EXPELLING AMERICA: A NEW COORDINATED RADICAL STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000301250027-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: October 1, 1984
• Content Type: MISC

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EXPELLING AMERICA: A NEW COORDINATED
RADICAL STRATEGY
An Overview
By
Avigdor Haselkorn
October 1984
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Origins of the Radical Coalition
Ever since the early 1980s, a core radical group of countries, comprising
Libya, Syria, Iran, North Korea and Cuba, has attempted to coordinate a wide-
ranging strategy designed to expel the United States military, political and
economic presence from key world areas.*
Five developments, in the late 1970s, helped crystallize the radical
countries into a .purposeful coalition:
* It should be made unequivocably clear at the outset, that when the term
"coordinated" is used to describe the radical strategy, two meanings are
intended:
1. In specific instances, the radical countries have attempted
to operationally coordinate moves designed to harm US interests
abroad. Certain direct attacks on US personnel and facilities
overseas (e.g. the October-1983 bombing of the Marines'
Headquarters in Beirut) have been the result of such
collaboration. The same holds true with regard to radical activity
designed to stretch US forces thin.
2. More importantly, it is not suggested that radical leaders
conduct a "conference call" prior to every anti-US operation.
Rather, it is imperative that we understand these countries present
unison via a shared ideology, a Weltanschauung, which identifies
America as their common enemy and prescribes principles of
response. The consensus among the core radicals that they are
"brothers-in-arms standing in the same trench in the struggle
against imperialism," creates a pronounced and widely shared
willingness to support each other by independently embarking on
measures inimical to US interests. Moreover, the common objective
of expelling America dictates in the minds of the core leadership a
base need for joint action as the power imbalance between the
contestants is enormous.
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-- The initiation of the Camp David peace process by Egypt's
President Sadat in November 1977, which led to the formation of the
Arab Steadfastness Front.
-- The fall of the Shah of Iran and the installation in power of
the Ayatollah Khomeini's regime in early 1979.
-- The July 1979 seizure of power by the Sandinistas in Nicaragua,
which had a profound impact on the policies of Cuba.
-- The establishment of a US Rapid Deployment Force which the core
radical countries perceived as a direct military threat.
-- The election of President Reagan in early 1980. The election
was clearly perceived by radical leaderships as signalling
America's determination to regain its lost stature and position
most likely by "settling the account" with the radical countries.
Elements of the Radical Expulsion Strategy
The radical effort to expel America contains three elements:
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Element 1: Dislodging the US of External Strategic Assets
The first operational element of the strategy involves radical
collaboration in efforts to destroy the US political/military infrastructure
overseas. The aim is threefold: First, to eliminate the rationale for US
military and political presence abroad by decoupling America's allies from
Washington. Second, to impede America military deployments in key world areas
by undermining their external base structure. Third, to intensify foreign
condemnation of US overseas presence and involvement.
The prime method employed by the radical coalition to achieve these
objectives involves the launching of a concerted and intensive subversive
campaign against Third World regimes friendly to the US. As Figure 1
demonstrates, three kinds of inter-related subversions are noticeable in the
target areas: ideological, political and economic. Manifestations of the
three subversive techniques are frequently visible in areas stretching from
the Phillipines to Western Africa as well as in Central America. While it is
impossible to detail in the limited space available the evidence supporting
this contention several examples will testify to its prevalence.
-- Sri Lanka, where the US is planning to build a powerful VOA
transmitter, has been the subject of an intensified campaign to
destabilize the government there. The Colombo daily Sunday Times, on
22 April 1984, reported, for example, "a dramatic North Korean link in
the Tamil separatist campaign while diplomatic sources said the Pyongyang
might be trying to destabilize the Sri Lankan Government because of its
pro-Western stance." Accordingly, Tamil separatist radio broadcasts
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picked up in Colombo and in southern India were said to have been beamed
from a North Korean ship anchored in the narrow straits between India and
Sri Lanka.
