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March 28, 1986
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Approved For Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950009-7 United States .j America Sam Nunn MEMO TO: Editors FROM: Scott Maxwell DATE: March 28, 1986 RE: Senator Nunn's vote on contra aid UNrrsn $TATO a...Aa WA/S.MO7u.( D. C. (202) *24-3921 Senator Nunn asked me to send you the attached clipping from the Congressional Record. Included are his floor statement prior to the Senate's vote on contra aid, his letter to President Reagan, the President's response and a colloquy between Senator Nunn and Senator Cohen (R-ME), which collectively outline the reasoning behind Senator Nunn's vote in favor of military assistance. CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE Mr. N'UNN. Mr. President. last year. Senators LUGAR. BENTSEN, BOREN. CHILES. JOHNSTON, DOLE. - DQREN- BERCER, .'DECOVCIN7.- SOCSEYELLER. .NicxLEs. DixoN, and I introduced an amendment to provide humanitarian assistance to the democratic resistance in Nicaragua. That amendment was to provide hu- manitarian assistance to the democrat- ic resistance in Nicaragua. That amendment eventually became the law which provided some $27 mil- lion in humanitarian assistance to the, Contras and also provided the basis for the President to return to Con- gress and ask for military aid, as he has now done. When we Introduced our resolution, the United States had terminated all assistance, both military and nonmili- tary to the Contras. Congress had re- fused to continue to fund a so-called covert program of military assistance to the Contras because of serious con- cerns about the administration's goals and the nature of the Contras. The purpose of our amendment was to chart a course which would enjoy the broadest possible support in the Congress and the American people. We felt that if the 'United States was to have any success in confronting the crisis in Central America, it was neces- sary to develop a consensus behind a policy of supporting a genuinely demo- cratic opposition with humanitarian aid, while keeping the military option alive but on the back burner. At the time, I Said, and I Quote: U.S. interests in .fie region can be reduced to two simple objectives: one, we must foster genuine democratic principles as well as eco- nomic and social growth. and two, we must prevent the Soviets or the Cubans or their surrogates from making Central America a base for the projection of their power. If we support dialogue. democracy, and national reconciliation in El Salvador as we do, we should also support those goals in Nicara- gua. I added. "Congress and the Ameri- can people must be convinced that we are supporting the true democrats. men like Arturo Cruz." March 27. 1986 Approved For Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950009-7 Approved For Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950009-7 March 27, 1986 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE S 3629 Those remain our goals, that goals that I think we should pursue. We must now ask, what progress has been made since we enacted humanitarian assistance last year? It is obvious that many people in this Chamber and in the country con- tinue to believe that the administra- tion's only true objective Is a military overthrow of the government in Mana- gua. Many also believe that the admin- Istration has been unwilling to negoti- ate either bilaterally or through the Contadora process. I believe the ad- ministration has to overcome this widespread skepticism If there is to be any hope for a sustainable American policy, whatever happens here today. With respect to the Contras. linger- ing doubts remain about whether they are truly democratic and whether they respect human rights. It is unclear who is in control of the Contra organi- zation. Is it the civilian leadership or is it the former national guard officers who make up most of the senior mill- tary leadership of the Contras? The Sandinistas have refused to talk to the Contras and the internal oppo- sition. They have not negotiated with lengthy studies which record many al- leged violations of human rights by both the Sandinistas and the Contras. I do not know the truth of the allega- tions in these reports. but find that they raise many disturbing questions which must be answered. In a thoughtful floor statement on Pebrs- ary 26. Senator LrAKY summarized these reports. All of our offices have been receiving massive documents prepared by the Department of State which document human rights abuses by the Sandinis- tas. However, almost nothing has been said by the administration about al- leged abuses by the Contras. This ad- ministration attitude must change if sustainable support for administration policy is to emerge in Congress and among the American people. Mr. President, in deciding this issue, we are also sending a message to the people in Nicaragua and Central America that will have far-reaching implications. Nor would it be an exag- geration to say that we are also send- ing a message to the world. We must make this message unmistakably clear and strong. Our message must be that the nations In good faith, and they have United States is ftrmly committed to continued their military buildup and the cause of democracy in the