NICARAGUA: SUPPORT FOR REGIONAL INSURGENCY AND SUBVERSION

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• Collection: General CIA Records
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• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 26
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: March 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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' Director of
Central
Intelligence
Nicaragua: Support for
Regional Insurgency
and Subversion
Special National Intelligence Estimate
o~ro*
March 1985
WARNING: The material in this document is sensi-
tive. Distribution of this Estimate is strictly limited
to those officials who require access to the subject
matter for the performance of their duties.
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Warning Notice
Sensitive Intelligence Sources and Methods Involved
(WNINTEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL ABBREVIATIONS
NOFORN- Not Releasable to Foreign Nationals
NOCONTRACT- Not Releasable to Contractors or
Contractor/Consultants
PROPIN- Caution-Proprietary Information Involved
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Controlled by Originator
REL This Information Has Been Authorized for
Release to ...
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SNIE 83.3-2-85/L
NICARAGUA: SUPPORT FOR
REGIONAL INSURGENCY
AND SUBVERSION
Information available as of 14 March 1985 was
used in the preparation of this Estimate, which
was approved by the National Foreign Intelligence
Board on that date.
WARNING: The material in this document is sensitive.
Distribution of this Estimate is strictly limited to those
officials who require access to the subject matter for the
performance of their duties.
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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the
Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security
Agency, and the intelligence organization of the Department of State.
Also Participating:
The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army
The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy
The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force
The Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, Marine Corps
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CONTENTS
Page
SCOPE NOTE ...................................................................................... 1
KEY JUDGMENTS .............................................................................. 3
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................ 5
The El Salvador Pipeline ............................................................. 5
1984, Year of Shifting Patterns ............................................ 5
Training ................................................................................. 9
Communications ................................................................... 9
Other Assistance .................................................................... 13
Future Salvadoran Resupply ................................................ 13
Regional Subversion ...................................................................... 13
Honduras ............................................................................... 14
Guatemala ............................................................................. 16
Costa Rica .............................................................................. 17
South America and the Caribbean ..............................................
Colombia ...............................................................................
Ecuador .................................................................................
Chile .......................................................................................
Other Countries ....................................................................
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SCOPE NOTE
This NIE is a follow-on to SNIE 83.3-85, Nicaragua: Prospects for
Sandinista Consolidation, February 1985 nd NIE 83.1-85, El
Salvador: The Outlook for the Duarte Government, March 1985
Those Estimates examined the future outlook for those countries in
detail, as well as the implications of continuing Sandinista support for
the Salvadoran insurgency. This Estimate provides additional informa-
tion on the extent of Nicaraguan support for regional insurgents and
subversive groups.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
Nicaragua's support for insurgents in El Salvador and the rest of
Central America remains an integral part of Sandinista foreign policy.
Nicaragua also has established ties with other revolutionary groups
throughout the hemisphere, developing a more sophisticated network
and coordinating its activities more closely with Cuba
Nicaraguan support remains a critical factor in sustaining the
Salvadoran insurgency. Nonetheless, there appears to have been some
reduction of materiel support over the past year, probably as the result
of several factors: '
- Managua's growing problems with its own insurgency and
continued direct and indirect US pressure.
- The assessment by Castro and the Sandinistas that, in view of
President Duarte's election and the increasing capabilities of the
Salvadoran military, insurgent prospects for a near-term victory
have declined.
- The need for greater discretion created by the Manzanillo and
Contadora negotiations, which focused greater attention on
Managua's support for insurgents.
- Internal guerrilla logistic problems in El Salvador
Nevertheless, convincing evidence of continued shipments from
Nicaragua by sea, land, and air indicates that, while Managua may shift
its activities and deliveries to minimize its own vulnerability or husband
occasionally scarce resources, it has an abiding commitment to the
maintenance of the insurgency in El Salvador. Indeed, Managua's role
as a communications center and training hub for the Salvadorans has re-
mained constant during the last 12 months. We believe that, over the
long run, once the Sandinistas feel more secure, support for the
Salvadoran insurgents can be increased
Nicaraguan activities elsewhere in the Central American region
provide other examples of training and arms support for radical groups,
generally typified by close cooperation with the Cubans. The establish-
ment of communications and broadcast sites in Nicaragua in 1983 and
'For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between Sandinista support for regional
insurgencies and their negotiating posture, see NIE 83.3-85, Nicaragua: Prospects for Sandinista
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1984 for Guatemalan guerrilla factions parallels early communications
support for the Salvadorans. In Honduras, the Sandinistas have used
infiltration teams in an attempt to establish an insurgency and pressure
the Honduran Government. Nicaragua also has provided arms and
training to the orthodox Costa Rican Communist party.