"The weekend broadcasts--in English, Sinhala and Tamil--calling
for a separate Tamil state in the North and east of Sri Lanka
and advocating terrorism, are said to be beamed by a powerful
transmitter which is shifted around to avoid jamning...The ship
was anchored outside the new surveillance zone set up (in early
April) by the National Security Ministry between Sir Lanka's
coast and the maritime boundary with India and safely out of
reach of the navy and air force."
In May 1984, Sri Lanka's Minister of Transport, M. H. Mohamed conducted a
5-day visit to Libya to "inquire about allegations" that Tripoli has been
supporting the Tamil insurgency. Mohamed told newsmen in Madras, India
that Libyan foreign minister All Abd as-Salam at-Turayki had "dismissed"
charges about his country's connection with the Tamil separatists. It
may be recalled in this connection that during its 1982 "Peace for
Galilee" operation, Israeli forces captured dozens of Tamil "Tigers" who
had been training in PLO bases in Lebanon. More were reportedly
undergoing training in PLO camps in South Yemen. More importantly from a
longer term perspective, is the establishment by Libya of various Islamic
institutions inside Sri Lanka ostensibly to attend to the needs of its
Muslim minority numbering more than a million people (7% of the
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population). This process would likely result in the further
radicalization of the Sri Lankan society.
-- Jordan: There is no question but that the Hashemite Kingdom is under
increasing radical pressure. While part of this is due to King Hussein's
strong and continuous support for Iraq in its ongoing war with Iran, the
recent intensification of this campaign could also be traced to US plans
to assign the Jordanian Army the mission of a "regional rapid deployment
force." Further, the recent decision to normalize relations with Egypt,
would likely be a costly one for Hussein.
An interesting and unusual description of the concerted radical
effort to undermine the Jordanian monarchy was recently given by its
Prime Minister Ahmad Ubaydat. Speaking in the House of Representatives
on 15 May 1984, Ubaydat described in detail radical efforts at
ideological subversion aimed at Jordanian students both inside the
country as well as those studying abroad. He noted:
"I do not want to discuss this subject too much, but I assure
you that hardly a week passes without the authorities
impounding explosives or weapons transferred to this country to
be used in this country. These explosives and weapons are not
intended to be used in the occupied territories. We are not
ashamed to say this... The onslaught is fierce. There are party
and political organizations, some of them from the resistance
factions and others. Some of them have relations with the host
country, some of them have relations with Libya, and some of
them have relations with Iran. Even the (Syrian-backed) Fatah
dissidents who rebelled against their leadership have a role.
They seceded from their leadership and they are now working
against Jordan. They sent fresh quantities of weapons to
Jordan. Explosives and bombs were seized. There is also the
Al-Jihad Organization which is active in Egypt...(This
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organization) even contacted Iran with the aim of coordinating
actions. Weapons were seized. It was revealed that they
received training in Lebanon and in other places. There was
also another religious organization owing allegiance to Iran,
under the patronage of the Iranian Embassy in Jordan.
Jordanian citizens were involved. They exploited to Mosques to
begin their campaign. They did not name their organization in
order to avoid being pursued. Those responsible for this
organization visited Iran twice, contacted the Iranian charge
d'affaires in Amman, and contacted other sides. This is going
on continuously.
Element 2: Stretching US Forces Thin
As an integral part of the coordinated radical effort to expel America
from key world regions, some countries, particularly Libya and the DPRK, have
sought to stretch US military power thin, by fomenting tensions in certain
areas of the world as well as by launching strategic'diversions. It would
seem that in pursuing this strategy, the radicals sought to:
-- Spread US military resources between widely separate
geographical areas, thus reducing the potential effectiveness of
the deployments.
-- Increase the financial cost for the US of maintaining
expeditionary forces abroad.
-- Demonstrate the vulnerability and political fragility of Third
World regimes friendly to the United States by highlighting their
frequent need for US military backing. In turn, this is regarded
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by the radicals as abetting popular discontent inside the target
countries and as contributing to an increased reluctance on the
part of Third World states to offer America their friendship and
military facilities.
