ISSUES PAPER SUMMARY OF SELECTED READINGS BACKGROUND FOR THE 13 NOVEMBER MORNING SESSION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000903690006-2
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 17, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Content Type: REPORT

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Issues Paper
Summary of Selected Readings
Background for the 13 November Morning Session
How Fast Will the Soviets Progress in the Information Revolution?
Judgments about the pace of Soviet advance depend on
assumptions about how the Soviets will choose between partly
incompatible goals. Most authors take as a given that the
centralized, socialist Soviet system creates an inhospitable
environment for maximizing advance in information technologies and
their applications. Thus, as one author (Malik) puts it, the
Soviets face an "agonizing dilemma"--balancing the gains of
development with the risks of losing political and social control.
Experts differ, of course, over where the Soviets will end up
along this continuum, and what the consequences will be for the
Soviet position in the world. We summarize below the key elements
of a general consensus that seems to emerge-- the Soviets will
"muddle through" but will not reach the levels of leading western
nations in the year 2000. (see reading 24, Goodman "Advanced
Technology: How will the USSR Adjust?", reading 25, Malik,
"Communism vs. the Computer," and reading 26, Dizard, "Mikhail
Gorbachev's Computer Challenge").
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The Ingredients
Even before Gorbachev, most Western experts believed that
Soviet information technologies would continue to advance at a
healthy.rate, benefiting from the traditional impetus of massive
resource commitments, exploitation of Western developments, and
leadership attention. Gorbachev has given a strong kick to the
program, especially in terms of resources. Even so, few observers
expect the Soviets to signficantly narrow the gap, except possibly
in a narrow front of specialty military applications. Most believe
the Soviets will remain about ten years behind in most technology
areas--that is, in 1995 they will have about the same array of
technologies available that we have today. Moreover, within the set
of information technologies, most expect to see relatively faster
Soviet progress in technologies that lend themselves to a "national
program" approach (e.g. telecommunications) and relatively worse off
in technologies that don't (e.g. software) (see, for example,
reading 12, Selin).
These judgments are predicated on the widely held belief that
Gorbachev will not fundamentally change the Soviet system, moving
from a Party-dominated command system to a more pluralistic,
decentralized system. Gorbachev is moving aggressively on weak
links--orienting science to the needs of production; stressing
services, maintenance, and computer literacy; and generally trying
to create an environment that encourages individual initiative and
creativity. These measures are nevertheless conservative. Although
many Soviet officials are optimistic, most Westerners believe the
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system will remain fundamentally hostile to information technology
advance (see reading 27 Graham, "The Soviet Union is Missing Out on
the Computer Revolution").
The Applications
Western and Soviet experts seem to agree that information
technologies will be applied preferentially in government, science,
industry, and, as a means to an end, education. Conservative Soviet
authorities write of the need for "unified state control" of
information technologies, while even the most vocal believers in
information technologies generally write in terms of the provision
of centralized services.
, In the government, police, and military establishments,
information technologies are likely to be extensively applied to
support the maintenance of central control. For economic
management, computers have been described as the "last great hope of
central planning." Although early dreams of "computerizing" the
entire economy have been scaled back considerably, computers are
likely to find increasingly widespread use at all levels in planning
production and supply. With an improved telecommunications network,
expanded automated data links will increase Moscow's ability to
collect information and convey instructions. In the military,
information technologies will continue to be incorporated in weapon
applications, but the real frontier is command and control. Soviet
military literature extolls such computer applications, and most
experts believe that information technologies will be more
extensively applied in combat modeling, operational planning
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(including reconnaissance and fire support), and strategic battle
management. Western authors presume that the KGB and militia will
be quick to pioneer surveillance and record-keeping applications,
but doubt that the technologies would support truly Orwellian
measures of control--at least by the year 2000.
In the economy, most experts expect that the Soviets will apply
information technologies extensively in information dissemination,
product design, and manufacturing process control. The Soviets have
long invested large sums in acquiring and disseminating technical
information, and the Soviets are moving to automate this process
more extensively. Access to Western data bases will be aggressively
pursued. Soviets acknowledge-- and Western experts agree--that
computer-aided design will be a very high priority, as the Soviets
move into components (e.g. VLSI integrated circuits) and systems
(e.g. high performance aircraft) that are either impossible or
prohibitively expensive to develop by other means. Computer-aided
manufacturing probably will be pursued the most vigorously, because
it is so important for Gorbachev's productivity and growth goals.
Many Western experts believe the Soviets will succeed in producing
large numbers of robots, automated machine tools, materials handling
equipment, and control computers, but will not develop an effective,
integrated systems approach. "Islands of automation" will spread,
but continuing deficiencies in software, maintenance, technical
standards, and Soviet incentives will impair comprehensive advance
and efficient use.
In the home, Western experts anticipate substantial progress in
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entertainment applications but little prospect of a "computer
culture" comparable to that in the West. Mass communication
services already permeate Soviet society. Given the receptivity of
Soviet citizens to radio-and (especially) TV, Soviet officials are
likely to try to improve the quality, timeliness, and variety of
offerings, if only to compete with Western alternatives. At the
same time, information technologies are likely to be used in jamming
or otherwise interfering with these Western alternatives. Ownership
of videocassette recorders and possibly video cameras will become
more widespread as Western systems and Soviet products become
increasingly available. The apparent Soviet concern over impact of
these systems makes it difficult to forecast how rapidly this
process will unfold. Ownership of personal telephones will
increase, but most experts believe that even by the mid-1990s they
will not achieve levels prevalent in the West in the mid-1980s.
Finally, most Western experts seem to believe that personal
computers will reach Soviet citizens in relatively small numbers.