Ameri- intensified their repressive domestic cas and that we are determined that policies. Whatever one may think of democratic movements in this hemi- the Contras and the Reagan adminis- sphere will not be crushed by armies tration policy, it is clear that the San- and police power, whether of the left dinistas are repressing their people, or the right. damaging their economy and making What then is the solution to this di- efforts to destabilize their neighbors. lemma and how do we convey the mes- All of this confronts us with a tern- sage of our support for democracy? ble dilemma. A strong message in support of de- I am convinced that Americans will mocracy will not be conveyed if aid to support genuine democratic resistance the resistance squeaks by the Congress movements. Recent events In the Phil- on a narrow vote. ippines show the enthusiasm that In developing our policy we must Americans have for those committed demonstrate the United States neither to democratic principles. wishes to restore the old regime in To criticize the Contras as they cur- Nicaragua nor wishes to impose its rently exist does not mean we should own will upon Nicaragua. The resist- abandon them. The road to democracy ance forces. must be an authentic and where there is meager democratic tra- democratic national liberation move- dition to follow is not smooth or ment or they do not deserve our sup- simple. The recent steps toward de- port. The message we send will be a mocracy In the rest of Central Amer- clear one, The United States supports Ica, principally in Guatemala. Hondu- democracy in Nicaragua, not a return rss, and EI Salvador are evidence of to the Somoza era. this. Yet we must support these fledg- I am encourgedby the appointment ling efforts, as we are. We owe our of Ambassador Habib as the Presi- support to those governments as well dent's Central America negotiator. But as to the genuine democrats who are we need more than a man, we need a in the Contra leadership. plan. A closely allied issue is whether the We face a difficult and demanding Contras adequately respect human task. But there is reason to believe rights, that this approach can succeed. Five us in this Chamber. I am grateful for President Carter set in motion a years ago Nicaragua's neighbor, Eh the leadership of Senators COBEN. policy which emphasized respect for Salvador, seemed destined toward RUnMAtt and KASsIZAOM in this regard. human rights as a key element in U.S. greater bloodshed and repression. Specifically, section 9(f) prohibits ex- foreign policy. Although he was much But out of our debate here in Con- penditure of the funds until the Presi- criticized at the time, his policies have grew a two-track policy for El Sawa- dent determines and reports to Con- proven a rallying cry for those who dor evolved: we gave military aid, but gress that. the Contras "have agreed to champion freedom. liberty, and de- we also insisted upon democratization and are beginning to implement": mocracy around the world. and reconciliation within Salvadoran Broadening their leadership base: coordi- Mr. President, there are simply too society. The American public-and the nation of efforts: elimination of human many questions about the human Central American public-stood rights abuses: pursuit of a program to rights record of the Contras. For ex- behind this sometimes slow-moving achieve democracy in Nicaragua. and subor- ample. Amnesty International and the and imperfect policy. El Salvador today dination of military forces to civilian leader- Americas Watch have just released still has many difficulties. But the ship. levels of civil violence have dimin- ished, $ democratically elected govern. ment is in place, and the country has begun to rebuild. Nicaragua. of course. is not El Salva- dor. It is today ruled by Marxists-Len- inists: home-grown. but foreign spon- sored. But this is another reason why our Nicaraguan policy is so important. The United States has shown-in El Salvador, in the Philippines and in Haiti-that we can help change repres sive regimes. We must also find poli- cies that enable us to respond to the challenge of Communist totalitarian- ism. Accordingly. I have written the President a letter. - - In that letter. I state that unless the Contras are perceived in the United States and Central America as a genu- ine democratic movement. it is unlike- ly that American aid can be sustained or that the Contras will attract much support in Nicaragua. Therefore. I asked the president to give assurances on several points which are spelled out in my letter. let me summarize them: First. aid should be given only to ci- vilian political leaders who respect human rights. are genuinely democrat- ic, and have not engaged in criminal activity; no aid should be given direct- ly to military leaders: Second, this political leadership must form a genuine democratic move- ment. Third, the resistance forces must in- vestigate and prosecute individuals re- sponsible for human rights abuses. Fourth. all intelligence and other nonmateriel assistance should also be funneled through the civilian leader- ship. Fifth. strict accounting measures over our aid muss. be adopted. And. sixth, humanitarian aid should Include education in reading, writing, health care and agricultural and voca- tional skills that will foster