fuze for Mass Munitions Antisubmarine Torpedo Antisubmarine Missile Munitions Testing Equipment Thermal Decoy Target Protective Blast Structure Solid Propellant Unmanned Target Plane Equipment Space-Based Photoreconnaissance System Infrared Space Reconnaissance System Space-Based Missile Launch Detection System Space-Based Infrared Image Processor Synthetic Aperture Radar for Space Reconnaissance T-55 Tank T-64 Tank T-64A Tank T-64B Tank T-72 Tank T-80 Tank 125-mm Tank Gun Industrial Gas Laser Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Aerial Frame Camera High-Altitude Aerial Camera Coordinate Measuring Machine Portable Antiaircraft Missile System Advanced Night Vision Device Small-Arms Night Sight Holographic Fire-Control System Laser-Guided Artillery Shell Laser Gyro Optical Computer for Tactical Ballistic Missile Diamond Turning Device for Mirrors for Future Laser Weapons A New ICBM A New SLBM Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MaRV) Strategic Cruise Missile Reusable Space System (Shuttle) Navigation Satellites Manned Space-Based Orbital Station Reentry Vehicle Laser Rangefinder Antitank Missile Countermeasure Against US Antitank Guided Missile Automatic Gun Barrel New Artillery Gun Barrel Sniper Rifle and Machinegun High-Strength Gun Barrel from Electroslag Steel Automated Rolling Mill for Military Production Carbon-Carbon Nosecone for Reentry Vehicle Missile Motor Case Material (Based on DuPont Kevlar 49) Surface-to-Air Missile Missile Fuel Tank Cryptographic System Telemetry System Radars and Computers Aircraft-to-Submarine Communica- tions System High-Altitude Video Reconnaissance System Video Processor for Space Reconnaissance Reconnaissance Radio Receiver Strategic Aircraft and Cruise Missile Communication System Fiber-Optics Communications System Electronic Countermeasure Station Signals Intelligence Equipment ABM Radar System Design Space-Based Oceanographic Radar Three-Dimensional Phased-Array Radar Over-the-Horizon Radar Shortwave-Band Aircraft Radar High-Capacity Computer Narrow-Band Signal Analyzer Cryptographic System Scrambler Magnetic Recorder Fiber-Optical Cable Microcomputer for Communications Programmable Oscilloscope Digital Processor Printed Circuit Board Production Equipment for Communications Correctable Aerial Bomb Remotely Piloted Vehicle Electronic Page Teleprinter Disk Drives for Ryad Computer Computer Software BESM-6 Computer Magnetic-Bubble Computer for Onboard Missile Computer Matrix Processor Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Nuclear and High-Energy Lasers Nuclear Weapons Safety System Space-Based Nuclear Reactor Nuclear Reactors Naval Nuclear Reactor Water-Cooled Power Reactor Process for Reactor-Grade Zirconium High-Sensitivity Mass Spectrometer for Uranium Enrichment Isotope Separation Process Space-Based Microprocessor for a Detector Radiation Detector Airborne Military High-Power Carbon Dioxide (COZ) and Carbon Monoxide (CO) Laser Weapon High-Power Gas Dynamic Laser Space-Based High-Energy Chemical Laser Weapon Electronics and Microelectronics New Aircraft Carrier Catapults for High-Performance Airplanes New Submarine Submarine Quieting Equipment and Techniques Antisubmarine Torpedo Telecontrolled Torpedo Torpedo Missile Laser Submarine Wake-Detection System Radioactive Submarine Wake- Detection System Hydrophone for Aircraft-to-Submarine Communications Photolithography System Photomask Equipment Microelectronics Tester (Fairchild Corporation SENTRY-7 Design) LSI IC Circuit Mask Fabricator Microelectronics for Onboard Weapon Systems Large-Scale Integrated Circuit Tester Microprocessor (Motorola MC 10800 Series Design) 16-Bit Microcomputer Computers (Digital Equipment Corporation PDP Series Design) Micro- and Mini-computers for Military Purposes (AM 2900, LSI-11 M, PDP 11 /70 and REDAC Designs and Hardware) Memories for Onboard Radar Fire Control Systems Computer Memories New Semiconductor Thyristor for Military Equipment Magnetometer Surface Warship Warship-Based Multitarget Radar Fire-Control System Sonar System for Nuclear Submarine Sonar for Surface Ship Sonar for Ships and Helicopters Sonobuoy Radiowave Underwater Communica- tion System for Diver-Scouts Ship Demagnetizer Gyrohorizoncompass for Naval Ships Naval Gun Charge Coupled Devices Traveling Wave Tube for Military Satellite Communications Space-Based Laser Communication System High-Power Microwave Tube for Onboard Radar Against Low- Flying Targets Laser Communication, Detection, and Ranging System (Hughes Aircraft Company 3800 Design) Infrared TV System MIG Aircraft Centimeter Waveband Radar with Onboard Digital Processing Compact Analog-Digital Converter Quartz Resonator Crystal Grower Power Generator Communication and Telemetry System Microwave Generator Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7 Hybrid Ramjet Engine for Cruise Missile Solid Rocket Propellant for Strategic Missile Polyethylene Production System Color Aerial Photographic Film Photographic Film for Air and Space Reconnaissance Photographic Film for Space Recon- naissance (Kodak 3414 Film) Antistatic Photoreconnaissance Film Low-Density Polyethylene Photoresist System for Microelectronic Photolithography Polyamide Composite Materials for Aircraft and Tank Industries Carbon Fiber Production for Aerospace Applications Radiation Hardening Paint for Radio- electronic Equipment Bonding Material for Spacecraft Ion-Exchange Resins Laser Systems for Remote Chemical Biological Reconnaissance Fillers for Deep Sea Vehicles New Gas Mask Petroleum and Petrochemicals Space-Based Turbogenerator Tank-Mounted Infrared System Sodium-Sulfur Battery for Missiles, Space, Tanks, and Submarines Electric Step-Motors for Aviation Weapon Systems New Fuel for Strategic Cruise Missiles New Jet Engine Fuel Polyurethane Binders for Solid Rocket Fuels New Zeolite Catalyst for Motor Fuels Synthetic Motor Oil for Tanks in Arctic Areas (Mobil Oil Company) Synthetic Lubricant for Aerospace Equipment Radiation-Resistant Additives to Lubricants for Space New Lubricant-Coolant for Motor Vehicles Power Sources for Missile Installations Space-Based Solar Power Cells Spacecraft Temperature Contro] System Ship Electrical Supply System Batteries for Naval Ships Rubberized Fabric Inflated Seal for Supersonic Military Aircraft Industrial Rubber for Aerospace and Armored Vehicles Industrial Rubber Seals High- and Low-Temperature Fluoroelastomer for Aerospace and Armored Vehicles Improved Protective Gear for Astronauts and Pilots Radar-Absorbing Camouflage Coating Approved For Release 2010/01/26 :CIA-RDP88B00443R000201080007-7