Nicaraguan training support of other radicals in Latin America has
expanded in the last year and, on the basis of reporting from a wide va-
riety of sources, appears to be closely coordinated with Cuban efforts.
Training courses in Cuba and Nicaragua are frequently complemen-
tary, and leftists from Honduras, Guatemala, Costa Rica, Colombia,
Ecuador, Chile, and the Dominican Republic have received instruction
in the two countries. Many of these contingents receive combat
experience in Nicaragua before returning to their home countries. The
cooperation extends to training by Cuban instructors of regional
insurgents at Nicaraguan facilities. Nicaragua also reportedly acts as an
arms conduit to several of the countries cited above
In Costa Rica and Honduras, where support has been more
concerted, the Sandinistas probably hope to gain leverage against the
governments. In more distant countries, where opportunities for suc-
cessful revolution are less promising or where Nicaragua has little if any
real influence, the Sandinistas have nonetheless maintained contact and,
in certain cases, have actively supported radical leftists. In these areas,
Sandinista involvement has demonstrated revolutionary solidarity; Ma-
nagua also probably welcomes foreign radicals as a small but enthusias-
tic source of troops for their counterinsurgency effort.
Intelligence gaps on Nicaraguan export activities are cern to
the Intelligence Community.
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DISCUSSION
1. Nicaraguan support to the Salvadoran insurgents
over the last five years has been an invaluable lifeline
for weapons, munitions, and other supplies. In the
early years of the Sandinista revolution, Managua's
efforts focused largely on the Salvadoran cause. Grad-
ually, however, the Sandinistas began to take a more
active role aiding other insurgents. Over time, Sandi-
nista practices have also become more sophisticated,
providing Managua better concealment and also al-
lowing it to deny publicly its involvement in giving
support to the Salvadoran insurgency
2. Since 1979, the Sandinistas have worked hand in
glove with the Cubans in sponsoring subversion, both
in El Salvador and elsewhere.
an ongoing series of consultative meetings
among Cuban and Nicaraguan officials and Salvador-
an rebel leaders both in Managua and Havana. In
addition, a variety of reporting indicates that Cuban
instructors provide training to regional insurgents at
Nicaraguan facilities. Further testifying to the integral
Nicaraguan-Cuban effort are such examples as F_
in November 1984 indicating that a mixed
5. In general, Havana and Managua appear to have
worked out complementary training patterns for radi-
cals from throughout the Latin American area. Basic
guerrilla instruction appears to take place in Nicara-
gua, with more advanced training provided in Cuba.
Sources throughout Central America
have reported on this pattern.
Frequently, it also includes a stint in Nicaragua fight-
ing the anti-Sandinista insurgents before the trainees
return to their home countries. In the Dominican
Republic, where the Cubans have not been very
successful in preventing squabbling between compet-
ing leftist groups Nicara-
gua and Cuba apparently now are separate y training
members of two rival groups.
The El Salvador Pipeline
6. The Sandinista commitment to maintaining the
Salvadoran insurgency remains strong, and F
anagua continues to play a key
role as a training base, guerrilla headquarters, and
support center.
Cuban-Nicaraguan team was to go from Managua to
El Salvado
3. The Cuban-Nicaraguan complementary efforts
extend well beyond El Salvador. Managua and Havana
worked jointly in establishing the Guatemalan Nation-
al Revolutionary Union-the consolidation of the prin-
cipal Guatemalan rebel factions in 1982. The initial
meetings brokering the agreement took place in Mana-
gua, with Nicaraguan and Cuban officials. As a prod
to unification, the Cubans and Nicaraguans threat-
ened, in the absence of unity, to cut off the Havana-
Managua arms supply.
4. A variety of other examples in Central America
illustrate the close working relationship between the
two countries. In Costa Rica, Havana designated both
a Cuban and a Nicaraguan pegpoint to handle leftist
unity talks. In Panama, the relationship is so close that,
the
Sandinistas recently recruited an asset and are sharing
him with Cuban operatives.
There is enough
specific evidence of materiel resupply from Nicaragua
to El Salvador, however, for the Intelligence Commu-
nity to be confident that it continues and that it
remains a critical factor in determining the Salvadoran
guerrillas' military capabilities
1984, Year of Shifting Patterns
7. A number of new variables affected the Salva-
doran situation and the Cuban-Nicaraguan role last
year, prompting Havana and Managua, at a mini-
mum, to review their strategy and levels of support.
