EXDIR PAPER MORE ON LEAKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000903750006-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 26, 2011
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: November 20, 1985
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/26: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903750006-5
20 November 1985
0
NOTE TO: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Deputy Director for Intelligence
SUBJECT: EXDIR Paper "More on Leaks"
1. I have no serious problems in principle with Jim's
proposals, but I do have a few observations:
As Jim points out, restricted dissemination of either DI
or DO material will still put information in the hands
of people who do the vast majority of the leaking. At
the same time, it may take the material out of the hands
of people at lower levels who genuinely need to have it
or could use it.
One point Jim overlooks is that there already is a
significant differentiation made between the
dissemination of more sensitive papers- and routine
papers. Intelligence assessments and other information
that are either source or politically sensitive already
are disseminated in extremely limited copies --
somewhere between two and four dozen depending on the
subject. The only papers that are disseminated in large
quantities any more are those that do not involve
sensitive technical or human sources or are not
particularly controversial. For examnle_ wp nn lnnoor
talk aboutnrestricting dissemination of DI papers, for
the most part that would include things that are not
particularly sensitive nor susceptible to leaking. (S)
2. Jim cites in paragraph five several contributions his
program would make to managing the leaks problem. I agree with
three of those. Reducing dissemination would help regain the
initiative; it would strengthen our ability to ask others to take
difficult steps;; and it would get the attention of a lot of
people. I'm not sure I agree it would ultimately improve our
Cl By Signer
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/26: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903750006-5
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ability to deliver our intelligence or have any impact to speak
of on the number of leaks. (S)
3. I have no objection to reducing further the
dissemination of DI products, but I do not think it makes sense
to do that alone. I would oppose further reduction in the DI
dissemination in the absence of very real changes in the
dissemination of raw traffic from both the DO and NSA. I
disagree with Jim that we cannot deal with NPIC and NSA at this
point. Too many of the leaks that occur involve NSA material to
rely only on exhortation. The Director has statutory
responsibility and authority to deal with protection of sources
and methods and I think you would find in Odom a willing partner
in reducing dissemination. Similarly, it does not make any sense
to reduce CIA's finished intelligence without a parallel
reduction on the part of DIA. All of the information is the
same. Accordingly, I have no objection to the kind of program
Jim has laid out but I strongly believe that it should be a
Community-wide program that does not focus just on CIA (or as so
often has happened in the past, solely on the DI). (S)
4. Insofar as the suggestions in paragraph 8 are concerned,
I have no objection to any of them. I disagree that briefing
(paras 9-12) is a particular problem area. While you may not
have the constant reminder of a security classification in front
of you, neither do you have a piece of paper that you can xerox
or share with people who are not authorized access. A briefing
enables you to target an audience without a lot of people on the
periphery that would have access to a written document. It also.
enables you to know specifically who is receiving the information
so that when the time comes for an investigation you have a
better place to start. In short, I think parag-raphs 9-12 are
flawed. Indeed, I believe we should do more briefing not less.
(S)
Robert 14. Gates
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/26: CIA-RDP88B00443R000903750006-5