-- Create for the benefit of international and domestic audiences
alike the impression that the United States is under attack around
the world. Also, that Washington has been relentlessly pursuing an
"aggressive and interventionist imperial policy" which is not only
immoral but in fact very dangerous.
As Table 1 below demonstrates, radical leaders have apparently
recognized, and sought to exploit, the emerging correlation between incessant
and costly committals of American forces abroad, and the improved prospects
for a wholesale withdrawal of US foreign political/military presence which
such trials yield eventually. Consequently, Libya and the DPRK have engaged
in a long term strategy designed to undermine the United States' overseas
posture by repeatedly putting it under strain. Expulsion of American military
presence, expected as a consequence, is undoubtedly regarded in both Tripoli
and Pyongyang as the best guarantee for long term survival of the Libyan and
North Korean regimes. Moreover, the removal of US power from key world
regions is likely to open up new opportunities for radical countries to export
revolution, uproot opposing regimes and destabilize local allies of the US.
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It should be stressed that while the diversionary efforts cited in
Table 1 might be dismissed as insignificant militarily, several considerations
need to be taken into account:
-- The Soviet Union, either through pre-planning or by seizing an
opportunity, could time a major strategic move to coincide with
other radical pressures so as to scatter US military resources
between several fronts. Alternatively, radical countries'
willingness to independently launch anti-US operations (e.g. mining
of key waterways) to support a Soviet military initiative should
not be doubted.
-- The size of the diversionary effort depends entirely on its
perpetrators. The DPRK, and to a lesser extent Libya, possess
capabilities which in principle allow them greater impact on US
strategic posture overseas via intensified military pressure on key
US allies if they so desire.
-- Following each of the diversionary interactions detailed in
Table 1, the central DPRK-Libyan activity was followed up by
"secondary" interactions with Syria.
-- The United States, by being unaware of true radical
motivations, has actually rewarded negative behavior. It is
critically important to appreciate that Qaddafi and other radical
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leaders have been masters of deception. The Libyan leader has thus
not only deceived the US, but utilized Washington's countermeasures
themselves to further his subversion of US allies. He says:
"What a shame. Following each fabricated incident, rescue
calls are made to the United States to send US spy planes.
What a farce. Rescue calls were made for US AWACS aircraft 4
times in one year, as if Egypt and Sudan--which represent half
the Arab nation's population--cannot defend themselves, cannot
feel assured, and cannot preserve their security except with US
aircraft. This is a shame for the Egyptian and Sudanese
armies. This is a shame for the Egyptian and Sudanese
people. Following each fabricated incident, rescue calls are
immediately made to the United States, as if Egypt has no air
defense system, or an air force. Egypt has said it will
protect Sudan. Egypt has pledged to protect Sudan. If Egypt
can protect Sudan, then why can it not protect itself, having
to seek help of US spy aircraft 4 times in one year...He who
has nothing cannot give."
Ironically, through its inept response, the US has thus assisted
the long-standing radical quest to destabilize Egypt and the Sudan.
-- It would appear that in addition to specific diversionary
operations, usually launched to deflect growing US military
presence in the vicinity of one of the two countries (DPRK and
Libya) , radical strategy has sought to involve America permanently
in trouble spots close to its own shores. While some observers may
argue that radical support of Nicaragua has been thus motivated by
cynical self-serving interests, this is hardly the view of the core
radical leaders. In fact they have frequently served notice that
their own challenges to the US have to taken pressures off the
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"progressive forces" elsewhere, for example, in Central America.
The radical effort is thus total and interelated while the claim of
self interest is based in partial interpretations inappropriate to
the understanding of a comprehensive concept envisioning a unified
approach to the problem of "imperialist aggression."