economic and political growth. The President has now responded to my letter. In his response, I am pleased that the President has pledged to meet these concerns and states that he fully agrees with the objectives of my letter. I am also pleased that the resolution which has been-will be-introduced by Senators Lucnrt, Dots and BsxrssN contains provisions reflecting these concerns which are shared by many of Approved For Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950009-7 S 3630 Approved For Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950009-7 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE March 27, 198e In addition, the Commission estab- lished by section 11 is required to report to Congress by June 30, 1986 on whether the Nicaraguan democratic resistance has agreed to, and are be- ginning to, implement these measures. Finally, Mr. President and this is very important. Congress must exert vigorous oversight over all aspects of this program. We must investigate carefully the allegations of human rights abuses by the Contras. We must oversee this program to assure that the administration is making a good faith effort to negotiate and to build a democratic center. We must also care- fully monitor progress of the negotia- tions. The Commission, which will be established by section 11, will provide us with the facts upon which we can conduct this oversight. Mr. President, if we adopt the pro- posal we are debating, including the provisions I have discussed, and if the President adheres to the pledges made in his letter to me, I believe it will go a long way toward developing a consen- sus behind a sustainable policy of mili- tary pressure on the Sandinistas to ne- gotiate while at the same time build- ing a genuine democratic movement which will enjoy the support of the American people and of the other gov- ernments in the region. I have spend a good deal of time talking to the administration's top of- ficials about this. including the Presi- dent and the Secretary of State. I would like to close by quoting from my exchange of letters with the President on this subject. Mr. President. my letter stated a number of goals. The main goal I will state very briefly: All aid should be given only to civilian po- litical leaders that are genuinely democrat- ic. respect human rights and have not or are not engaged in criminal activity, such as drug trafficking. No aid should go to the military leaders except thrqugh civilian leadership committed to these goals and principles. Mr. President, I would like to read one part of the letter I received from President Reagan in response to my letter. This statement is on the second page of the President's letter. I think It is the most important commitment that we could have now in terms of the future of this Contra program. I quote from the President's letter. Please be assurred that I will implement this mandate from the Congress in a manner which gives primacy to civilian lead- ership and democratic development within the Nicaraguan opposition. To do so, we will work with the leadership of the Nicaraguan opposition to establish a council which, like our own National Security Council. ensures that military activities are conducted under the guidance of responsible civilian leaders. It is our intention that this body will be re- sponsible for ensuring that U.S. assistance is fairly and properly administered. I ask unanimous consent that the letters be printed in the RECORD. There being no objection, the letters were ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: UNITED STATES SENATE. COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVIC s. Washington, DC, March 26, 1986. The PRESIDENT. The White House. Washington, DC. DEAR Ma. PREsIDExr. Last year when Sen. ator Lugar and I. and a number of our col- leagues. sponsored an amendment which provided humanitarian assistance for the democratic resistance in Nicaragua. we sought to develop a consensus behind a sus- tainable policy that would promote the growth of democracy in Nicaragua and sup- port negotiations. One of the central pur- poses of our amendment was to foster the growth of democracy and respect for human rights within the democratic resistance. I agree with your view that the establish- ment of a consolidated. Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua, allied with the Soviet Union and Cuba. represents a potential threat to the security of the United States. The Sandinistas have steadily tightened their grip on the people of Nicaragua. They have violated the human rights, and denied fundamental freedoms, of the Nicaraguan people. Moreover. the evidence is incontro- vertible that the Sandinistas have continued to support guerilla movements and terror- ism outside Nicaragua and that the Soviet and Cuban presence and influence has grown. Although some progress has been made in forming a democratic political leadership for the contras. the American people and the Congress are reluctant to support the contras because they are not convinced that they are truly a democratic movement. The Congress, and I believe the American people, are prepared to support an authen- tic broad-based democratic resistance move- ment fighting for freedom and human rights in Nicaragua. - Our policy must indicate clearly not only what the United