These included:
- Managua's growing problems with its own insur-
gency and continued direct and indirect US
pressure.
- The assessment by Castro and the Sandinistas
that, in view of President Duarte's election and
the increasing capabilities of the Salvadoran mili-
tary, the insurgents' prospects for a near-term
victory had declined.
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- The need for greater discretion created by the
Manzanillo and Contadora negotiations, which
focused greater attention on Managua's support
for insurgents.
- Internal guerrilla logistic problems in El Salva-
dor.
met with Salvadoran guerrilla and political leaders.
the Sandinistas
indicated that, predominantly because of US pressures
and Nicaragua's internal problems, Managua would no
longer be able to provide significant aid. The Sandinis-
tas urged the Salvadorans to emphasize negotiations to
gain power, rather than to pursue military victory.
continued arms and materiel shipments from Nicara-
gua to El Salvador, despite the elevated concerns in
Managua. The information suggests that, while Mana-
gua may shift its activities and deliveries to minimize
its own vulnerability or to husband occasionally scarce
resources, it has an abiding commitment to the main-
tenance of the insurgency in El Salvador. Evidence of
ongoing deliveries includes:
Nicaragua during the first quarter of last year,
including 150 M-16 rifles, 40,000 rounds of 7.62
ammunition, and an assortment of grenades,
grenade launchers, and explosives.
the
materiel support to the insurgency since mid-1984
11. Restrictions have not, however, reached critical
proportions. Throughout 1984 and up to the present,
guerrillas received a shipment of mines from
Nicaragua via Honduras in May, while insur-
gents in central El Salvador reported the delivery
mid-May when Sandinista
officials told guerrilla leaders that it is "vital that
munitions reach you."
of 166 rifles
and the arrival of men from Nicaragua.
guerrilla representative in Nicaragua said in ate
February 1985 that Nicaragua was providing
better portable radios for the guerrillas to use in
conducting ambushes.
- Several reports over the past six months from
guerrilla defectors and prisoners in which they
recount firsthand details of deliveries of arms
12. For the last several years,) report-
ing has been consistent in relating that the Cosiguina
Peninsula is a major hub in the resupply network, with
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several transshipment points in the area for the dis-
patch of both men and materiel to El Salvador. Two of
the points identified reporting were
Potosi and La Pelota-60 and 50 i ometers, respec-
tively, across the Gulf of Forseca from El Salvador.
16. This activity followed on the heels of the un-
loading of the Bulgarian arms carrier, the Christo
Botev, in Nicaragua in late October.
had reported earlier that' i Libyan
mili-
tary equipment destined for El Salvador had been
Imagery analysis tended to confirm
verifying pierwork, warehouse facilities,
an arge canoes on La Pelota, and a mainland beach
area cleared as a transshipment point to the island.
The La Pelota facility was attacked and badly dam-
aged by anti-Sandinista insurgents in late 1983. Area
residents freely admitted to US journalists that it had
been used for arms shipments.
13. Meanwhile, the Potosi facility had been upgrad-
ed in 1982 and included a large, lighted, wooden pier,
POL tanks, a warehouse, and other supply buildings.
Imagery in 1983 showed a Dabur-class patrol boat
anchored near the facility with a tarp-covered cargo
and an ocean-going canoe moored alongside-highly
suggestive of an arms transfer in progress. In the last
year, however, portions of the Potosi facility have been
dismantled, and the site currently appears largely
inactive. Some of the salvaged material may have been
used to upgrade the nearby Santa Julia camp, which
appears to be primarily a training base for Salvadorans
but which sources have reported is
also now used as a transshipment point. The rough
terrain on the peninsula offers numerous other areas
where concealed transshipment facilities could be
loaded in Tripoli on a Bulgarian ship which, on the
basis of satellite photography, we believe was the
Zakharii Stoyanov. The Stoyanov proceeded to offload
its cargo in Burgas, Bulgaria, where the Christo Botev
picked up cargo and then made its journey to Nicara-
gua. This sequence of events fits with information
fro source indicating Libya's
intention to use Nicaragua as the focal point for
Libyan assistance to guerrilla groups such as the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front of El
Salvador.
17. Intelligence Community plotting of the main
logistics corridors in El Salvador-
also points clearly to maritime
from Nicaragua. (See figure 2).