Element 3: Direct Targeting of US Presence and Interests
As noted on several occasions, raids on US targets overseas were
unquestionably the result of operational collaboration between two or more
core radical members. Other hits were carried out independently. Such state-
sponsored terrorist strikes at American personnel and installations overseas
are designed to force the US to withdraw its presence from key outposts as
being too costly. The attacks are also intended to demonstrate Washington's
inability to defend its own interests and instruments of foreign presence, let
alone its allies. From this particular perspective, radical attacks on
defended US facilities are perhaps of greater payoff than striking at
isolated, vulnerable targets. Again, the particular traits of the radical
thinking have to be recognized in order to devise appropriate
countermeasures: It may be that defense actually provokes attacks rather than
deters them.
Besides, forcing the US to boost the defenses of American institutions
-abroad, entails other important benefits as well. For example, in the wake of
the December 1983 bombing of the US Embassy in Kuwait, as well as other
official French and Kuwaiti institutions, the New York Times, on 13 December
1983, observed as follows:
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"The attackers surely must have known that such bombings will force
the Americans and the French to hide behind the prison-camp-style
barriers which presently protect the American and French Embassies
in Beirut. But the more isolated these foreign diplomatic missions
become and the more repressive the security measures the host
countries take, the more fertile the ground for spreading
revolutionary ideas. In this sense Beirut is a prime example,
where with each passing day of misery more and more posters of
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini seem to appear on walls around town."
The United States could thus find itself confronting a dangerous and
complicated vicious cycle: While neglecting the defenses of its overseas
institution has brought strong condemnation at home, externally hardening such
installations could prove provocative, and would seem to involve significant
political costs.
Of particular concern are recent efforts by core members to equip
themselves with weaponry potentially useful in attacking US targets.
Moreover, in this quest the radical countries have been aided not only by the
Soviet Union, but by the greed of certain West European states. Such has been
the case with French supply of Exocet SSMs as well as Italian fast missile
patrol boats to Libya. For their part, the Soviets are known to have provided
Syria with ground-to-sea missiles capable of hitting US Sixth Fleet ships if
another American-Syrian confrontation develops. The provision of SS-12
Scaleboard missiles to Libya is another disturbing development, raising
suspicions about Moscow's motivations vis-a-vis the core radical coalition.
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Sources of Hostility Towards the US
It has to be made abundantly clear that despite their participation in
the radical coalition, individual motivations for seeking "memberships" cannot
be overlooked. In the longer run, some of the countries may even become
rivals--most notably in the case of future Syrian-Iranian relations. However,
these countries are presently united by a potent and lasting bond--deep-seated
enmity toward, and profound anxiety over, Washington's intentions.
The enmity of the five core radicals towards the United States grows out
of the following:
1. The US is perceived as a strong ideological threat. Two
observations need to be made to appreciate the significance of this
reality:
-- It should be noted that save for Syria's Asad, all other
leaders of the core countries have come to power on the basis
of universal ideologies designed to substitute for Capitalism,
for example, Qaddafi 's Third Universal Theory and Khomeini 's
Fundamentalistic Islam.
-- The radicals see the ideological threat as American. For
example:
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"Who learns Russian, listens to Radio Moscow, watches
Soviet films, buys Czech watches, or invests in the
Ukraine? It is the United States and Western Europe,
rather, that influence Muslims everywhere. Their pop
music, movies, video games, comics, textbooks, literature,
and art reach throughout the Muslim world. Their clothing,
foods, household items, and machines are found in towns and
villages. Their universities and banks and oil companies
beckon aspiring Muslims. Their sexual
customs--contraception, abortion, dancing, dating,
nightclubs, pornography, mixed social drinking, tight
clothing, scant swimming suits, mixed bathing, beauty
pagents, co-educations and female employment--break down
the divisions required by Islamic law... Fundamentalists
view the culture of the United States and West Europe as
the main threat because its influence so greatly exceeds
that of the Soviet bloc."*
2. America is perceived as a potential direct military threat.
3. Since all of these countries hold irredentist claims
against neighboring states, or have been actively engaged in
exporting revolution, they perceive Washington's pro-status quo
stance as an obstacle to their territorial and political
ambitions. Though radical leaderships do not agree ib the precise
details of the future international system, they are unanimous in
their view of its present ills and the absolute need for its
radical restructuring.
