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December 22, 2016
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June 3, 2011
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April 22, 1986
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Iq Next 3 Page(s) In Document Denied STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 The Requ rement to Implement overnments including the United On June 23, 1979, all OAS g ates called for the immediate and resolution ofptheeXVII off the Somoza government, through _ o Meeting of Consultation of Ministers which r'ign eadsAasbirs o the Organization of American Sta follows: "WHEREAS: . the "The people of Nicanconflictsthatzisgcausing horrors of a fierce armed grave hardships and loss pof life# and olitical* socials anrown a ono - country into a serious .ic upheaval; "The inhumane conduct of the:dictathei l regime governing the country,?as evidenced by report of , is the the inter-American oco~esa=~ tic situati onhts faced.by fundamental cause ands the Nicaraguan people "The spirit of hemispheric Solidarity void that an unaable guides. Hemisphere relations places ert obligation on the American countries eod exto the every effort within their power, to put bloodshed and to avoid the prolongation of this conflict which is.disrupting the peace of the Hemi- sphere: "THE SEVENTEENTH' MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS., "DECLARES: "That the solution of the serious problem is exclusively within the jurisdictioh of the people of Nicaragua. "That in view of the seventeenth Meeting tof Consultation of Ministers of Foreign A-ffairs s' solution should be arrived at on the basis of the following: i. Immediate and definitive replacement of the Somoza regime. 2. Installationinrnment, Nicaraguan territory of a democ the composition of whirhhups should include the principal representative groups which oppose the Somoza regime and which reflects the free will of the people of Nicaragua. 3. Guarantee of the respect for human rights of all Nicaraguans without exception. 4. The holding of free elections as soon as possible, that will lead to tt hehatestablisent peacea truly democratic government freedom, and justice. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 26 June 1985 NICARAGUAN AGGRESSION AGAINST COSTA RICA AND HONDURAS 1979 TO PRESENT Since seizing power in July 1979, the Sandinista government has attempted to intimidate, coerce, and destabilize the governments of Costa Rica and Honduras through direct actions and through its extensive ties with local leftist extremists. The following chronology details Sandinista border incidents/military incursions, terrorism, guerrilla infiltration, and support to local radicals. COSTA RICA October 1980 Sandinista forces three times attacked Costa Rican vessels engaged in medical missions on the San Juan River. November 1980 The Sandinista Army attacked with machinegun fire a Costa Rican vessel sailing up the San Juan River. Costa Rica has navigational rights on the river guaranteed by two nineteenth-century treaties. December 1981 The Costa Rican Communist Party, which sent cadres to fight with the Sandinistas in 1978-79, formed its own paramilitary unit sometime in late 1981. The Sandinistas provide extensive training and logistical support to this brigade, which since its formation has been participating in counterinsurgency operations in southern Nicaragua against anti-Sandinista rebels. February 1982 The principal suspect in an assassination attempt against anti-Sandinista leader "Negro" Chamorro was the Nicaraguan consul in Liberia, Costa Rica; he returned to Nicaragua, and the case was never completed. March 1982 Two Nicaraguans were among nine arrested when Costa Rican security forces uncovered a terrorist cell in San Jose with $500,000 in arms, the largest and most sophisticated cache discovered to date in Costa Rica. 1 UNCLASSIFIED Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Iuw. ~`E r I P V Pw Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 May 1982 San Jose protested border raids by Nicaraguan soldiers during late May in the provinces of Upala, Los-Chiles, and San Carlos. June 1982 A Sandinista patrol intercepted a Costa Rican tourist boat on the San Juan River and held tourists for several hours. Both sides agreed to form a mixed commission to deal with possible border violations. The Nicaraguan Foreign Ministry affirmed the continuation of Nicaraguan police and customs control of the San Juan River, presumably as