SHARING THE BENEFITS OF SDI

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000502430001-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: September 1, 1986
• Content Type: REPORT

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SHARING THE BENEFITS OF SDI
September, 1986
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KEY JUDGMENTS
1. Overall, the net effect of sharing would appear to be positive.
While initially the idea of "sharing an SDI system" or "sharing the benefits
of an SDI system" would appear to be impossible in view of the intense
military and technological competition between the US and the USSR, on close
examination, one finds that the idea, while subtle, has considerable merit.
Certainly, one should not dismiss it out of hand without careful analysis and
a weighing of potential gains and losses.
2. Sharing the benefits of SDI to eliminate the ballistic missile threat
from the world would conceivably be the most valuable joint US-USSR project in
history.
3. The benefits potentially shareable are numerous and include
significantly more than the obvious primary value of mutual protection.
4. Some sharing benefits can be derived immediately. One need not wait
until complex and expensive systems are deployed in the distant future, nor
does one have to wait for the feasibility of such systems to be established
before benefits can accrue.
5. Sharing can be achieved without transferring or compromising either
side's perceived technological advantages. Further, one can reasonably
imagine cases of technology transfer where the strategic benefits could
outweigh the strategic losses.
6. Sharing need not involve lengthy and complex bilateral or
multilateral negotiations and agreements. Scientific and technical
information can be exchanged; operational sensor and control information can
be exchanged; all within a framework of gradual, measured, confidence
building, without the limitation of sovereign options or the compromise of
essential security technology.
7. The USSR is not the only potential recipient of the benefits of a
program for SDI research and development, or even a program for deployment.
Various benefits are received worldwide.
8. Sharing can be a continual process whose pace and character should be
modified in response to changing technological findings and changing domestic
and international environments.
9. Sharing should be done at a substantially comparable rate with both
our Allies and the USSR, with the former lest they feel we are deserting them
and the latter lest they feel we are ganging up on them even more.
10. While there is a great deal of uncertainty concerning the specifics
of an SDI system and its effectiveness, it is worth noting that most of the
benefits discussed here are independent of the quality or effectiveness of the
system.
TAD CCCDCTJ
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(A) INTRODUCTION
In an earlier paper ("Sharing SDI", also dated September 1986), the
concept of sharing an SDI system was explored, taking as its starting point
the 17 December 1985 letter of G. A. Keyworth to the President. Earlier
notions of "sharing the SDI system," or "sharing the control of an SDI
system," or "sharing the technology on which an SDI system could be based"
have been enlarged to include the more general idea of "sharing the
benefits." Discussions of benefit sharing have focused on such specifics as
"sharing the fruits of the research,"; i.e., knowledge; "sharing the benefits
of the technology,"; i.e., know-how; or "sharing the benefits of the system,";
i.e., operational value. It is the purpose of this paper to review these
several "benefit" areas and to attempt to fit them into some logical
structure.
To do this we ask, and suggest answers to, the following questions, each
of which is addressed in subsequent sections:
1. What, more specifically, are the "benefits" to be shared, bearing in
mind the various domains within which the word benefit is to be understood
(Section B)?
2. What is the downside to sharing the benefits (Section C)?
3. Who are the constituencies who might receive the various benefits
(Section D)?
4. How might the US implement the several kinds of benefit sharing and
what is the minimum amount of sharing necessary to achieve the benefit
(Section E)?
5. When could such sharing reasonably take place (Section F)?
Based on these thoughts, the Key Judgments have been developed.
(B) WHAT ARE THE BENEFITS TO BE SHARED?
There would appear to be at least eleven generic classes of benefits that
can accrue from an SDI program of research, development, and deployment. In
priority order, these are:
1. Protection: A deployed SDI system will provide positive protection
from both land-based and sea-based ballistic missile attacks. Beyond the
obvious requirement that an SDI system be technically effective, there are
perceptual dimensions of effectiveness that must also be recognized and dealt
with. People (as distinct from national decisionmakers and defense elites)
must understand how the system operates and must agree that it will work as
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expected should the need to use it arise; it must also be understood that the
system will operate successfully under a variety of circumstances, some of
which may be unanticipated when it was designed and deployed; and these
understandings and agreements must be at a deep emotional level if the feeling
of protection is to be sufficiently strong that a restructuring of strategic
nuclear forces is to be effected.