4. Syria, Libya and Iran have attempted to harm American
interests because of Washington's strong support for Israel. The
* Daniel Pipes "Fundamentalist Muslims and US Policy," International
Briefing, the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C. 10 August 1984,
pp.7-8.
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latter is perceived as a powerful regional check against these
countries' aspirations, possibly acting in cohort with Washington.
Novel Aspects of the Radical Strategy
Four aspects make the radical strategy a serious threat to US
security interests:
-- Coordination: While the core countries--with the exception of
Iran under the Shah--have had a long record of supporting radical
causes (e.g. terrorism), the novel aspect is the often lucid
demonstration of the concerted nature of the expulsion effort,
including a proven and growing interest in collaborating in harming
specific US interests and instruments of foreign presence, since
the early 1980s.
-- Motivation: It has been customary among Western observers to
assume that underlying these countries' radical motivation are:
First, the need for hard currency--this particularly in the case of
North Korea's military and other support for such radicals as Iran
and Libya. Second, the search for political clout or
legitimization--allegedly the belief among the leaders of these
countries that revolutionary zeal and pronounced extremism are
conducive to cementing their domestic position and claim for the
leadership of the world's "liberation forces." In contrast, the
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current perspective suggests that the main motivation behind a
large share of radical-sponspored activities is strategic and
ideological. In turn, this guarantees that the participants would
be less prone to compromise and more likely to "go all the way"
against their implacable enemy--the United States.
-- Range of anti-US activities: In recent years the study of
radicalism has become synonymous with that of terrorism. By being
too narrowly focused, Western analysts have thus contributed to a
dangerous fallacy neglecting in the process an entire range of
radical (non-terrorist) activities similarly designed to harm
American overseas interests. For some unexplained reason, Western
observers have treated ideological subversion of US allies, or the
massing of conventional armies on their borders, as a separate,
perhaps less ominous, phenomenon unrelated to an overall radical
strategy even when carried out by the very countries which, at
other times, were denounced for the sponsorship of terrorism.
-- Target: The prime target of the radical expulsion strategy is
the US presence and security interests abroad. This holds true
even when such activities do not physically harm the instruments of
America's foreign presence themselves. For instance, the wide-
spread radical subversive efforts noticeable in Third World
countries friendly to the United States are mainly aimed at
undermining America's overseas posture by dislodging the US of its
external strategic assets.
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The Role of the Soviet Union
Moscow does not appear to control the radical expulsion strategy. By all
accounts, the five core radical countries are sufficiently motivated to pursue
their anti-US activities independently. However, in order to reap the
benefits of this radical campaign, no Soviet control is necessary. In fact,
the Soviets cannot be described as passive. On the contrary, ample evidence
exists to suggest strong Soviet support of the radical coalition. In general,
the Soviets seems to be utilizing the various radical pressures to further
their penetration of the target areas. Recent examples of this policy course
could be found in Soviet arms offers to Kuwait and Lebanon, its conclusion on
9 October 1984 of a friendship treaty with the YAR and its courting of Jordan.
With regard to the core radical countries themselves, the Soviets seem to
be engaged in a threefold effort:
1. Consistent and highly visible efforts to radicalize the
core countries even further, while attempting to streamline their
hostility exclusively against the United States.
2. Supplying the war: The Soviets have attempted to build up
the defenses of the five radical countries so that they can
effectively protect themselves and support each other if confronted
by Washington. The recent supply of anti-ship missiles to Syria is
a case in point. Similar activity is apparent with regard to the
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supply of sophisticated Soviet mines to Libya (one of which was
found recently in the Red Sea), the upgrading of the Cuban arsenal,
as well as the expected resumption of aircraft deliveries
(reportedly 30-40 MIG-23s) to the DPRK.