Iwas partly corroborated
rilla map in 1984 showing arms transport routes
moving from the coast through the Salvadoran logistic
corridors. Together, they reflect the guerrillas' high
dependence on maritime receipt of arms from their
located
14.~ ~ has reflected ongoing resup-
ply activities in the Gulf of Fonseca area. During the
period August-November 1984,
indicators reflected at least eight infiltration opera-
tions. However, the concealment practices have made
precise identification of the routes or cargos almost
impossible
15. At other times, various intelligence indicators
have demonstrated the origins and methods of deliv-
ery of materiel.
18. In addition to such repeated indicators of resup-
ply activity, both Cuban and Sandinista officials pri-
vately acknowledge the Salvadoran
tions. During his farewell calls in
admitted the existence of the insurgents' command
and control network but suggested a quid pro quo by
added that both knew the truth. Similarly,
resupply opera-
April 1984 on
wo key Sandinista
US Ambassador
Quainton reported that both men implicitly acknowl-
edged their government's involvement with the Salva-
doran rebels he reported arms supply coordi-
nator-contended that Managua did not admit to
supply of the guerrillas just as the United States did
not admit to the mining of Nicaraguan ports, but he
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Figure 2
Central America Arms Routes
Seaborne arms route
Overland arms route
Airborne arms route
Airstrip
SAN JOSE
Costa
Rica
Secret
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and also a report from a
Jiloa is known for billeting both Salvadoran
and Honduran guerrillas, although Hondurans have
not been noted there since the beginning of 1984.
Local residents told the defense attache in March 1984
that a contingent of 20 Salvadorans in civilian attire
were undergoing physical training and classes at the
camp. A new group of 12 replaced the 20 in May,
The same source report-
ed another new group of 12 arrived in August 1984.
Training
19. In addition to military materiel, the Sandinistas
continue to provide political and military training to
the Salvadoran insurgents. We believe that a few
hundred rebels may be undergoing training in Nicara-
gua at any one tinieF__~
20. We believe, on the basis of a variety of evi-
dence, that a new training camp for the Salvadoran
guerrillas in Nicaragua was established in 1984.
reported last jury
that a military barracks was under construction near
Santa Julia on the Cosiguina Peninsula. Furthermore,
eported in
late August that a training/processing center for Salva-
doran insurgents exists at the head of the Cosiguina
Peninsula. Satellite imagery of Santa Julia shows new
buildings, a small-arms firing range. and an obstacle
course. (See figures 3 and 4.) The buildings and a
vehicle dispersal area are hidden in wooded terrain,
apparently to limit observation, an indicator that the
camp probably is for unconventional warfare training.
Moreover, the isolated location and proximity to El
Salvador make it ideal for insurgent training and
infiltration.
21. A variety of sources have reported the training
of Salvadoran insurgents in the vicinity of Managua as
well. A camp located at Jiloa, which since 1981 has
housed-for training and safehaven-Salvadorans
awaiting infiltration into El Salvador, is apparently
still functioning. (See figure 5.)
22. I (stated that Salvadoran
guerrilla units often undergo basic military training at
Sandinista army facilities under the supervision of
Sandinista officers. Trained insurgents are sometimes
integrated into regular army units or internationalist
brigades to fight the anti-Sandinista forces. Last
November and again early this year, a Nicaraguan
Democratic Force unit exchanged rounds with a group
of combatants identifying themselves as Farabundo
that Salvadorans integrated into the Sandinista army
are sent to the Honduran-Nicaraguan border for "their
baptism of fire" before being infiltrated back into El
Salvador.
23. Nicaragua has also been a communications base
for the insurgents since 1980. All five Salvadoran
guerrilla factions maintain their communications
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25. We believe the Sandinistas are fairly circum-
spect about their physical presence in El Salvador to
avoid being unequivocally implicated in the insurgen-
cy. Nevertheless, we have detected several recent
instances where Nicaraguans provided assistance in El
Salvador,
26. In addition,
the guerrilla alliance, but will increasingly focus on a
political strategy to promote the regional revolutionary
cause. Thus, we expect Managua and Havana to
continue to provide sufficient materiel for the guerril-
las to sustain at least their current level of activity. We
doubt that resupply from Nicaragua is likely to return
to pre-1984 levels unless there are major changes in
the Salvadoran or Nicaraguan political or military
28. We expect several of the factors that contribut-
ed to some decline in the volume and frequency of
materiel shipments to the Salvadoran insurgents from
Nicaragua in 1984 to hold true in 1985. These include:
- The likelihood that the Salvadoran Army will
maintain the tactical initiative, which has forced
a reduction of large-scale guerrilla operations
and disrupted internal supply networks.