States opposes-a Marxist- Leninist repressive regime in Nicaragua- but also what we support, democracy and human rights. As we learned in El Salvador, the most effective force to prevent a com- munist success is a strong, principled, demo- cratic movement which represents the real aspirations of the people. Similarly; in the Philippines we recently saw the enormous force generated when people want democra- cy and believe that there are leaders with integrity ? and courage who support demo- cratic goals. Unless the contra movement is perceived in the United States and Central America as an effort to bring democracy to Nicaragua. it is unlikely that American aid can be sus- tained or that the contras will attract the kind of. political support required to bring about changes In Nicaragua. Unfortunately. the contras have yet to become this force. Their political program and goals remain unclear. The various forces opposing the Sandinistas are divided. The power within the FDN. the largest contra force. still does not appear to be under civilian control. Although the United Nicaraguan Opposition has recently formed a Human Rights Commission, the contras' record and commitment on human rights re- mains unacceptable. In El Salvador. we have used our military and economic aid effectively with bipartisan support. to strengthen democratic forces committed to human rights. We should follow a similar course in providing military assistance to the democratic resistance in Nicaragua. I agree with the recent suggestion of Sen- ators Cohen, Kassebaum and Rudman that the contras must agree to broaden their base. eliminate human rights abuses, and develop and pursue a program for achieving democracy in Nicaragua. I suggest a number of measures to insure that U.S. aid is de- signed to bring about these goals which are essential for success. First, all aid should be given only to civil. ian political leaders that are genuinely democratic. respect human rights and have not or are not engaged in criminal activity, such as drug trafficking. No aid should go to the military leaders except through civilian leadership committed to these goals and principles. Second. the civilian political leadership of the opposition movements must form a gen- uine democratic movement. The United States must insist that they work together and that they broaden their base so as not to exclude Nicaraguans who are committed to democratic principles. This does not mean that they must all adhere to a common political approach, but only that they embrace democratic principles. Third, vigorous action must be taken to enforce respect for human rights including investigation and prosecution of individuals within the resistance responsible for human rights abuses. Fourth. all intelligence and other non-ma- teriel assistance and cooperation should also be funneled through, or at least controlled by. the democratic civilian political leader- ship. Fifth, strict accounting measures must be adopted to insure that all aid is being prop. erly administered and accounted for. Sixth, humanitarian aid should include basic education for the democratic resist. ance fighters and their families. We should, for example, teach reading, writing, health care, and other basic courses in agricultural and vocational skills which will foster politi- cal and economic growth. It is my firm belief that these assurances would go a long way toward satisfying doubts that linger in the minds of the Con- gress and the American people as to wheth- er the contras truly represent a democratic force worthy of our support. I hope you will be able to provide me with these assurances. Mr. President, I have one final but impor- tant point. The foreign policy of the United States toward Nicaragua cannot succeed if the only way it can be sustained is by re- peated. razor-thin votes of the Congress. We need to develop a bipartisan, sustainable policy toward Nicaragua that enjoys the long-term support of the Congress. the American people and of the governments and the people of Central and South Amer- Ica. I applaud the efforts of Senator Sasser. Senator Byrd. Senator Lugar and Senator Dole in seeking to develop such a policy. I hope you will support them in that effort and join in developing such a policy. THE WHITE HOUSE. Washington, March 27, 1986. Hon. SAM Nuxx. U.S. Senate. Washington. DC. DEAR SAM: Thank you for your letter this morning regarding our need to move in a bi- partisan,manner on forging a policy which will lead to a democratic outcome in Nicara- gua. I fully agree with your objective of en- suring that everything we do diplomatically, politically, economically, and, especially. with our aid should contribute to the goal of a truly democratic solution. Your observations, regarding the Nicara- guan opposition and its need to broaden its appeal to the Nicaraguan people. are entire- ly accurate. I agree that we need to do more to ensure that the Nicaraguan democratic resistance is, indeed, a representative move- Approved For Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950009-7 Approved For Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950009-7 March 27, 1986 CONGRESSIONAL. RECORD - SENATE S 3631 menu. responsive to civilian leadership Mr. President, the present episode in efforts by our Latin American neigh- which