Additionally, by augmenting radical arsenals, the Soviets
have, in effect, allowed the core countries the extension of their
military reach into those regions where Moscow has sought to foment
trouble and undermine America's position. A striking example of
this evolving capability came in April 1983, when four Libyan cargo
planes--3 of which were Soviet-built I1-76s--were intercepted by
Brazilian authorities, apparently on their way to Nicaragua. A
search of the planes uncovered heavy arms, missiles, Czech rifles,
a dismantled Soviet training plane and at least 5 tons of bombs and
grenades. Newspaper accounts reported allegations that the arms
were, in fact, bound for El Salvador, by way of Nicaragua, to help
the Marxist guerrillas fighting the government there.
3. Deterring the US from responding to the source: On
numerous occasions Moscow has made it clear that it will not
tolerate US military moves designed to respond, and at times
retaliate, against the territories of the core radical states. A
similar Soviet posture has been noticeable with regard to
'Khomeini's Iran. Frequently, the Soviets have implied and/or
demonstrated their defensive umbrella over that country. For
example, the Soviets had warned the United States against attacking
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Iran, when in the wake of the failed US rescue mission, reports
indicated America was planning to punish Tehran and seize Kharg
Island. The Soviets on that occasion also massed troops and
conducted exercises on their border with Iran.
It has to be recognized, at the same time, that since the US
has seldom entertained serious thoughts of striking at the core
countries, Soviet protective image is both effective and "cheaply"
acquired. In effect Moscow has been capitalizing on America's
confusion and uncertainty regarding what response, if any, should
be developed to deal with the proliferation of anti-American
radical pressures.
Some Western observers have noted that the USSR may potentially be more
concerned over radicalism than the United States is. They cite Soviet
geographical proximity, Russia's ethnic composition and the anti-dominationist
content of radical ideology as elements which should make Moscow
apprehensive. Consequently, it is suggested that the Soviets may be open to
some sort of US-Soviet cooperation in checking the radical threat. However,
there are serious difficulties standing in the way of such a hypothetical
condominium:
-- It is illogical to assume that as the radicals become more
-effective against American presence and interests, the Soviets
would get less interested. Besides their vehement anti-
Americanism, what attracts Moscow to the radical countries is the
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geographical spread and geopolitical opportunities which the five
states potentially provide:
- Syria--is an important outpost on Turkey's southern flank
as well as on Jordan's northern borders, and a crucial link to
Iran. It may also provide a potential staging area useful in
confronting US naval deployments in the Mediterranean.
- Libya--has been an important staging area for Soviet
penetration of Africa. In addition, it has provided a pressure
point against Egypt and the Sudan, and may play a role in
Soviets plans for confronting the US Sixth Fleet.
- Iran--could become a focal point in a Soviet drive towards
the Persian Gulf. Over the longer range, Iran may become the
linchpin in a Soviet effort to establish a "southern tier"
designed to protect its defense perimeter, or in Soviet
parlance "southern borders."
- North Korea--has been an important instrument in Soviet
policy of exerting pressure on the PRC. It shares Soviet
interest in blocking increased US-Japan-ROK strategic ties
which apparently are tacitly supported by China.
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- Cuba--in addition for being located in America's backyard,
the country provides an attractive staging area for further
penetration of Central American-Caribbean basin.
-- Cooperation with the US in checking radical countries is liable
to undermine Moscow's position in the Third World.
-- The radical threat could become an important bargaining chip
for the Soviets in their relations with the US. In other words, by
utilizing their widely-held image of "puppeteers" the Soviets may
gain more than by professing Moscow's own concerns. On the other
hand, an American approach suggesting that such a superpower
cooperation be established, tacitly confirms such a US perception
and would likely confer on the Soviets important polito/strategic
advantages.
Conclusion
While some in the West, solely preoccupied with combating terrorist, have
been endlessly searching for the "smoking gun," a macro view of the radical
expulsion effort produces an entirely different "surprise": repeated, clear-
cut and public confirmation by leaders of the core countries of their extreme
jnalintentions towards the United States. This in spite of their fears of
retaliation by an enemy which they themselves have described as an "arch-
satan," and the secretive nature of some of the techniques they have employed
against America's interests and presence overseas.