- The improved surveillance by Salvadoran, Hon-
duran, and US authorities, which is complicating
resupply from Nicaragua.
- The possibility that guerrilla strength, which we
believe peaked in 1984, will decline, thus de-
creasing requirements for external resupply.2
porting indicate that Cuba an Nicaragua continue to
maintain close contact with Salvadoran guerrilla lead-
ers and to monitor the status of the insurgency:
Future Salvadoran Resupply
27. We believe that external resupply and support
assistance from Cuba and Nicaragua will remain
critical for the Salvadoran insurgents for the foresee-
able future. This will be particularly true of munitions
and other provisions, which remain the major priority
for the insurgents. We judge that the insurgents'
mentors will try to maintain the military viability of
Managua and Havana have reevaluated the situation
and no longer believe the guerrillas can achieve a
military victory in El Salvador, and may in fact face
an eventual defeat by the US-backed Army. Conse-
quently, Castro and the Sandinistas reportedly are
prepared to maintain the integrity of the guerrilla
effort in El Salvador, but their strategic focus increas-
ingly is shifting toward international political initia-
tives designed to: (1) obtain security guarantees for the
Sandinistas through the Contadora peace process and
(2) promote negotiations between the Salvadoran Gov-
ernment and the guerrillas. Several reports indicate
that Castro believes that, once the Sandinista revolu-
tion is consolidated, support for the Salvadoran insur-
and Cuba. For example
29. These trends are likely to be reinforced by the
negotiation strategy reportedly favored by Nicaragua
gents can be increased.
Regional Subversion
30. Nicaraguan activities elsewhere in Central
America and the hemisphere provide other examples
of training and arms support for radical groups,
' For a more detailed discussion of the subject, see NIE 83.1-85,
El Salvador: The Outlook for the Duarte Government, March 1985.
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generally typified by close cooperation with the Cu-
bans. In Costa Rica and Honduras, where support has
been more concerted, the Sandinistas probably hope to
gain leverage against the governments. In areas where
opportunities for successful revolution are less promis-
ing, or where Nicaragua has little, if any, real influ-
ence, the Sandinistas have nonetheless maintained
contact and, in certain cases, actively supported radi-
cal leftists. In these more distant countries, Sandinista
involvement has demonstrated revolutionary solidari-
ty; Managua also probably welcomes these individuals
as a small but enthusiastic source of troops for their
counterinsurgency effort. (See inset on page 15.F__
Honduras
31. The Sandinistas-in active cooperation with the
Cubans-have shifted their policy toward Honduras
from one of peaceful coexistence to more active
subversion, even though their efforts so far have been
largely ineffective.
Havana and Managua before 1982 cautioned against
the premature launching of an armed struggle in
Honduras because Honduras was serving as a conduit
for arms shipments to El Salvador and a safehaven for
Salvadoran guerrillas. Nevertheless, as the Honduran
Government began to intercept arms shipments, dis-
rupt leftist networks, and cooperate with the Salvador-
an military and anti-Sandinista groups, Cuban and
Nicaraguan tactics shifted. A variety of sources report
that they actively recruited and trained Honduran
radicals abroad starting in late 1981 and began active
operations in late 1982.
32. From Terrorism to Guerrilla Infiltration.
The Sandinistas first attempted to intimidate the
newly elected administration of Honduran President
Suazo with a wave of terrorist actions in the second
half of 1982,
the Nicaraguan
Embassy in Tegucigalpa was implicated in the 4 July
bombing that year of two electrical substations by
members of the Salvadoran People's Revolutionary
Army and the Honduran Revolutionary Popular
Forces. Honduran security forces raided a Salvadoran
safehouse and captured two insurgents who had par-
ticipated in the attack and linked the Nicaraguans to
their operation. Reportedly during the same raid, a
Nicaraguan national, later identified as Sandinista
Comandante Modesto, was killed. Honduran terrorists
seized over 100 prominent Honduran and foreign
businessmen in San Pedro Sula in September 1982,
demanding the release of some 60 Honduran and
Salvadoran leftists. The operation, reportedly planned
in Cuba, probably had Nicaraguan support. Other
terrorist activities-bombings on 4 August and 4
November 1982-reportedly were perpetrated by the
same Honduran and Salvadoran organizations, possi-
bly with Sandinista direction. Another example of the
close link between Honduran leftists and Managua was
the September 1983 dynamite attack on an airlines
office in San Pedro Sula. The operation by the Cin-
choneros-a radical Honduran group-was in an-
nounced retaliation for the bombing of Nicaragua's
international airport by anti-Sandinista forces.