2. Conflict control: Removing the likelihood of mutual nuclear
anniliation will allow international disputes to be "settled" at lower levels
of force. In essence, the uppermost ranges of the escalation ladder will have
been removed (it is assumed that air-breather threats have been addressed by
sovereign air defense systems.) There is, perhaps, an analogy to be drawn
between this argument and that for encouraging motion along geological
faults. By continually releasing energy in more frequent, small earthquakes,
one avoids the severe damage from less frequent, major earthquakes.
An effective, global (in Keyworth's terms) SDI system would also
eliminate the need for launch-under-attack-assessment (LUAA) response
strategies. While there are various approaches to mitigating the risk of
unwise LUAA responses (discussed in "Sharing SDI") involving less than full
symmetric SDI deployments, such deployments do give added confidence to both
sides.
3. Lowering international tensions: Related to, but separate from, the
above is the benefit of decreasing international tension, anxiety, and
suspicion. All the nations of the world are hostage to the wisdom, stability,
and control of nuclear-power decisionmakers under stress. Deployment of an
SDI system reduces the threat of nuclear war and, thus, can be expected to
have salubrious effects across the board in international affairs. Clearly,
other sources of superpower conflict and other domains of competition will
exist. And while these are fully capable of causing incalculable human
misery, those tensions deriving from the possibility of almost instantaneous
nuclear annihilation will be reduced (to the extent that the SDI system is
credibly effective.)
4. Improving the environment for international cooperation: A "joint"
US/USSR SDI effort, along any of the lines outlined in the "Sharing SDI"
paper, could provide a basis for further cooperative ventures in the next
century. Such ideas are, of course, continually under discussion. These
include such efforts as the Apollo-Soyuz Test Program (ASTP), cooperative
programs in health and physical sciences, a joint Mars lander program, etc.
Today, such useful efforts are pursued only to the extent that they do not
compromise critical national security technology. In a world in which the US
and the USSR engaged in joint security endeavors, such other programs could be
increasingly productive. Indeed, in comparison to ASTP or a joint Mars
lander, it is difficult to dispute that "sharing the benefits" of SDI (i.e.,
working toward the goal of making the world safe from ICBMs) is the single,
most important joint US-USSR effort in history.
5. Arms control: One area where the US and the USSR have engaged in a
joint security endeavor is that of arms control. The results to date have
been--depending on one's expectations and viewpoint--impressive, modest, or
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disastrous. Questions of verification and compliance have caused many to
question the degree to which the benefits have been symmetric. An SDI
deployment, actual or potential, would shift the focus of arms control from
offense to defense. Issues of verification, breakout, telemetry denial,
levels of offensive forces (the "arms race"), and the phasing in of new
offensive systems or new technologies would be replaced by a focus on
defenses. But while levels and effectiveness of offensive forces are of major
concern to the other side, questions of the quantity and quality of defenses
are of major concern to one's own side.
6. Stabilizing the transition: A difficulty with a unilateral or
grossly asymmetric deployment of effective strategic defenses is that it
creates an incentive for a use-or-lose preemptive attack. On the other hand,
a fully deployed, effective, global SDI which defends both sides represents a
stable state, one that reverses the incentive to invest in offensive forces to
achieve strategic superiority and substitutes, if you will, a race to achieve
the best possible defensive deployment. Joint efforts in developing SDI
systems should help to make the transition over the "potential barrier" from
offensive investments to defensive investments.
Without sharing, if only one side is developing an SDI system, the other
could feel that its offensive missiles were about to become useless. Thus,
prior to this happening, the non-SDI side could decide to launch a preemptive
attack while it could still be effective. Sharing an SDI system would
eliminate this possibility.