is. in turn. committed to the ideals of the long-rumung, debate over U.S. aid bors to ensure regional security. democracy. human rights. the rule of law, to the Contras has been marred and To meet the latter goal. I believe we and a better life for-the Nicaraguan people. clouded by intemperate rhetorft. We must vigorously Support the efforts of It Is because I believe so deeply Ins truly seem at times to be focussing more on our Latin American neighbors to ors ttic in o worveendorsed o rsed a n nuu mbear of proposals made h en outcome Nicaragua that a tMiCtftsi-.slogans and allusions aimed at out diplomatic solutions through the by thoughtful members of Congress. region- inspiring the desired response-than Contadora negotiating process. al leaders, and the leadership of the Nicara- substance. This can also be advanced through guan opposition itself. which are designed to It is imperative that we move beyond measures to promote democratization further that end. The legislation that we this. There are some critical issues in Nicaragua- Here, then, we must have discussed with the Senate leadership which must be eareiully considered if turn to consideration of the Contras. and which I find acceptable. reflects this we are to arrive at ? responsible policy. White there has been increasing advice and Includes the following provisions I believe that. a key to developing a agreement among the public and intended to sore effect to the objectives Identified in your letter. sound, long-term approach lies in a Members of Congress concerning the "The President shall use the authority careful consideration of the principal nature of the Sandinista regime and provided by this Joint Resolution to ... en- parties in Nicaragua, the threat that it poses both to its courage the Nicaraguan democratic resist- Unfortunately for the Nicaraguan neighbors and to the United States, ance to take additional steps. strengthen its populace, the Sandinista government there is still no consensus over the unity. pursue a defined and coordinated pro. has removed lingering doubts about its character of the Nicaraguan rebels. gram for representative democracy in Nics- nature and intent In the pall year. Indeed. the term "Contras" is mislead satin. and otherwise increase its appeal to Last October. the Nicaraguan Govern- ing to the extent that it implies a the Nicaraguan people." Please be assured that I will implement menu suspended fundamental civil single source of armed opposition to this mandate from the- Congress in a rights of its citizens, including the the Sanelin ?tas. We know that there manner which gives primacy to civilian lead- right to form unions and to strike; the are is fact numerous groups battling ership and democratic development within right to be presumed innocent until the Sandinistas. groups which do not the Nicaraguan opposition. To do so, we will proven guilty-, freedom of movement: always share the same methods or ed Rork with the leadership of.the Nicaraguan right of peaceful assembly; freedom of Jectives. opposition to estabbah a council which, like information- and the right to a trial. We need to address a number of nn that our miownlitary National activities are Security Council. conducted eruur under er These and the continuation of other resolved questions concerning the the guidance of responsible civilian leaders. human rights abuses underscore more than ever the antidemocratic Courts, wore we embark on a policy It is our intention that this body will be re- clearly that will deepen our involvement with sponsible for ensuring that U.S. assistance is nature and intent of a force which Lh~Eae groups. need ensure ~ that fairly and properly administered. I have also once promised to embody the hopes of their gaols coincide with our that owix endorsed language in the legislation which the Nicaraguan people. their methods are consistent with provides not less than $3 million for It is also clear that the Sandinistas them ~4. dand s that they have a pro ..strengthening prograass and activities of have Interfered to the internal affairs and organisation which promises the Nicaraguan democratic resistance for of their neighbors. and have encour-' gram the observance and advancement of human to garner significant popular support rights." Training and democratic principles aged the consolidation of Cuban and among their countrymen in Nicaragua. will be an Important part of our program. Soviet presence and influence. Last The United States bathed Contras Finally. I am committed to ensuring that no year. we were surprised at Daniel Or- d accused of human rights abuses aid be provided to those groups that retain tega's Indelicate visit to Moscow on K uncertain roertain whether they in their ranks individuals who engage in the heels of the votes in the House of hei. Can hagree an er a toe ~~ with human rights violations. drug smuggling, or Representatives to deny aid to the other resistance groups WOrdite mouse of resistance funds. Contras. This week lightning struck I believe that these commitments are re- again in the form of a significant San- their activities. sponsive to your concerns and those of U etct goal is to bring pressure to other members of Congress who are as dedi- dinista incursion into Honduras as the bear on the Sa 1stas to move cited as you and I to