33. The shift of strategies by Managua and Havana
was apparent during the summer of 1983, when
information
revealed that t ue Sandinistas in i -
trated 96 Cuban- and Nicaraguan-trained Honduran
insurgents into Olancho Department. The group's
objective was the establishment of a base of operations
and an insurgent organization in the Honduran in-
terior. Most of the infiltrated Hondurans reportedly
had undergone military training for up to two years in
Nicaragua and at a guerrilla training facility in Pinar
del Rio, Cuba. Several participants turned themselves
in to the authorities within days and others starved to
death in the jungle. A Honduran military operation
lasting nearly three months captured or killed the
remaining insurgents-including the group's leader,
Jose Reyes Mata.
34. Exactly a year after the Olancho operation.
Managua infiltrated another group of Cuban- and
Nicaraguan-trained Hondurans near El Paraiso, al-
though on a smaller scale-reportedly some 20 insur-
gents. By October 1984 the Honduran military had
netted 28 of some 60 would-be insurgents and their
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Nature of Nicaraguan Support to Latin Radicals
Country Remarks Year
Assistance
Initiated
El Salvador Support of Salvadoran insurgency to include provision of arms, 1979
ammunition, other materiel, ane training on a sustained basis;
serves as a secure rebel headquarters and communications base.
Honduras Support of terrorist activity; provided training and arms; helped 1981
infiltrate insurgents into Honduras; promoted unity efforts.
Guatemala Provided limited amount of arms and training; instrumental in 1981
unifying main insurgent groups; new communications support.
Costa Rica Maintenance of armed Costa Rican Communist group operat- 1979
ing inside Nicaragua since revolution; provided some training
and arms; gives guidance and material assistance to domestic
left through Embassy in San Jose.
Panama Recruitment of Panamanian operative with Cuban cooperation. 1985
Colombia Armed Colombian guerrillas operating in Nicaragua against 1979
counterrevolutionaries since revolution; provides military train-
ing to two Colombian radical groups.
Ecuador Provided military training to Ecuadorean guerrilla group; cur- 1980
rently giving training and support to domestic terrorist organi-
zation; Nicaraguan Embassy in Quito active in support of local
left.
Bolivia Nicaraguan Ambassador in La Paz active in contacts with 1983
domestic left.
Chile Support base for numerous Chilean leftists; provided military 1983
and political training; Chilean guerrillas operating against anti-
Sandinista insurgents; served as conduit for arms.
Argentina Provided false travel documentation for several radicals; has 1979
served as a safehaven for Argentine left since revolution.
Uruguay Group of Uruguayan Communists in Nicaragua as coffee 1984
pickers, perhaps received military training; plans to open
Nicaraguan Embassy in Montevideo will facilitate contacts with
left.
Brazil Possibly provided military training; group of Brazilian Commu- 1984
nists scheduled to enter into armed operations against anti-
Sandinistas.
Venezuela Group of Cuban-trained Venezuelan radicals in Nicaragua, 1983
probably to fight against anti-Sandinistas.
Dominican Military and political training provided to Dominican left since 1979
Republic revolution; Nicaraguan Embassy in Santo Domingo active in
supporting domestic radicals.
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35. As with El Salvador, Sandinista officials have
admitted their involvement
in March 1983 Nicaraguan Foreign
Minister D'Escoto told the UN Secretary General that
Nicaragua would one day send guerrillas into Hondu-
ras-the Olancho infiltration occurred four months
36. Training. In addition to the training reportedly
provided by Cuba and Nicaragua to the infiltrated
insurgents, a variety of sources have detailed other
types of instruction.
38. As with the Salvadoran insurgents, the Sandinis-
tas provide the Hondurans with battlefield experience.
in March 1984
that a company-sized unit of one uran Communists
and other revolutionaries, commanded by Sandinistas,
was targeted against anti-Sandinista forces.
quarters and sanctuary to virtually every known Hon-
duran leftist group, according to a variety of sources.
The Honduran radical left in 1983 and 1984 issued
several unity announcements from Managua, attesting
to its close association with the Sandinistas, and the
Nicaraguan capital serves as a base for the dissemina-
39. Other Support. The Sandinistas provide head-
40. Despite Nicaragua's severe economic problems,
it has provided funding to various Honduran groups.
radical university ele-
37. Training activities have continued, as illustrated
by several examples:
- Honduran authorities in September 1983 arrest-
ed a guerrilla "paymaster" who reportedly was
responsible for distributing payments to the fam-
ilies of young men who had gone to Nicaragua
and Cuba for training.
the University of Hon( uras
labor union was actively recruiting its member-
ship and students for guerrilla training in Nicara-
gua and Cuba.