Another concern raised by domestic opponents of SDI is the so-called
"cost at the margin" argument, specifically that costly defensive deployments
can be circumvented by much less costly offensive increments by the other
side. While this is a valid issue, the idea presented here is that once the
strategic focus shifts to effective defenses, resources from a nation's
substantially fixed strategic budget are better allocated in a way that
maintains parity in a strategic defense.
7. Strengthening alliances: A successful SDI deployment would impact
the NATO and Warsaw Pact Alliances differently. Our NATO Allies would, of
course, be unsettled by the apparent removal of the US strategic umbrella.
But a successful SDI should, in principle, make possible an effective ATBM
system. And by emphasizing the need for a defense of Europe without recourse
to strategic nuclear conflict, the cohesiveness of the late 40's could
return. To this writer, the logic of European political processes is
frequently counter-intuitive. Nevertheless, there would appear to be no
greater reason then than at the present for the Western European nations or
Japan to make a separate accommodation with a USSR. This is particularly true
since the USSR's land forces would appear ever larger than they do now. The
challenge will be for the US to sustain its position vis-a-vis the USSR, but
in conventional rather than nuclear technology. There is no reason to believe
that in such a conventional military technology arena, the US will be found
wanting. Instead, there is the reasonable expectation that in the domain of
"smart" precise weapons, advanced computer and space-based C /I, and the like
the US will appear a natural leader.
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8. Intelligence access: As discussed in "Sharing SDI", a cooperative
SDI program will provide many opportunities for enhanced access to the other
side's technology enterprise by intelligence services. The suggestion made in
the earlier paper is that the US will benefit more than will the USSR as a
result of the closed nature of the USSR military establishment compared to the
relatively open nature of that of the US. Of equal importance as the nature
of the two systems is the degree to which each side attempts to exploit the
new opportunity for access. One can be sure that the USSR will aggressively
pursue all opportunities for increased access to the US technology
enterprise. Thus, the US would have to go into a cooperative SDI venture with
similar intentions, lest the net benefit accrue to the USSR. But there is no
reason why it need be. Clearly, this is not a matter for public debate, yet
the issue is of supreme importance if the West is not to strengthen the rope
to hang itself.
9. Economic benefits: There are new business areas in the SDI arena
that are of natural interest to US, Japanese, and European industry. There
will be an "SDI market" that will create jobs, businesses, markets, and
profits. While phrased in different economic terms, there will be comparable
benefits for the USSR. Alternatively, it may be that a focus on SDI will
diminish the resources the USSR can bring to bear on conventional military
technology. Most of these impacts, positive and negative, will occur
regardless of whether SDI is a cooperative or joint program, but the degree
may well vary. In any event, these impacts constitute benefits to be weighed
in the balance.
10. Technology development: Despite the anti-defense rhetoric of the
domestic political opposition and the arguments of the economists that
channeling technology resources into defense is economically inefficient, the
demonstrable fact is that technological progress is rapid when stimulated by
the needs of national security. There may or may not be direct non-military
benefits of an SDI R&D program. (Although basic science always has broad
applicability and science has ways of producing positive benefits in totally
unexpected ways.) But there will be technology advances from an SDI R&D
program, advances that while they may come in any event, will probably be
delayed unless force-fed by such a program. These developments, such as in
space technology, will also result in economic benefits and they will
demonstrate the continued technological leadership by the West. Most of these
benefits will occur, regardless of the degree to which the program is
cooperative with the USSR. And it is unclear, as in the case of intelligence
access, which side will benefit more.
11. Removal of uncertainty: The strategic nuclear balance is a critical
determinant of national stature. The efficacy of defense factors directly
into the current and future worth of each side's strategic offensive forces.
Having raised the issue of new strategic defense technologies, until the
question is resolved, there will be a potential instability in the relations
of the superpowers with each other and in the relations of each superpower
with its Allies. Absent reasonable grounds for judging SDI system
feasibility, there will be continual concern that each nation's nuclear
deterrent could be voided by an SDI deployment by the other. Clearly, if an
SDI system is shown to be infeasible, the matter will be put to rest. And if
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an SDI system is feasible, each nation will know the facts and can react in
whatever it judges to be in its own best interest.
