HABIB TRIP: MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT GARCIA AND FOREIGN MINISTERS WAGNER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950024-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 3, 2011
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: April 26, 1986
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/12/30: CIA-RDP88B00443R000401950024-0
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FM AMEMBASSY PANAMA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9433
INFO RUEHLL/CONTADORA COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
BT
PANAMA 06024
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PE, PREL, XK
SUBJECT: HABIB TRIP: MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT
GARCIA AND FOREIGN MINISTER WAGNER
2. SUMMARY. FOREIGN MINISTER WAGNER TOLD US THAT
PERU SHARES OUR OBJECTIVES OF A DEMOCRATIC NICARAGUA
BUT DISAGREES WITH OUR MEANS. IT COULD NEVER
APPROVE OF INTERVENTION, EVEN IN THE NAME OF DEMG RACY.
HE FAVORED A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH TO BUILD CONFIDENCE,
WITH ONE IMPORTANT STEP BEING THE SIGNING OF AN
ACCORD ON JUNE 6. I TOLD HIM THAT US ENDORSEMENT
OF THE CONTADORA PROCESS HAD BEEN BASED ON THE
UNDERSTANDING THAT IT WOULD PRODUCE AN AGREEMENT
INCORPORATING ALL OF THE 21 OBJECTIVES OF 1983.
THE LATIN AMERICANS NOW HAD A RESPONSIBILITY TO
PRODUCE SUCH A TREATY, AND WE AND THE CENTRAL
AMERICANS EXPECTED IT TO BE COMPREHENSIVE. VERIFIABLE,
AND SIMULTANEOUS. WAGNER CALLED ON THE US TO TAKE
CERTAIN STEPS TO HELP BUILD CONFIDENCE. I TOLD HIM
THAT WE WOULD CONSIDER HIS SUGGESTIONS, BUT THAT
THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES SHOULD FOCUS THEIR ATTENTION
ON NICARAGUA, WHICH WAS CLEARLY THE COUNTRY
RESISTING A PEACEFUL SOLUTION. I ADDED THAT THERE--,
WAS GROWING DOUBT THAT NICARAGUA WANTED TO SIGN
ANY ACCORD BECAUSE OF THE COMMITMENTS TO DEMOCRACY/
AND NATIONAL RECONCILATION IT WOULD UNDERTAKE.
3. IN A SUBSEQUENT MEETING, PRESIDENT GARCIA
INSISTED THAT SOME FORM OF AGREEMENT MUST BE
READY FOR SIGNATURE BY JUNE 6. THE CONTADORA
MOMENTUM MUST BE SUSTAINED, AND THE CRISIS
MUST NOT BE ALLOWED TO ESCALATE. I WARNED THAT
MANY IMPORTANT DETAILS REMAINED TO BE WORKED OUT.
-'$rEG~
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I NOTED THAT THE STUMBLING BLOCK WAS NOT THE
CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES, IT WAS NICARAGUA.
THE LATIN AMERICANS MUST PUT PRESSURE ON NICARAGUA
TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY. GARCIA ASKED IF THE U.S.
WAS COMMITTED TO DEMOCRACY, WHAT WAS IT DOING IN
CHILE. I ANSWERED THAT A WAVE OF DEMOCRATIZATION
WAS SWEEPING OVER MUCH OF THE WORLD, PARTICULARLY
LATIN AMERICA. THE U.S. SUPPORTED THIS
DEMOCRATIZATION, AND WE WERE SENDING SIGNALS TO
CHILE THAT CHANGES WERE NEEDED THERE TOO. THE
IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WAS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, WHERE
NICARAGUA WAS AN ABERRATION AMONG DEMOCRACIES.
I SUGGESTED THAT THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES LOOK
SERIOUSLY AT COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT-ELECT ARIAS'
CALENDAR FOR DEMOCRATIZATION IN NICARAGUA. END
SUMMARY.
4. ON APRIL 25, AMBASSADOR JORDAN AND I HAD A
CORDIAL BUT ANIMATED LUNCHEON DISCUSSION ABOUT
CENTRAL AMERICA WITH PERUVIAN FOREIGN MINISTER
WAGNER. WE LATER CALLED ON PRESIDENT GARCIA WHO
WAS ACCOMPANIED BY WAGNER. DURING THE LUNCH, I
EXPLAINED MY MISSION WAS TO EXPLORE THE PROSPECTS
FOR PEACE IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND TO DETERMINE THE
STATUS OF CONTADORA IN THE WAKE OF THE RECENT
PANAMA MEETING. THE US DESIRES A PEACEFUL SOLUTION
WHICH INCLUDES THE 21 OBJECTIVES OF SEPTEMBER 1983.
