DCI UNCLASSIFIED LEAK PRESENTATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000903750003-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: December 26, 1985
• Content Type: MISC

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DCI Unclassified Leak Presentation
C JS,ROH
2CDEC1985
The resources and the efforts we have devoted to improving our
intelligence capabilities are being severely undermined by the security
breakdown represented by unauthorized disclosures. While we have spent
billions on collection and assessment, almost every method of intelligence and
many of our sources have been endangered by leaks. Serious disclosures are
published on an average of once a week.
We need to do something to alleviate this situation. Combatting
unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence is severely hampered by a
lack of unity and resolve in the government's efforts. It is easy to get
people to express alarm about the damage done to our intelligence efforts by
leaks. It is much more difficult to get them to agree on action to deter
unauthorized disclosures. Meanwhile, the reprehensible conduct of leakers
jeopardizes our ability to learn the capabilities and intentions of a powerful
and implacable adversary.
Let me make it plain that I believe in the importance to our nation of a
free press. Journalists must be able to criticize wrongdoing in government.
The government, on the other hand, must have the ability to maintain the
secrecy of its legitimate secrets. Intelligence activities, by their nature,
cannot fulfill their purpose under the spotlight of worldwide media
attention. I do not believe that US journalists are any less patriotic than
other Americans, although some seem more concerned with their rights and
privileges than their responsibilities. I do believe that unless those of us
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who are entrusted with intelligence secrets become more scrupulous in
fulfilling that trust, our freedom and that of future generations will be
gravely imperiled.
Why is the publication of unauthorized disclosures of intelligence a
serious problem? Because it damages the national security of the United
States in several ways. First it tells our adversaries what we know about
their strengths, weaknesses and intentions. It also tells them, directly or
indirectly, how we collected the information and advertises the capabilities
and vulnerabilities of our collection efforts. Second, it enables hostile
nations to predict more effectively how we will respond to the intelligence we
gather, tells them how they can stop our collection activities, and finally,
it enables them to feed us disinformation through sources and methods we have
every reason to trust and rely upon. Over the long term, this could lead to a
disaster that would make the Pearl Harbor attack look like a picnic. Third,
leaks lad to the loss of agents and the cooperation of intelligence services
of friendly foreign countries. When I speak of the loss of agents, I don't
necessarily mean the imprisonment or execution of brave people who take
incredible risks to support freedom and democracy. Although such things
regrettably do happen, our ability to gather vital intelligence is harmed when
an agent decides cooperation with US intelligence is too risky, because
everything we do seems to appear in the press. Or when another country's
intelligence service decides to hold back important data because we don't seem
capable of protecting it from unauthorized disclosure, the US intelligence
effort is severely handicapped. Fourth, the economic cost of leaks to the US
taxpayer can be staggering. As one intelligence operation after another has
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its usefulness destroyed by media publicity, we must provide new ways to learn
what we must know about the capabilities and intentions of nations whose
avowed historical intention is to destroy our system of government and our way
of life. Developing human sources is a risky and expensive business. In
terms of cost, the development of new technical collection capabilities to
replace those which have been compromised and countermeasured is
astronomical. The American people can ill afford to have our economy burdened
with such unnecessary costs rising from unauthorized disclosures. And yet we
cannot afford not to know what our adversaries are about. Fifth, such
disclosures are a reprehensible breach of trust by persons who have signed
written agreements to protect the classified intelligence entrusted to them.
Finally, it undermines the credibility and viability of our entire security
system. The drumbeat of disclosures makes it easy for the John Walkers among
us to rationalize that they are simply selling for cash that which "officials
who spoke on the condition they not be named" are giving away free.
So that you will not think I am engaging in groundless hand-wringing,
let me review some trends in this dangerous practice of unauthorized
disclosures of classified intelligence.
Recently, a study by my Security Committee determined that in the
five-year period from FY 1979 through FY 1983, there were 285 verified first
time publications in the news media of unauthorized disclosures of classified
intelligence information. The study showed that the number of such
publications is increasing, and that the time between production of
intelligence reports and the media's publication of their content is
decreasing.
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This means that more leaks are occurring and they are occurring with
greater rapidity. The study showed that the number of journalists and the
number of publishers and broadcasters who present classified intelligence
material are increasing. The publication of classified intelligence is now
virtually an accepted practice to some people.
The KGB must find it amusing that the US Intelligence Community seems so
incapable of maintaining the discipline that is the sine qua non of an
effective intelligence service. We work hard to learn what our Communist
adversaries are up to; they read about our plans and activities in the
newspapers. We obviously are doing something wrong, and nobody seems to
care.
Anarchy is the most accurate term to describe the system covering the
discussion of classified intelligence by government officials with
journalists. Nobody seems to be in charge, and the casual use of classified
intelligence to make a point in the press appears to be an established
practice.
The President has said on more than one occasion that the disclosure of
intelligence secrets is illegal, unethical and plain wrong. I might add that
over the long-term it generally is counterproductive. To trade the betrayal
of long-term, reliable intelligence collection activities for short-term media
support of a particular point of view is not good business. Time frequently
demonstrates that the point could have been made adequately, but less
spectacularly, without divulging sensitive intelligence.