(C) WHAT IS THE DOWNSIDE?
The focus of this paper, by its very subject, is to explore the positive
side of the sharing equation. Thus, it tends to resemble an advocacy
argument. There is, of course, the potential for risks to national security
in the short-to-mid term as the net effect of positive and negative results
from each sharing action undertaken come to fruitition. For example, the
effects on the NATO alliance could be negative, not positive, for a variety of
reasons. Loss of technology (perhaps some of it critical) to the USSR could,
and likely will, occur despite our best efforts to prevent it. The net
balance of increased intelligence access for both sides could turn out to be
detrimental to the US. And there could be adverse economic effects.
All this is to say that there is a downside risk, as there is in all
important enterprises. The downside cannot be reasoned away but steps can be
taken to minimize the risk. Clearly one would initiate any long term shift to
a mutual reliance on defensive systems aware of the potential negatives.
While these downside risks must be considered, we believe that at least for
the most part, careful preparation will mitigate them. And it appears that,
even taken in total, these downside risks are not sufficient to negate the
potential benefits from sharing.
Analysis can provide some guidance in helping us understand the long-term
policy effects of sharing the benefits of SDI. The work reported on here is
continuing with emphasis on these longer term issues.
(D) WHO MIGHT SHARE IN THE BENEFITS?
The various benefits--real, potential, or hypothesized do not fall
exclusively on the USSR and/or the US. Nor do they fall uniformly on the
nations of the world. There would seem to be at least seven natural groupings
or constituencies for the benefits of separate or joint SDI programs. While
regional and internal subdivisions abound, the obvious groups at the national
level would appear to be:
1.
US Government
5.
USSR Allies
2.
US Populace
6.
Non-aligned developed countries
3.
USSR
7.
Non-aligned underdeveloped countries
4.
US Allies
Table 1 suggests how each of the benefits outlined in Section B relate to
the above constituencies. The US Government and US Populace are included as
separate entries since different benefits accrue to each entity. Using Table
1, it is possible to begin to map out strategies for appealing to various
national groups and interests.
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Table 1
Who Shares the Benefits?
1. Protection
US US US USSR Non-aligned
Govt Populace USSR Allies Allies Dev Under Dev
2. Conflict control x x x x x
3. Lowering
international
tensions x x x x x x x
4. Improving the
environment for
international
cooperation
5. Arms control
6. Stabilizing
the transition x x x x
7. Strengthening
alliances
8. Intelligence access x x
9. Economic benefits x x
10. Technology
development x x x x x
11. Removal of
uncertainty x x
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(E) HOW CAN ONE IMPLEMENT BENEFIT SHARING?
Sharing is, by the definition of the word, at least a two-sided
venture. And usually it requires some degree of cooperation or coordination
between the parties involved. When the two parties are sovereign nations,
completing these sharing arrangements is particularly difficult and complex
because of what the economists would call "externalities": national
sensitivities, precedent, prestige, and the like. Furthermore the natural
concerns for quid pro quo, terms and conditions, and risks also enter into the
scene.
One approach to sharing is open publication of laboratory research,
theoretical studies, and field experiments and demonstrations (despite the
propensity of the Soviets to discount US open source information as
disinformation). There are, in essence, no negotiations, no agreements, and
no consequent questions of verification and compliance. A variety of such
sharing arrangements were discussed in "Sharing SDI".