a sustainable biparti? Senate prepared to debate the merits democratization and regional ran and truly democratic solution to the of further aid to the Contras. It would toward demOCZaL de- them the t need to del turmoil in Central America appear that Mr. Ortega thought he security, a, common act 09 objeeUves, i~ tras. need to along Sincerely, could vanquish any claim the Contras with a program and organisatfonsl RONALD REAGAN might have as a fighting force; In NUNN. Mr. President. there are stead, he suffered a serious, self-in- structure for implementing them. a number of other statements that I flicted head wound. They also need to develop recognition think are important in President Rea- As a result of the Sandinista's Inter- as legitimate and representative gan's letter. Time does not pei-mit me nal policies and International designs. spokesmen for large segments of the to read them there appears to be little remaining population inside Nicaragua. Internal Let me close by saying that I am doubt about the nature of their rule. and international support for the Corr pleased that the resolution, the Dole- As the distinguished Senator from teas will crow only when it is clear Lugar-Bentsen resolution. which I Tennessee stated in the Democratic re. that they are not CIA mercenaries or intend to vote for, contains provisions spouse to the President's televised ad- es-eomoza national guardsmen intent reflecting these concerns which are dress on aid to the Contras: On returning' Nicaragua to the authori- shared by many in this Chamber. We agree that the Sandinista government tartantsm o1 the past. I am grateful to the leadership of has betrayed the promise of its own revohr- In short, support for the Contras Senators CoHEN. RUDILAN, and ISessc- lion. has suppressed the freedom of its own will not prove effective unless we SAUM in this regard. people.. and has supported subversion make it clew to them that our support I congratulate Senator Couss for his against its neighbor is El Salvador. . Is contingent on reforms that will pro- leadership and I assure him that I - The principal differences of view mote the formation of a confederated. agree completely with the goals that arise over the question of what to do broadly based, coordinated, democratic he has been effective in pursuing. about this. In my view, the United opposition. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Who States does have an inescapable inter- It Is for this reason that I joined yields time? est in problems and events in Latin with my colleagues, Senator Kasss- Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, if I have America. Regional security is a valid sets and Senator RUDMAN, in pressing time. I yield whatever time I have re- concern an& tempting as it may seem, ,for legislation linking assistance to the maining to Senator COHEN. . we cannot simply turn away from the Contras to concrete measures to devel- The PRESIDING OFFICER. The situation in Nicaragua. Our objectives op and implement a reform program. Senator has 3 minutes and 50 seconds. in this situation should be to help ad- Specifically, we have argued that addi- Mr. COHEN. I thank the Senator vance the democratic aspirations of tional aid beyond the initial outlay be for yielding. the Nicaraguan people and to support prohibited unless and until the Con- Approved For Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950009-7 Approved For Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950009-7 S 3632 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD - SENATE tras have agreed and have begun im- plementing: Confederation and reform measures to broaden their leadership base: The coordination of their efforts; The elimination of human rights abuses: The pursuit of a defined and coordi- nated program for achieving repre- sentative democracy in Nicaragua: and The subordination of military forces to civilian leadership. Notificatioh that these conditions have been satisfied would be provided through Presidential certification. We have also insisted that an inde- pendent commission, established under the legislation, prepare and transmit to the Congress a report on whether the Contra groups have car- ried out these obligations. Our purpose in this legislation is not to raise unworkable obstacles, but. rather, to establish a rational frame- work for ensuring that U.S. assistance promotes the objectives for which it is intended. Hence, we envision detailed reporting on the reform efforts of the Contras, including relevant informa- tion relating to the degree of success achieved in meeting the goals of the legislation: I am pleased to note that these reform provisions have been included in the legislation we are considering today. I am hopeful that their enact- ment will give impetus to a healthy re- structuring of the Nicaraguan opposi- tion forces. In any case, the message, I trust, will be clear. The United States will not indefinitely funnel assistance to disparate, fractious forces with questionable human rights practices. What we demand is a broad-based, co- ordinated, democratic force with a popular program for promoting de- mocracy in Nicaragua. Mr. President. after years of debate and discussion, we are still groping for a policy toward Nicaragua. I believe it is essential that we define our