THE COMING WEEKS WERE CRUCIAL TO THIS PROCESS
AS THERE WAS NEED TO RESOLVE THOSE ISSUES THAT REMAIN,
AND SEVERAL EVENTS SUCH AS THE ESQUIPULAS MEETING
AND THE INAUGURATION OF COSTA RICAN PRESIDENT-
ELECT ARIAS WERE TO PRECEDE THE SCHEDULED JUNE 6
SIGNING. THE US HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED BY THE
PANAMA MEETING. NICARAGUA'S PERFORMANCE HAD HINDERED
PROGRESS AND FED GROWING SPECULATION THAT THE
SANDINISTAS WERE NOT TRULY INTERESTED IN SIGNING
AN AGREEMENT. THERE WERE MAJOR PORTIONS OF THE
AGREEMENT WHICH REMAINED TO BE RESOLVED, AND THE
NECESSARY MECHANISM AND PROCEDURES NEEDED TO BE
ESTABLISHED.
5. WAGNER SAID THAT PERU SHARED US GOALS IN
NICARAGUA, BUT IT DISAGREED WITH OUR MEANS. IT
I DID NOT WANT A COMMUNIST NICARAGUA, BUT RATHER A
DEMOCRATIC NICARAGUA, WITH DEMOCRACY DEFINED AS
SELF-DETERMINATION. THE GOP COULD NEVER ENDORSE
INTERVENTION IN NICARAGUA, EVEN IN THE NAME OF
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DEMOCRACY. WAGNER BELIEVED THAT THERE WERE
IDEOLOGICAL DIVISIONS WITHIN THE FSLN, AND WHILE
THE REVOLUTION HAD RADICALIZED, THIS TREND WAS NOT
IRREVERSIBLE. WAGNER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT GORGE WAS
A COMMUNIST, BUT HE CHARACTERIZED THE ORTEGAS AS
MORE PRAGMATIC MARXISTS, AND SERGIO RAMIREZ AS A
SOCIAL DEMOCRAT. I REITERATED THAT US POLICY
CALLED FOR A CHANGE IN SANDINISTA BEHAVIOR, BOTH
WITH REGARD TO THEIR OWN PEOPLE AND TO THEIR
NEIGHBORS. THEY SHOULD AGREE TO OPEN UP THE
POLITICAL SYSTEM AND END THEIR AGGRESSION TOWARD
THEIR NEIGHBORS.
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6. WAGNER INSISTED THAT US MILITARY PRESSURE ON
THE SANDINISTAS WAS COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. HE SAID
IT (A) GAVE THE RADICALS IN THE FSLN AN EXCUSE
TO SUSPEND CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND (B) COMPELLED
THE "MODERATES" IN THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER TO
RADICALIZE IN ORDER NOT TO LOSE POLITICAL SPACE.
HE SAID THAT THE SANDINISTAS ARE NOT AFRAID OF THE
ARMED RESISTANCE OR THEIR NEIGHBORS. THEY ARE
GENUINELY AFRAID OF AN INVASION BY THE US. I
ASSURED HIM THAT THE US HAD NO INTENTIONS TO
INVADE NICARAGUA. HE RESPONDED THAT HE BELIEVED
ME, BECAUSE A WAR WOULD BE MADNESS. HE ASSERTED
THAT OUR RHETORIC OFTEN LEFT A DIFFERENT IMPRESSION,
HOWEVER, AND IT PROVIDED THE SANDINISTAS A PRETEXT
FOR MILITARY MOBILIZATION ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS
IS NEEDED TO DETER AN INVASION. I REMINDED HIM
THAT THE US WAS NOT THE ONLY COUNTRY TO USE
RHETORIC AS A POLITICAL SIGNAL.
7. WAGNER INSISTED THAT TO DEFUSE THE SITUATION,
A SERIES OF STEPS MUST BE TAKEN TO CREATE A CLIMATE
OF CONFIDENCE. TO GET THIS PROCESS MOVING, IT IS
NECESSARY TO OMIT AT THE INITIAL STAGE ANY ELEMENT
WHICH ANY ONE OF THE CENTRAL AMERICANS FINDS
OBJECTIONABLE. THIS ACCORD, TO BE SIGNED ON JUNE 6,
WOULD HELP CREATE A NEW MOOD OF CONFIDENCE; ALTHOUGH
IT MAY NOT BE PERFECT, IT WOULD BE WORKABLE
AND WOULD COMMIT THE CENTRAL AMERICANS TO CERTAIN
ACTIONS AND TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CRISIS.
HE REFERED TO THE COSTA RICA-NICARAGUA BORDER
COMMISION AS ANOTHER SUCH ACCORD. I WARNED ABOUT
THE DANGERS OF THIS SALAMI APPROACH. IT WOULD
ALLOW THE SANDINISTAS TO PICK JUST THOSE POINTS
THEY WANTED AND GIVE NOTHING IN RETURN.