At the opposite extreme from these unilateral or bilateral R&D
(knowledge) sharing modes is the unilateral SDI benefit sharing that could
derive from a US SDI deployment. Imagine the US were to develop and deploy an
SDI system unilaterally, a system in which the US has complete and utter
confidence. So much confidence, in fact, that the US phases out its ballistic
missile strategic offensive forces as they reach technological obsolescences
(or before). In such a case, the USSR automatically derives or shares the
benefit of the US SDI system because the US no longer has strategic ballistic
missiles that can threaten the USSR. The benefit accrues to the USSR without
negotiation and without the compromise or transfer of US technology. To be
sure, the USSR will have concerns about US deception, breakout, and long-term
intentions. Nevertheless, the benefit is shared, however much it may be
discounted by the USSR. This unilateral sharing approach, particularly if
announced well in advance as a US fallback position if negotiations fail, also
appears to have considerable near-term political benefit.
Bilateral and multilateral sharing is, of course, possible. Approaches
to these were outlined in "Sharing SDI" and need not be repeated here. They
include the exchange of scientific and technical information in measured
amounts, joint research and demonstrations, and joint deployment and
operation, including operational information sharing and exchange at various
levels.
Finally, each nation can embark on a program of parallel but separate SDI
programs involving research, development, or deployment with time-phased
"milestones" at which they will pause and notify, or wait for some appropriate
response by the other.
Theoretically, sharing the benefits of SDI, in its ultimate form is a
concept that has been a part of the SDI program since its inception in 1983.
It implies we are building, in effect, an astrodome to protect us from
ballistic missiles and we will "give" one to the USSR also. However, it may
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be possible to share the benefits in a manner short of providing a second
"astrodome." We explore here lesser degrees of sharing the benefits of SDI.
In order to understand how much must be shared so as to achieve some of
the benefits, we examine each of the potential benefits discussed in section
B. These are discussed in terms of the minimum amount of sharing necessary to
achieve the benefit. It is convenient to use the concepts for sharing
delineated in the table in "Sharing SDI". That table is reproduced here as
Table 2.
The potential benefits are:
1. Protection: This is perhaps the most difficult benefit to achieve.
It clearly requires sharing system operation and likely system development.
The same benefit could also be obtained if each side developed its own SDI or
through the unilateral sharing concept described in detail above. The
Keyworth concept of shared control would also help.
2. Conflict Control: Any of the concepts discussed in Table 2 helps
perceptually in conflict control in that working together in any manner helps
lessen the possibilities of escalation of conflict. However, to provide
actual protection it is necessary for both sides to have an SDI available or
to control one. Here the sharing of control appears to be the minimum sharing
required.
3. Lowering Tensions: From the US standpoint, US tensions are lowered as
soon as the US has its own SDI system. Likewise US tensions increase if only
the USSR has an SDI system. Sharing sensor information or any of the items
listed in Table 2 jointly help to a lesser extent. The unilateral sharing
concept also resolves this problem.
4. Improving the environment for international cooperation: In the
absence of other mitigating factors (such as the Daniloff case), international
cooperation tends to build upon itself. Thus, doing any of the items in Table
2 provides this benefit. Further, providing the same benefit earlier is
better than providing it later.
5. Arms Control: The arguments in the previous section for the most
part apply here. Any movement towards more reliance on a defensive regime is
beneficial. Thus, any of the items in the table provide this benefit.
6. Stabilizing the Transition: An agreement (in the arms control arena)
to share the benefits and consequent compliance with that agreement through
transition) is all that is necessary to achieve this benefit. The sharing
itself is not really necessary.
7. Strengthening alliances: Reaching agreement to bring the Western
allies and Japan into the SDI R&D program would have probably the greatest
positive effect in this area. The actual joint deployment and operation or
sharing of control per Keyworth, or unilateral sharing, should also provide
additional, incremental improvement.
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TABLE 2
Concepts for Sharing the Benefits of SDI
Value Shared When Possible
Technology Immediately, through system
deployment. Continuing through
deployment as the system is
upgraded.