- As of early November 1984. three recruiters were
combing three Honduran departments for candi-
dates to take guerrilla training in Nicaragua and
Cuba
Some 70 reportedly were al-
ready in different stages of the training process.
meats received technical equipment and funds from
Nicaragua to produce anti-US propaganda in January
Guatemala
41. Cuba and Nicaragua continue to provide assis-
tance to Guatemalan leftists, who have been fighting a
guerrilla war for over 20 years, although it has been
more sporadic and not as far-reaching as in the
Salvadoran case. Over the last six to 12 months,
however, Managua has extended new communications
support to the Guatemalan insurgents, which is remi-
niscent of early Sandinista support for the Salvadoran
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43. Training.
we judge that the bulk of the training given to the
Guatemalan left occurs in Cuba, but a limited amount
is provided by the Sandinistas. Managua probably
plays a greater role in facilitating the travel of training
46. The Sandinistas apparently view Costa Rica as a
special category in their efforts to export the revolu-
tion-one step removed from the confrontational poli-
cy of supporting insurgencies elsewhere in Central
America and subject to a more subtle mix of clandes-
tine and other means. Several factors probably account
for Nicaragua's posture, including the absence of a
standing army and San Jose's inclination to remain
neutral in regional conflicts. Both Cuba and Nicaragua
probably recognize that an insurgency in Costa Rica
would have little chance of success. In addition,
they
believe that armed insurrection in Costa Rica would
47. Shortly after their revolution, the Sandinistas
began to use their residual local support in Costa
Rica-which had actively supported the anti-Somoza
campaign-to promote their own regional interests.
intervention aimed at Nicaragua
prompt San Jose to call on Washington for security
assistance that eventually could result in a military
the Sandinistas set up a
44. Arms Deliveries and Other Activities. Solid
evidence of Nicaraguan arms support in recent years is
lacking. Nevertheless, we believe that land routes
through Honduras for weapons destined for the Salva-
dorans are probably also used to transport materiel to
45. Despite the relatively low level of Sandinista
support for the Guatemalan insurgency, we believe
Managua maintains an active interest. In addition to
communications support, reporting from several
sources over the last six months suggests efforts to
expand the arms supply corridors through Guatemala
into western and northwestern El Salavador. These
routes may also be used to service Guatemalan guerril-
la needs
support network in San Jose
support apparatus for the alvadoran guerrillas in
Guanacaste Province during the early 1980s. In 1982,
Managua made initial efforts to establish a terrorist
but shifted to less aggressive tactics.
but the network was
discovered. Nicaragua continued to deal with the left,
48. Training and Arms. Managua's most extensive
clandestine support goes to the so-called Mora-Canas
brigade-a group of Costa Rican radicals that has been
operating in Nicaragua against the anti-Sandinista
insurgents.
fled military duty in Nicaragua
members o the Costa scan Communist party who
fought with the Sandinistas during their revolution
form the basis for this military arm, which formally
organized in late 1981. Their initial preparations
included spending some six to 12 months on unspeci-
officer training to selected members.
since last fall that several hundred
Some of the Costa Rican Communists' internal party
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differences revolve around the role of the brigade,
which the hardline faction wants to use as the back-
bone of a domestic insurgency. Reflecting the special
status of Costa Rica, Sandinista officials have said
privately that they would support an armed confronta-
tion in Costa Rica if events sparked it, although they
53. Although Colombia is a member of the Conta-
dora group and maintains correct relations with Nica-
ragua, the Sa -
an guerrillas.
have advised against starting one.
49. In addition to providing battlefield experience
to the Communists, the Sandinistas have provided
arms support. in
December 1983 that 1,000 rifles and 500,000 rounds of
ammunition were to be smuggled into Costa Rica for
the Communist Party. Earlier reporting indicated that
the brigade had cached weapons from Nicaragua on
both sides of the border.
the Sandinistas
have also provided training such as that accorded to
union leaders on the orizanization and indoctrination-
of union members.
Front sent five militants for training at a Sandinista
army base in 1984. This group reportedly followed a
previous contingent that returned in 1984.
50. Diplomatic and Other- Contacts. In addition
to using direct supplier contacts, Nicaraguan diplo-
mats also actively cultivate the left inside Costa Rica.