8. I REMINDED WAGNER THAT THE LATIN AMERICANS HAD
YEARS AGO ASKED THE US TO STEP ASIDE AND ALLOW THEM
TO WORK AMONG THEMSELVES TO REACH A PEACEFUL
SOLUTION THROUGH CONTADORA. WE DID SO ON THE
UNDERSTANDING THAT THE AGREEMENT WOULD BE BASED ON
THE 1983 DOCUMENT OF OBJECTIVES. WE NOW EXPECTED
THE LATINS TO COME THROUGH WITH SUCH AN AGREEMENT
WHICH IS COMPREHENSIVE, VERIFIABLE, AND SIMULTANEOUS.
OUR TALKS WITH THE CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRACIES
SUGGEST THAT THEY WANT THE SAME THING. I ASKED
HOW NICARAGUA COULD BE COMPELLED TO NEGOTIATE
SERIOUSLY ON LATER POINTS IF ITS PRINCIPAL CONCERNS
WERE ADDRESSED PIECE-MEAL. WAGNER SAID THAT PRESSURE
FROM THE LATINS WOULD SEE TO IT THAT THE SANDINISTAS
WERE FLEXIBLE. I SAID THAT OTHER TYPES OF
PRESSURE WERE ALSO NEEDED.
9. WAGNER ARGUED THAT US SUPPORT FOR THE ARMED
RESISTANCE FRUSTRATED HIS CONFIDENCE BUILDING
APPROACH AND NICARAGUA USED IT AS A PRETEXT NOT
TO SIGN THE AGREEMENT. I RESPONDED THAT MY
RECENT LETTER TO CONG. BARNES AND HIS COLLEAGUES
HAD STATED CLEARLY THAT THE US WOULD CEASE ITS AID
TO THE RESISTANCE IF AN ACCEPTABLE ACCORD WERE
REACHED. WAGNER INSISTED THAT SUCH AID WAS
COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. COMPARING NICARAGUA TO PERU,
HE SAID THAT IF THE US HAD USED THAT KIND OF PRESSURE
ON VELASCO, PERU WOULD BE A COMMUNIST COUNTRY NOW
INSTEAD OF A DEMOCRACY. HE SAID THAT THE US
DEMAND THAT THE SANDINISTAS TALK TO THE ARMED
RESISTANCE AT THE OUTSET WAS UNREASONABLE. WHILE
THEY SHOULD TALK WITH THEIR INTERNAL OPPOSITION NOW,
TICLKS WITH THE RESISTANCE WOULD ONLY BE POSSIBLE
AFTER SEVERAL STEPS ARE TAKEN TOWARD CONFIDENCE
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S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 04 PANAMA 06024
EXDIS/CONTRA, EXDIS FOR CONTRA DISTRIBUTION
FROM AMBASSADOR HABIB
E.O.12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PE, PREL, XK
SUBJECT: HABIB TRIP: MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT
BUILDING. I REMINDED HIM THAT THE RESISTANCE
WAS COMPOSED OF NICARAGUANS, AND THE 1983 OBJECTIVES
HAD CALLED FOR NATIONAL RECONCILIATION SPECIFICALLY
TO ADDRESS THIS ISSUE. AMBASSADOR JORDAN SUGGESTED
THAT THE CHURCH MIGHT BE THE MEDIATOR IN A DIALOGUE
AS IT IS IN EL SALVADOR, BUT WAGNER DISMISSED THIS
IDEA.
10. WAGNER PROPOSED THAT THE US TAKE STEPS TO
IMPROVE THE CLIMATE. HE ASKED THAT MY LETTER BE
REITERATED BY SOMEONE AT A HIGHER LEVEL. I TOLD
HIM THAT THIS WAS UNNECESSARY, SINCE IT WAS
OFFICIAL POLICY, BUT IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. HE
ASKED IF THE US WOULD RENOUNCE INTERVENTION IN
NICARAGUA UNDER ANY CONDITIONS. I TOLD HIM THAT
NO COUNTRY COULD EVER MAKE SUCH A BLANKET STATEMENT.
HE THEN ASKED IF THE US WOULD SIGN A CONTADORA
PROTOCOL. I RESPONDED THAT NO POLICY DECISION HAD
BEEN MADE ON THAT YET, BUT SOMETHING SUITABLE COULD
BE WORKED OUT BY WHICH THE US COULD ENDORSE
AN ACCEPTABLE CONTADORA AGREEMENT. INDEED, SOME
PROPOSALS ALONG THOSE LINES HAD BEEN DISCUSSED
AT MANZANILLO.
11. WAGNER ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THERE WERE LEGITIMATE
CONCERNS ABOUT THE CUBAN AND SOVIET PRESENCE IN
NICARAGUA. THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES WERE TALKING
TO THE CUBANS TO RESOLVE THIS ISSUE.