Sensor Now with current sovereign
Information early warning and attack
assessment sensors; later
with experimental or deployed
sensors
System Now with current systems;
Control later with experimental or
deployed systems
System After commitment to an SDI
Development system
System After development and
Operation deployment of a system
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Concept
o Open publication policy
o Encourage attendance at
scientific meetings
o Bilateral or multi-lateral
exchanges
o Exchange of scientific
workers for long or short
periods
o Provision of laboratory
equipment
o Joint use of facilities
o Establishment of joint
research programs
o Exchange of sensor output
o Exchange of attack
assessment center ouput
o Combinations of the above,
with both sovereign or
jointly operated sensors
o Exchange of NCA decisions
(hotline)
o Interconnection of battle
management computers
o Design of an SDI system
o Fabrication of an SDI
system
o Testing of an SDI system
o Operation of an SDI system
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8. Intelligence Access: Any agreement with the USSR to trade
information and/or people provides the US with otential new intelli ence data
and often access to even more.
9. Economic benefits: They begin during the R&D process. However, they
really do not begin to accrue in significant amounts until actual fabrication
of system components begins. Only small increases result from sharing in
comparison to the economic benefits of building a US system.
10. Technology Development: Unlike the case with economic benefits, the
major technological breakthroughs are likely to occur during the R&D phase.
Here the addition of relatively different (albeit likely somewhat lagging)
Soviet design and R&D concepts might add significantly to the overall increase
in technology.
11. Removal of Uncertainty: While any of the sharing options in Table 2
would resolve this problem, the completion of the current US R&D program also
will by itself. This sharing, per se, is not necessary to obtain this
benefit.
These implementation modalities are summarized in Table 3 for each
generic class of benefit.
(F) WHEN COULD BENEFIT SHARING OCCUR?
Some benefits, such as protection, can only accrue after the deployment
of an SDI system and that, in turn, requires the completion of joint or
sovereign R&D programs to establish feasibility and joint or sovereign
development and deployment periods. Other benefits, such as lowering
international tensions, possibly strengthening alliances, intelligence
collection, and economic benefits derive sooner, if not immediately. And
others, such as removing uncertainty, occur at intermediate times.
Table 3 also outlines how the various benefits are distributed in time
and how they increase with the natural evolution of events. It is noteworthy
that many of the benefits of sharing actually occur much before the majority
of the sharing takes place. This is particularly true of the political
benefits.
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Table 3
The How and When of SDI Sharing
Benefit
3. Lowering international
tensions
Implementation of Benefit Sharing
o deploy an SDI system, at least
unilaterally by US
- complete protection for the
USSR will require a sovereign
terminal defense
- credibility of the system will
require joint tests and
demonstrations, both in the
R&D phase and during and after
deployment
o deploy an SDI system
o undertake joint R&D actions to
initiate the process
(see "Sharing SDI")
- international tensions should
decrease continuously over
the long term as strategic
postures change
4. Improving the environment o undertake joint actions
for international (see "Sharing SDI")
cooperation
o reach agreement to pursue SDI
R&D in a manner consistent
with current or new arms
control agreements
6. Stabilizing the
transition
o agreement to share the benefits
is all that is necessary to
initiate
- compliance needed to maintain
credibility
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Time Period to Realize Benefits
o deployment mid-late 90's
- during R&D late 80's-early 90's
o post mid-late 90's deployment
o immediately upon reaching
domestic and international
agreements to proceed
- post deployment and for
several decades thereafter
o immediately
o whenever agreement with the USSR
on SDI is achieved; could be
soon, or never
o late 80's or whenever agreement
can be reached
- through SDI deployment
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Benefit
Implementation of Benefit Sharing
Time Period to Realize Benefits
7.
Strengthening o
alliances
8.
Intelligence access o
9.
Economic benefits o
10.
Technology
development
11.
Removal of uncertainty o
reach agreement to bring US
allies into the R&D, both to
assess its results as well as
to share in the economic/
technological benefits
reach agreement with USSR for
exchange of information and
people as a minimum; joint
research and field experiments
could follow later if deemed
useful
initiate R&D provided initial
gains
- benefits most from development
and fabrication of hardware
complete current R&D program to
assess feasibility
o this is already underway
o as soon as possible after
reaching an agreement with
the USSR; realistically
would require at least a year
to set up effective contacts
o this is already underway
- early-late 90's
- this is already underway
o early 90's
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