The priority of applications in the computer literacy program and in
industry, along with restrictions on imports, makes it unlikely that
large numbers would be available to the Soviet consumer before the
early 1990s. Deficiencies in or unavailability of peripheral
equipment--such as printers or modems--will further restrict
personal applications.
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What Will Be the Consequences for the Soviets?
If the Soviets do indeed "muddle through", the Soviet Union of
the 1990s will be not much different than it is today--a repressive
society still playing catch up the the West, but still dangerous
militarily. Progress and change will be constrained by and
contained within a Soviet system that resemble the current model.
Of course, the scenario assumes that the West will generally
continue playing the same kind of role it does today. The West
generally will try to hold the Soviet Union at arms length in its
quest for high technology, and to influence the evolution of the
Soviet political and social systems mainly by the provision of
i nformati on.
In the economic and military arenas, most experts believe that
information technologies will support continued steady Soviet
progress, but that the Soviets will not reach present Western levels
of per capita production, quality of life, or military technology by
the year 2000. Although no one is willing to hazard a precise
forecast, most doubt that Gorbachev will transform the Soviet Union
into an engine of economic development, achieving his goal of five
percent annual growth in the 1990s. There is at least as much
skepticism that Soviet technology and products will become
competitive with the best Western alternatives. If so, the Soviets
will continue to have an export profile like that of a third world
country--selling mainly raw materials. Continuation or worsening of
the Soviet position in those markets would impair Soviet ability to
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rely on the West. In sum, many Western experts would agree the the
chance of the Soviets falling further behind is at least a good
chance of their catching up.
On-the political and social front, many Western authors imply
that there will be a gradual moderation of state control--whether
intended or unintended. Gorbachev's campaign to encourage
individual and local initiative--plus the technologies he is
supporting it with-- requires some moderation. At the same time,
Gorbachev acknowledges that the increasingly sophisticated and
demanding Soviet citizen must be catered to, and indeed one Western
author (Dizard) argue that the Soviet "Yuppie"--and not the
dissident--will be the driving force. Among areas of potential
Soviet concern are:
o Direct Western broadcasts, likely to become
increasingly accessible to ordinary citizens-- although
Soviet cable TV could check this trend (see readings
28, Quester, "Transboundary Television" and 29,
Reichlin, "Big Brother's Grip Can Fail").
Paradoxically, to the reported consternation of Soviet
Party officials, even Soviet television may have a
moderating influence. Television, a major
entertainment medium, is undermining the effectiveness
of political lectures and other, more traditional means
of conveying propaganda.
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o The growing availability of videocassettes, both
Western-origin and blank tapes. (see readings 22,
Yasman, and 30, Yasman, "Video in the Soviet Union:
Trouble With a Capricious Stepchild"). Propagation of
"antisocial values" and popular agitation are feared.
o Direct telecommunication links. Increasing access to
telephones (and possibly modems), plus improvement in
the national systems at least increases control and
surveillance problems for the KGB. The Soviets' 1982
cut-off of international direct dialing illustrates
their willingness to take drastic measures.
The Soviet leadership has reason to worry that an increasingly
computer-literate citizenry may develop the ability to obtain,
manipulate, and transmit unauthorized information, whether at home
or on the job. Even within the bounds of the official system,
information technologies can be a double-edged sword-- Moscow can
use them to centralize and penetrate, but local authorities can use
them to deceive. According to Velikhov, Soviet social scientists
are also looking into possible consequences of the information
revolution that have been discussed in the West--worker alienation,
reduced peer contacts. There are also hints of concern over worker
"dislocation", if not unemployment.
Even under the scenario of steady if unspectular Soviet
progress, some Western authors have raised the possibility of more
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serious conflict or disruption within the Soviet system. One
eventuality might be unanticipated by the Soviets--that as
information technologies expand, a "cross-over point" is reached--
possibly suddenly--at which time developing networks overwhelm the
ability of controls (see Malik and Dizard). Alternatively, tension
may grow between "conservatives" and "modernizers" as one or both
sides become dissatisfied with trends in Soviet economic progress
and political control. Disagreement could lead to an abrupt change
in policy, with ramifications extending beyond the world of
information technologies. It could prompt a dramatic liberalization
of the Soviet system, or monumental internal crackdown and external
beligerence. Malik, perhaps the most alarmist of the writers on
this topic, concludes that "we are on track for a highly dangerous
situation."
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Discussion Questions
1. Will the Soviets meet their goals for information technology
development? How advanced will Soviet microelectronic,
computer, telecommunications, and software technologies be in
the late 1990s? What key technical or systemic deficiencies
will constrain progress?
2. Will Soviet technologies be adequate to support Soviet goals
for information technology applications? If not, to what
extent can and will the Soviets resort to Western, Japanese, or
East European technology to meet these goals? Taking all
technology resources into account, what progress will the
Soviets make in industrial automation, economic management,
social control, and personal applications?
3. How will Soviet progress in information technology applications
contribute to broader Soviet economic goals? Will likely
Soviet information technology progress endanger Soviet goals
for growth in productivity and consumer welfare?
4. Will progress in information technology applications lead to
some moderation of political and social control--whether
planned or unplanned? Or will information technologies serve
mainly to intensify central control? What will be the major
forces supporting moderation and intensification? Which
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sources of moderation are beyond the Soviets' control, and
which of these do they fear most?
5. Do or will the Soviets face a crisis? Will likely'progress in
applications of information technologies be compatible with
goals for both economic development and political and social
control? Even if the Soviet officials are content with their
apparent progress, will the growth of information technology
applications reach a critical concentration that threatens to
overwhelm control mechanisms? If Soviet interest groups are
unhappy with either the pace of progress or the diminution of
central control, is this likely to precipitate a fundamental
change in course? What is the more likely eventuality--
sacrifice of progress to preserve control, or the reverse?
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