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In light of this reality the impression has emerged that what hinders the
US is not the lack of evidence, but rather the absence of a hypothesis which
could explain how the various "pieces" fit. Indeed, the contradiction
highlighted between Western assumptions recommending secrecy and dissociation,
vs. the actual open reaffirmation, at times boastful substantiation, of these
countries' deep enmity, seem to have continuously thrown intelligence
estimates off balance, causing them to judge radical warnings as non-
credible. Up to now, the only beneficiaries of this fallacy have been the
leaders of the core radical coalition. In fact, the widely-shared belief that
these leaders' conduct is "erratic," or "crazy," has been in total variance
with the fact that in their anti-US campaign, they have been completely
rational and fanatically attached to their goal of driving America out of
their spheres of interest.
Several other intelligence fallacies stem from the preceding analysis:
-- There is dangerously little attention given in the West to the role
that ideology plays in guiding some international actors.
-- Radicalism has been consistently and wrongly equated with terrorism.
-- Extremist intentions openly communicated have been normally thought
as incredible and often ignored.
-- Assumptions that militant utterances may be indeed cover for
willingness to negotiate may be flawed. In fact it could be that
willingness to negotiate is nothing but a cover for hostile intentions.
21
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 Approved For Release 2010/08/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R000301250027-5
-- The assumption that a military issue acquires its significance only
if presented in Soviet terms, disregards the painful lessons of Lebanon.
-- It is impossible to ignore the record of Soviet interactions with the
radical countries. Moreover, the assumption that the Soviet radical link
has resulted from Moscow's failures in the Third World is not only
arguable but more importantly, irrelevant to the problem at hand: the
consequences for the United States of such a link.
-- Deception is a game which even small powers may effectively play to
their own advantage because of America's continuous pre-occupation with
the Soviet threat alone.
-- There is significant, recurring and detectable evidence of regular
and highly intensive anti-US polito/strategic interactions between all
the core radical countries to warrant viewing them as members of a
coalition and their activities as governed by common ideology and
strategy.
99
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 Approved For Release 2010/08/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R000301250027-5
r s'.JUL t.
RADICAL ACTIVITIES DESIGNED TO DESTROY U.S. POLITICAL-STRATEGIC
INFRASTRUCTURE ABROAD
DISLODGING U.S' OF EXTERNAL
STRATEGIC ASSETS (ALLIES, BASES, etc.)
COLLABORATION IN SUBVERTING
U.S. ALLIES
ECONOMIC
SUBVERSION
z
NONECONOMIC
MEANS EMPLOYED
TO SUBVERT U.S.
ALLIES' ECONOMIES
(MINING OF RED
SEA)
ECONOMIC
WARFARE
(SUBVERTING
SAUDI OIL
INDUSTRY AND
ECONOMY) ,
STATE-SPONSORED
TERRORISM
I
ATTACKS BY
EXTERNALLY
BASED TERRORIST
ORGANIZATIONS
(PLO; AL-JIHAD,
PF LPt~ A8k-PAD?)
IDEOLOGICAL
SUBVERSION
POLITICAL
SUBVERSION
SCHOLARSHIPS SEMINARS PROPAGANDA
(IDEOLOGICAL (IDEOLOGICAL
AND AND
RELIGIOUS) RELIGIOUS)
INSURRECTION CONVENTIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL
MILITARY WARFARE
PRESSURE fe tA6Aa-.T PE-
(S'1* -7&ADA,1) tyjj l ?F SMEIICDyMs)
SUPPORTING
INTERNAL INSUR-
GENCIES INSIDE
COUNTRIES FRIENDLY
TO U.S. (PHILIPPINES,
THAILAND, J V; ig?E',
EL SALVADOR)
Approved For Release 2010/08/06: CIA-RDP88B00443R000301250027-5