part of a strategy to pursue anti- Sandinistas. July 1982 Three Nicaraguan diplomats implicated in the bombing of a Honduran airline office in San Jose were expelled; a Colombian responsible for the bombing claimed that he had been recruited, trained, and directed by the Nicaraguan Embassy in San Jose. April 1983 Costa. Rica charged Nicaraguan troops were staging cross- border raids. An unmarked Nicaraguan patrol boat fired shots and captured three US fishermen, apparently in Costa Rican waters. June.1983 One Nicaraguan terrorist was killed and another severely injured when a bomb intended for anti-Sandinista leaders exploded prematurely in a San Jose parking lot. September 1983 The Costa Rican Security Council condemned Nicaraguan Army shelling of public buildings in Costa Rican territory. December 1983 February 1984 Sandinistas attacked Costa Rican border guards at Conventillos. April 1984 Nicaraguan naval vessels captured two Costa Rican fishing boats in Costa Rican waters. 2 UNCLASSIFIED STAT Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 A Costa Rican security official claimed a Nicaraguan mortar round fell near the Pan American Highway at Penas Blancas; six border guards investigating the mortar attack came under Sandinista machinegun fire. a ssmall land January 1985 Costa a that Ricans fire north of Barra del Colorado. May 1985 Sandinistas fired on a Costa Rican civil guard patrol unit near Las Tiricias, Costa Rica, killing two. June 1985 Sandinistas fired on a Costa Rican civil guard unit near Las Tiricias a second time. HONDURAS November 1979 Several Sandinista units crossed Honduran border in pursuit of former members of defeated Somoza National Guard. December 1980 Prominent Honduran banker kidnaped in Tegucigalpa by members of leftist group, Cinchoneros, aided by Salvadoran insurgents; released in March 1981 after family paid over $1 million in ransom; some members of Cinchoneros group reportedly had close ties to the Sandinistas as early as mid- 1980. March 1981 Honduran airliner hijacked to Nicaragua by Cinchoneros and Salvadoran guerrillas. September 1981 Two US military trainers attacked and killed in Tegucigalpa by the Lorenzo Zelaya terrorist group; Honduran legislative palace also bombed. November 1981 A leader of the Cinchonero group revealed that members of his organization were being trained in Cuba and that its leaders met regularly with Sandinista officials in Nicaragua. March 1982 Honduran businessman kidnaped in Tegucigalpa by local Communists aided by Salvadoran insurgents, reportedly at Cuban urging. July 1982 Two major electric power substations in Tegucigalpa bombed by Lorenzo Zelaya group and Salvadoran insurgents; damage estimated at $20 million; economic counselor at the 3 UNCLASSIFIED Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 ? Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Nicaraguan Embassy subsequently implicated by two captured terrorists; Nicaraguan national, later identified as Sandinista Comandante Modesto, killed by Honduran security forces during raid of terrorists' hideout. Nicaraguan military unit crossed border to ambush anti- Sandinista insurgents;. first Sandinista attack against rebels inside Honduran territory. August 1982 Air Florida, IBM, and Salvadoran airline offices in Tegucigalpa bombed by Lorenzo Zelaya and Salvadoran guerrilla groups demanding end to US involvement in Nicaraguan and Salvadoran affairs. September 1982 Cinchoneros, assisted by Salvadoran guerrillas, seized 105 Honduran businessmen in San Pedro Sula, demanding release of some 60 Honduran and Salvadoran leftist extremists; operation reportedly planned in Cuba; captives released after safe passage allowed by Honduran Government. .December 1982 Nicaragua began training.groups of 20-30 Honduran guerrillas; training included combat experience against anti-Sandinista insurgents inside Nicaragua; members of several Honduran . extreme leftist groups fought in Nicaragua for periods-of 4-6- months, at least until the summer of 1984. May 1983 A captured leader of the Lorezo Zelaya group revealed that the Sandinistas had provided his organization with weapons, funds, false documentation, safehaven, and propaganda materials. July 1983 Sandinistas infiltrated 96 Cuban- and.Nicaraguan-trained Honduran insurgents into Olancho Department in south-central Honduras; group's objective reportedly was to establish a base of operations and an insurgent organization in the Honduran interior; most had undergone military training for up