12. WAGNER DISCUSSED NICARAGUA'S DECLINING
ECONOMY, NOTING THAT THIS YEAR IT NEEDED
TO IMPORT 900 MILLION DOLLARS IN GOODS, BUT WAS
ONLY EXPORTING 300 MILLION. THE SOVIET BLOC MADE
UP HALF THE DIFFERENCE, BUT THAT LEFT 300 MILLION
WHICH DEMOCRATIC COUNTRIES WOULD HAVE TO PROVIDE.
I POINTED
OUT
FOR THAT
ECONOMIC C ISSUES, AND AGREEMENT
ONCE N
PROVISIONS CONCLUDED \at~~ ~
COULD STIMULATE THE ECONOMIES OF ALL THE COUNTRIES VS
IN THE REGION.
13. DURING THE DISCUSSION WITH PRESIDENT GARCIA
WHICH WAGNER ALSO ATTENDED, MUCH OF THE SAME GROUND
WAS COVERED. GARCIA INSISTED THAT CONTADORA WAS
A VIABLE PROCESS AND THAT SOME ACCORD BE CONCLUDED
IN JUNE OR THERE WOULD BE UNHAPPY RESULTS FOR
BOTH LATIN AMERICA AND THE US. IT WAS ESSENTIAL
TO KEEP THE MOMENTUM GOING AND. TO AVOID AN
ESCALATION. I AGREED THAT CONTADORA WAS THE ONLY
FRAMEWORK NOW EXISTING FOR A VIABLE AGREEMENT, BUT
I NOTED THAT MUCH WORK NEEDED TO BE DONE TO FINALIZE
THE AGREEMENTS. THE JUNE 6 DATE WAS DRAWING NEARER, AND
THERE WAS NO MOVEMENT ON NEGOTIATIONS. WE WERE
CONCERNED THAT THERE WOULD BE PRESSURE TO SIGN
AN INCOMPLETE AGREEMENT SIMPLY FOR THE SAKE OF
SIGNING SOMETHING. I POINTED OUT THAT NICARAGUA
WAS CLEARLY THE.OBSTACLE TO PEACE, AND THE LATIN
AMERICANS SHOULD APPLY PRESSURE ON THE SANDINISTAS.
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GENUINELY CONCERNED ABOUT PROMOTING DEMOCRACY,
WHAT WAS IT DOING ABOUT CHILE. I RESPONDED THAT
THERE WAS MOMENTUM TOWARD DEMOCRACY AROUND THE WORLD,
AND THE US WAS SUPPORTING IT STRONGLY. I REMINDED
HIM OF MY RECENT EFFORTS IN THE PHILIPPINES. THIS TREND
WAS PARTICULARLY STRONG IN LATIN AMERICA,
WHERE ONLY A HANDFUL OF NON-DEMOCRATIC REGIMES
REMAIN. WE HAD SIGNALED CHILE THAT CHANGES WERE
NEEDED THERE, TOO. THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM WAS
CENTRAL AMERICA, WHERE NICARAGUA WAS AN ABERRATION.
1 SUGGESTED THAT THEY LOOK CLOSELY AT COSTA RICAN
PRESIDENT-ELECT ARIAS' CALENDER FOR DEMOCRATIZATION
IN NICARAGUA AND LISTEN CAREFULLY TO SALVADORAN
PRESIDENT DUARTE DURING HIS UPCOMING VISIT TO LEARN
WHAT THE CENTRAL AMERICAN DEMOCRATS THINK.
15. WAGNER ASKED IF THE US WOULD RESUME BILATERAL
NEGOTIATIONS WITH NICARAGUA. I REPLIED THAT OUR
POSITION ON THIS WAS WELL KNOWN; WE HAD DONE SO
AT MANZANILLO WITH NO SUCCESS, AND THE SANDINISTAS
HAD USED THESE TALKS TO UNDERMINE CONTADORA AND
AVOID A DIALOGUE WITH THE RESISTANCE. WAGNER THEN
ASKED IF WE WOULD PULL OUR MILITARY FORCES OUT
OF HONDURAS AS A CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURE. I
S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 PANAMA 06024
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SUBJECT: HABIB TRIP: MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT
TOLD HIM THIS WAS TOTALLY UNREALISTIC, AND THE US
WOULD NOT ACCEDE TO SUCH PRECONDITIONS TO AN
AGREEMENT. I NOTED THAT IT WAS NICARAGUA THAT HAD
DISTURBED THE MILITARY BALANCE IN THE REGION WITH
ITS MASSIVE BUILDUP, AND THIS WAS SOMETHING
CONTADORA MUST ADDRESS. DAVIS
END OF MESSAGE
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