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In any event, decisions to disclose classified intelligence to the media
in support of policy objectives should not be individual, uncoordinated
judgments. In order for such determinations to be valid in the context of the
national interest, they must weigh knowledgeably the instant policy objective
against potential damage to sources and methods. This means that intelligence
experts must have an opportunity, before the disclosure, to assess the risk
and advise the speaker.
If we can sort out the leaks from the executive disclosures, we can then
move on to trying to investigate the leaks. Data gathered during the study I
mentioned earlier indicate that intelligence originated by CIA and NSA are
most frequently leaked. The leaked intelligence, however, is disseminated
throughout the Intelligence Community. I ensure that CIA's Director of
Security vigorously investigates the most serious disclosures. But these
efforts are futile if the actual disclosure was committed by another agency's
employee.
Certain beliefs about leaks are widely held. One is that senior
officials of the government regularly divulge classified intelligence in
efforts to influence or impress the news media. Another is that nobody is
ever punished for these unilateral illegal disclosures.
The first of those notions may be beyond my authority and capability.
The second is not. I have taken drastic action against CIA employees and
contractors who have revealed classified intelligence to unauthorized
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persons. These actions have included termination of employment, removal of
security clearances, and referral to the Department of Justice for possible
prosecution. It would be grossly unjust, as well as counterproductive, to
raise the level of risk for CIA affiliates while those in the rest of the
government continue to engage, without risk, in the disclosure to the media of
classified intelligence information.
Even when we identify those who disclose classified intelligence without
authorization, little can be done to penalize them. The existing laws were
designed to prosecute spies and traitors. The legislators did not foresee a
day when government employees would use classified information to enhance
their own positions, to attack their opponents' posture, to curry favor with
the press, or even to disrupt properly coordinated and approved intelligence
activities by revealing them in the media.
The breach of trust committed by a leaker is simple and
straightforward. He has chosen to disregard a clear responsibility and, for
his own purposes, place the national interest at risk. Although disclosures
to the media unmistakably convey classified information to foreign adversaries
of the United States, many people claim the act is not espionage.
Yet the Espionage Act is the only legal remedy available in most cases
of unauthorized disclosure. It is usually necessary to show that the
perpetrator intended to aid a foreign power or damage the United States. He
probably had no such intent, although his action could have had both results.
Even more of a problem is posed by the necessity of showing, in open court,
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that the United States was damaged by the unauthorized disclosure, and how.
The decision to forego prosecution is the usual result. There has only been
one prosecution of a leak under the Espionage Act, through the 78-year history
of the act.
Already, some segments of the media have criticized the conviction of
Samuel Morison on the grounds that he was not a spy in the classic sense of
working for a foreign intelligence service. The compromise of classified
information, regardless of the reason, damages our security. Proposals to
reduce the number of cleared people and to reduce the amount of classified
information simply do not face the root of the problem. Those who are
authorized to receive our secrets, regardless of the numbers of people or
secrets, must behave responsibly. If everyone decides for himself which
secrets he will keep and which secrets he will disclose, we have no security.
The age-old cry, "there ought to be a law," has never been more
appropriate. The law that is needed is one that will criminalize the act of
disclosing classified information to an unauthorized person. It would require
authorized recipients of classified information to live up to their fiduciary
responsibilities, or be penalized if they fail to do so. Such a law could not
be construed in any way as infringing upon freedom of the press. Ideally, it
would not require proof that the United States was damaged by the unauthorized
disclosure. It would only be necessary to show that the defendant gave
classified information to someone not authorized to receive it.
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We need to establish practical guidelines governing official contacts
with the press to reduce the possibility of unauthorized disclosures of
classified intelligence. This was directed by NSDD-84, but appears to have
generated little response. The laissez faire approach to media relations
affected by some departments and agencies does nothing to discourage
individuals from discussing classified matters with journalists. Even a
moderate requirement for closer control and reporting of media contacts should
help serve notice that unilateral, uncoordinated disclosure of classified
intelligence information is not to be tolerated.
It would be helpful if official statements to the press were attributed
by name and/or official position. The frequent publication of unauthorized
disclosures without specific attribution tends to encourage leakers.
Heightened awareness is needed throughout the government of the
corrosive effect of unauthorized disclosures upon the ability of our
government to be aware of the capabilities and intentions of those nations
which oppose us philosophically, politically and militarily.
It is hard to demonstrate the damaging effect of leaks without divulging
sensitive information. This makes it extremely difficult to take the case to
the public. Unfortunately, the true story about leaks is not being told.
Journalists label as a "coverup" any effort to maintain legitimate
intelligence secrets.
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Fi A It- U;iE P1, NO L Y
It is hard to believe that the American people are willing to continue
to permit their safety and that of their children to be jeopardized because
the government is impotent to stop its employees from illegally revealing
classified information. The national security is ill served by allowing this
practice to go unchecked. The official who has not violated his
responsibility regarding classified information has nothing to fear from a
polygraph examination. On the other hand, honorable men are not the only ones
to proclaim their integrity and trustworthiness. Scoundrels find honor a
convenient cloak for their activities as well. The truly honorable man should
be willing to place his nation's safety above his own ego.
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