to two years in Nicaragua and at a guerrilla training facility in Pinar del Rio, Cuba; Honduran military captured or killed several insurgents, and others surrendered or starved to death in the jungle. September 1983 Cinchoneros, claiming retaliation for the bombing of Managua's international airport by anti-Sandinista insurgents, dynamited Honduran airlines office in San Pedro Sula. 4 UNCLASSIFIED Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 July 1984 Some 20 Honduran guerrillas trained in Cuba and Nicaragua infiltrated into Honduras, supervised and supported by Sandinista Army; group had been issued M-16s--some of which have been-traced back to Vietnam--in Nicaragua; instructed to create military organizations, conduct political and military training, organize intelligence collection, and create a logistics base; Honduran military rounded up most by October 1984. March 1985 Nicaragua fired mortars into El Paraiso and Choluteca Departments, according to press reports. April 1985 Sandinista troops fired mortar rounds into Honduran territory, particularly around suspected anti-Sandinista. concentrations; Nicaraguan patrol boat attacked Honduran fishing boat. Seven Nicaraguan agents captured in Honduras providing training and arms to local terrorists. May 1985 Sandinista forces launched ground assaults as well as artillery and rocket barrages into areas of suspected anti- Sandinista presence inside Honduras. 5 UNCLASSIFIED Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 -- - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Year 1959 Cuban Action OAS 1esoonse PANAMA - 80 to 100 fully ax ed everrillas leave Cuba to invade Panama. OAS investigating committee, using aircraft & petrel boats force in- vading forces to .surrender. 1961 1961 1962 -1963-64 1967 PERU alleges Cuban inter- vention and subversion. COLOMBIA alleges Cuba a threat to peace and security of hemisphere. CUEA allcws installation of nuclear weapons by USSR. VENEZUELA alleges Cuba de= positing arms in Venezuela. OAS Council con.- f irms Cuban subversion. Castro government excluded from part cipation in OAS. OAS authorizes individual and collective measures including force. OAS verifies facts as true, votes sanctions against Cuba. _ VENEZUELA and BOLIVIA, OAS condemns Ci:be allegations of Cuban inter- extends sanctions vention. eluding cutoff of , l es government sa credits to Cuba- Since 1959, the OAS has sanctioned Castro Cuba a-number of times for its export of subversion, which the OAS has considered a form of armed aggression. For. example, in 1964, the 9th Meeting of Consultation of the OAS Ministers of Foreign Affairs established, among its conclusions, that "the Republic of Venezuela has been the target of a series of actions sponsored and directed by the Government of Cuba openly intended to subvert Venezuelan institutions and to overthrow the democratic government of Venezuela through terrorism, sabotage, assault and guerrilla warfare and that the aforementioned acts, like all acts of intervention and aggression, conflict with the principles and aims of the inter-American system (and therefore) resolves to declare that the acts verified by the investigating committee t are considered an aggression and an intervention 'on the part, of the. Government of Cuba ,in the statesaffairs (of the OAS). Venezuela which affect all Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2 LOS ANGELES TIMES 22 APRIL 1985 CENTRAL AMERICA 9 INTERNATIONAL LAW By John Norton Moore A prindpal argvat ant or those opposed to U.S funding of the tounternvoluuonaries In Nicaraju. IS that it 'would be Illegal under accepted rtonns of International law. The rule of law to at stake in Central America But the real threat is the serious and Sustained armed attack directed by Cuba'and Nicaragua against E1 Salvador and neighboring states. in violation of the Uruted Nations and Organization of Ameri. can States charters. To focus on the Issue of funding. rather than on the Cuban-Nicaraguan attack, is to accept the childhood plea. 