objec- tives clearly and develop a carefully drawn plan to implement them. When a policy is ambiguous or opaque. ef- forts to rally support-especially through verbal bullying-will fail. Casting aspersions is not a substitute for the heavy responsibility and diffi- cult task of persuading a free people to open their eyes and minds to near- or long-term dangers. We must instead define the problems, propose clear and specific policies to deal with them, and seek to convince the country and the Congress to support those policies. The problems of Nicaragua and its relations with its neighbors do not lend themselves to quick or easy solu- tions. I believe that only through a multitrack approach which includes a Contra reform element can pressure be effectively brought to bear on the Sandinista government to move toward pluralism and democracy and to cease being a threat to regional se- curity. Mr. President, earlier this afternoon. I heard some of the debate character- ized as a message to the Sandinistas or a message to the American people and our allies: that if we were not willing to support this assistance package. that America was not willing to stand up for her friends. A question came to my mind: Who are our friends? The enemy of my enemy is not necessarily my friend. . Mr. NUNN. Mr. President, may we have order? I am trying to listen to the Senator ftom Maine. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senate will be in order. Mr. COHEN. One of the major con- cerns Senator KASSESAUM, Senator RUDMAN and I had was that we have no chance of success, any long-term chance of success, unless we are able to forge a bipartisan consensus in Con- gress and in the country. We can only do that if we have a group that we can support that would be not only an effective military force but an effective moral force, as well: a force around which the people, the disenfranchised people of Nicaragua. could rally to say "these people now embody our aspirations"-the aspira- tions that have been, in fact, aban- doned by the Sandinistas. And it was for what reason that Sen- ator KASSEBAUM, SENATOR RUDMAN, Senator NUNN, myself and others be- lieved that it was important that we not support any package that did not call for a reform of the Contras to pro- mote the formation of a confederated, broadly based, coordinated, democratic opposition. Right now, it consists of a number of disparate groups. They are not effectively organized. They do not adequately subordinate military forces to civilian rule. They stand accused of human rights abuses, and we simply could not continue to support a group on a long-term basis under such cir- cumstances. - For that reason, we proposed an amendment-it was accepted-that would condition any additional aid, beyond the initial outlay, upon the Contras agreeing to implement a con- federation and reform measures to broaden their leadership base, to co- ordinate their efforts, to eliminate human rights abuses, to pursue a pro- gram for achieving representative de- mocracy in Nicaragua, and to subordi- nate military forces to civilian leader- ship. Mr.'NUNN. The Senator says, as I understand It-this is my view, and I am sure it is the view of the Senator from Maine-that this is not simply an altruistic principle of human rights- and democratic principles, although that is part of it. It is really the key as to whether this policy we are pursuing has any chance of success, in terms of being sustainable in this country, which is in doubt now, and in terms, most importantly of being supported by the people of Nicaragua. which, in the final analysis, will determine the outcome. Mr. COHEN. The Senator is correct. March 27, 1986 If these groups do not organize, do not coordinate their activities, do not engage in promotion of the democratic reforms that are essential, they will lose the support of the Nicaraguan people, and we will face ultimate defeat. This is the key to a reform package. Mr. NUNN. Will the Senator from Maine agree with the Senator from Georgia in the observation that now that we have the President's letter, and that we also have the language of the Senator from Maine in this resolu- tion, we have something by which to fudge the Contra movement? There will be no more debates in a vacuum 18 or 12 months from now. Either they move in this direction or, in my view, this will not be a program sustainable -by the United States. Mr. COHEN. The Senator is correct. The PRESIDING OFFICER. The time of the Senator has expired. Mr. PELL. Mr. President, I yield 15 minutes to the distinguished Senator from Connecticut. [Mr. DODD). Mr. DODD. I thank the Senator. Mr. President, I urge both my good friends from Georgia and Maine to see last week's interview on "Front Line," conducted by Judy Woodruff on Public Broadcasting. The person being interviewed thought the cameras and tape recorders were off. He made com- ments about who would be in control. I wish them well. I hope they are right in this. but I am suspicious that his statements may have been more re- flective of the realities. Mr. NUNN. I take that point well. I know about that interview, and that strengthened my conviction that there has to be civilian control by people who are committed to democratic prin- ciples. Approved For Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950009-7