South America and the Caribbean
52. In our view, Managua has increased its involve-
ment in South America and the Caribbean. Although
these activities are on a relatively small scale, they now
range from efforts to cultivate solidarity to supporting
and training insurgent groups. (See table.)
54. In the course of their training, the M-19 mem-
bers have received combat experience against the anti-
Sandinista insurgents. An M-19 guerrilla spokesman
publicly admitted in early December 1984 that mem-
bers of his group were fighting in Nicaragua and had
Ecuador
55. Nicaraguan political and financial support to
the Ecuadorean left is well documented and, accord-
ing to limited information, extends to military train-
56. In 1983, then President Hurtado officially ad-
monished Nicaraguan Ambassador Cortes for cultivat-
ing the domestic left. His successor, President Febres-
Cordero, reportedly sent the dean of the diplomatic
corps to deliver the same message in November 1984.
Cortes persisted in efforts to build links with the left,
and Ecuadorean authori-
ties finally expelled the Consul last December as a
warning to the Nicaraguans.
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To Secre
Summary of Nicaraguan Support to Latin Radicals
Country Arms Ammuni- Military Political Commu- Funds Safehaven Other Year
tion Training a Training nications Support b Begun
a To include experience fighting against anti-Sandinista insurgents.
b To include support through Nicaraguan diplomatic missions, false
documentation, recruitments, and so forth.
57. In addition, the Sandinistas have offered fund-
ing to the Ecuadorean left.
1983
1979
59. The Pinochet regime in Chile has been an
obvious target for clandestine support to the left, and
Managua has played a role in aiding its subversion, at
least since early 1983. Supporting Sandinista efforts,
but also providing training, Chilean leftists were fight-
ing against the anti-Sandinistas in northern Nicaragua
in July 1983 after receiving guerrilla warfare instruc-
tion in Cuba and the Soviet Union,
58. On the military side, Ecuador's growing guerril-
la movement has received some assistance from the
Sandinistas.
Nicaragua was scheduled to serve
as the transshipment point for arms and ammunition
from Libya to Chilean radicals as of early 1983-and
in mid-1984-although we are not able to confirm the
transfers. Chilean expatriates were involved in mid-
1983 in recruiting internationalist brigades to receive
military training in Nicaragua,
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against the anti-Sandinistas with the option of going to
another-unspecified-Latin American country to
fight at the expiration of their tour of duty in Nicara-
gua.
60. The Sandinistas also provide the Chilean left
with other means of support. For example,
120 members o t e C
can Unitary Popular Action Movement recently par-
ticipated in a political action training course in Nicara-
Qua~
Managua provides safehaven to representatives of the
Chilean Movement of the Revolutionary Left and the
Chilean Communist Party.
Other Countries
61. Intelligence from several other countries points
to a fairly wide range of Nicaraguan contacts with
subversives, although the reporting from other Latin
American nations is sporadic and often affords only a
glimpse into the Sandinistas' local activities. For
example:
- The Sandinistas have provided medical, educa-
tional, ideological, and military training to some
several hundred Dominicans since 1979
Other reporting
has corroborated the training, although we be-
lieve the number is somewhat less. Also, Mana-
gua's mission in the Dominican Republic in
October 1983 sponsored a strategy session with
local leftists to plan demonstrations, peace
marches, and protest letters condemning US poli-
cy toward Nicaragua.
- Some members of the Venezuelan Revolutionary
Tendency group, who received guerrilla training
in Cuba, were in Nicaragua as of July 1983,
probably
to receive combat experience by fighting the
anti-Sandinistas.
- Nicaragua reportedly facilitated travel to Syria
for several Argentine Montoneros by providing
them with Nicaraguan passports. Sandinistas
reportedly engaged Montoneros to assassinate
Anastacio Somoza Debayle in Paraguay in 1981,
and a Montonero-owned radio station in Costa
Rica was closed in 1980 and shipped to
Nicaragua.
- In September 1983, the Nicaraguan Ambassador
to Bolivia became the subject of a Bolivian
Senate investigation after he met with students,
workers, and politicians and reportedly urged
them to convert Bolivia into a "free country" like
Nicaragua.
62. Elsewhere in the region, the Sandinistas proba-
bly will pursue a dual strategy of trying to draw other
nations into bilateral agreements while continuing to
support the left. In South America and the Caribbean,
the Sandinistas probably will continue to try to be
discreet in their activities and take care not to damage
relations with friendly governments in the region.
Nonetheless, we believe they will also hedge their
bets-especially since some friendly governments are
beginning to become disillusioned-by continuing to
provide assistance and guerrilla training to leftists in
the area
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