'It all started when he hit me back" More dangerously, It Is to confuse the defense with aggression, and thus to undermine the single most important normative restraint against the use of force. Moreover. the goals of deterrence and stability are at risk if we ignore the commitment made repeatedly by out country: that we will take effective action against aggressive use of force intended to deprive nations in this hems. sphere of their right to self-determination. This commitment is found in the Monroe Doctrine and the hemispheric Rio Defense :peaty. and in the congressional Cuban resolution of 1962 and the 1965. House resolution on communist subversion in the hemisphere. Since seizing power in 1959. F1del Castro has directed insurgencies against 17 Latin American nations. Until the attack against D Salvador. the most serious of these *-as IN sustained insurgency against Venezuela. condemned in 1964 by the OAS: The success of the Sandinistas-with-substan.' auto, particularly D Salvador. That efrats Include meetings bald In Cuba in December, 1979. and May, 19e0, to forte a united Salvadoran Insurgency under Cuban and Nicaraguan Influence and aaatsta?a. Including arms supply. trairtinj_lfnancrtg. command and control, and political and technical support. The resulting Insurgency now Aelds ?eD-trained armed forces one-fifth the size of the Salvadoran army. and opcrittes 67 offices in 35 countries In political support of the continuing attack. As defectors' reports and weapon serial number dem- onstrate, the preponderance of the Irnstt. genii' weapons continues to be supplied erernally. In fact, they had American 1d-16 rifles and H-6p machine guns (from Stocks in Vietnam and Ethiopia) even before the Salvadoran army had those Y eapona Congress Itself found, in the Intelligence Authorization Act of 1983, that the actions of the governments of Cuba and Nicaragua threaten the independence of El Salvador and threaten to destabilise the entire Central America region, and the gove.-n. menu of Cuba and Nicaragua refuse to cease those activities' These Cuban-Nicaraguan activities.vio. late the United Nations Charter. the Char- ter of the Organization of American States, the Rio Defense Treaty, the United Nations definition of aggression, the 1965 U .N. General Assembly declaration on ttiter- vention. the 1970 General Assembly friendly relations' declaration. the 1972 basic prind les a re t th 197 p g emen . e 5 Mel. tial Cuban support-two decades after sinki principles and even the Soviet draft Castro's takeover in Cuba provided new deftnitioc of aggressiom ideological fervor and opportunity for what This pattern of ongoing aggression cm. is now a pint Cuban-Nicaraguan policy of statutes an armed attack justifying the we revolution without frontiers.' of force in collective defense under Article Both the bipartisan Kissinger Commis- 51 of the U.N. Charter and Article 3 of the lion and the House Select Committee on Rio Treaty. Indeed. Article 27 of the OAS fntefltgcnce have concluded that Cuba and Charter declares that such an.attack Is 'an YicAragua art engaged In efforts to over. act of aggression against ... (all) the 1hmw the governments of neighboring American rates,' and Article 3 of the Rio 36 PR. 11.5 Treaty cxates a legal obligation on United states to assist in meeting armed attack. This obligation Is parall that owed by the United States to North Atlantic Treaty Organization fu Article S of the NATO Treaty 1 in the e of an attack on a NATO member. A response in defense may lawfull overt, covert or both. as has been the In virtually every conflict in which Ar ca has fought In this century. In World n no one suggested that Allied supper partisan fortes or covert operatior Germany were illegal in responding to aggression. Certainly responses in defense mu proportional. But how is it disproporui for the United States to respond agar covert Cuban-Nicaraguan armed a aimed at overthrowing the democrat elected government of El Salvador b ruling out that sane objective ago, totalitarian Sandinista military J into? One of the most serious contemp threats to world order is the aggri covert political-military stuck by a vernally instigated and supported gut insurgency. Such an attack from Cub Nicaragua is the world threat to C, America Congress must decide whet meant what ft said in the 1962 ( resolution. when ft pledged `tha., United States is determined to preve whatever means may be necessary. U tng the rue of arms, the )Aarmst-Le regime in Cuba from extending. by to the threat of force, its agg-essr subversive activities to any part e hemisphere.' Joan Xorton Moore is thoirmcrt American l3otAssrt. Standing Cornmi Law and N'ationaf Security and a pr, of international' low at the Vniver, Virginia. He has served as cot 'set United Stores in the Nico rv pva C= f this International Court of Jur'.sce n.r cz-p*cuedore his own. Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/06/04: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950013-2