I HAVE OBSERVED WITH GROWING CONCERN THE INCREASING RESORT TO PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF CLASSIFIED INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000903770017-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 28, 2011
• Sequence Number: 17
• Content Type: MISC

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--I have observed with growing concern the increasing resort to
public disclosure of classified intelligence information.
--It is clear that certain recipients of sensitive intelligence
have not been made sufficiently aware of the detrimental
effect that public disclosure can have on national--and
allied--security.
--In particular, recent press disclosures of U.S. classified
intelli ence and reference to specific collectors such as
aise serious questions regarding our understanding
of the dangers involved.
--Such disclosures give the USSR and other foreign powers
insights into the capabiltieis and limitations of our
intelligence effort.
--Public disclosures tend to undermine the attitude toward
security at all levels of government and to lead to
further disclosures for clarification and elaboration.
--As a result the effectiveness of our intelligence effort is
jeopardized with inevitable negative impacts on the volume
and quality of information on foreign intentions and capa-
bilities, which is needed in formulating defense and foreign
policy.
--You are urged to take steps to insure that classified intelli-
gence to which you and your organization have access is
disclosed only to properly authorized recipients and solely
in consonance with applicable orders and regulations.
--Remind intelligence recipients of the sensitivity of intel-
ligence sources and methods and their vulnerability
to foreign countermeasures;
--Educate intelligence users on classification) and control2,
the two basic tools for protecting the product and
restricting access to those with a need to know the
information;
--Insist that public disclosure initiatives are reviewed
and approved at the policy level in your organization
1See Executive Order 12065, Dated 22 December 1978, Subject:
National Security Information.
2See Director of Central Intelligence Directive No. 1/7, Dated
18 May 1976, Subject: Control of Dissemination of Foreign
Intelligence.
STAT
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STAT
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Washington Y
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Disclosures of Classified. Intelligence
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
SUBJECT:
.Our national security and the continuing success of the intelligence ef-
fort of this Government are being adversely affected by the appearance
in public information media of classified intelligence, including informa-
tion tending to reveal 'intelligence sources and methods. Sources of a
continuing nature and methods of intelligence collection have been
jeopardized and in some instances great harm has been done to the intel-
ligence effort. I am concerned over the serious damage thus caused
to national security. it is clear that certain recipients of classified
information, including intelligence; have not been made auEficiently
. aware of the detrimental effect which their disclosures may have or
..that such recipients have been careless in the handling of such informa-
tion.
I direct that immediate action be taken in your respective departments
and agencies to prevent the disclosure of classified intelligence except
In particular each department or agency shall conduct a continuing
review of its dissemination of classified intelligence with a view to
to properly authorized recipients. Further, I direct that action be
taken to ensure that the disclosure of classified intelligence be made
solely in consonance with applicable statutes, regulations and this
:.directive. Recipients-of classified intelligence shall be made especially
aware of the damage. that can accrue to intelligence sources and methods
through the improper disclosure of Antelligence. Existing procedures
for the control of classified intelligence, and for limiting. access thereto,
shall be reviewed and corrective action shall be taken where undue re-
liance upon routine administrative methods or other inadequacies are
found..
May 23, 1960
SECRET I
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ensuring that such dissemination is conf'
both within the Government and to consultand to ts a athorized recipients
strict need-to-know basis. ontractors on a
m
..
authorized channels without tion will be No further dissemination of such informa_
made outside of these without an
.'assessment by the
n
national security and to the intenRlligence Chief of the risks to our ?
lilggence sources and methods involved.
In keeping with the re'sponsibilit
Intelligence for the Y vested in the Director of Central
protection of intelligence sources and methods,
T shall look to that official to assure the issuanc
guidance
guidance to departments a of appropriate
of this and agencies, as required in the
raentation directive. I shall expect department and agenc ,
? : heads receiving this guidance to see that it is carri
their- departments and a ed out within
shall keep me informed of developments under this directive anmake appropriate re co
as rna mmenda'
ions, including additional legislation
may be proposed by the United States Intelligence Board.
/s/
Dwight D. Eisenhower
SECRET
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71% 7
4 AN 1971
F1EX0 `AN DUM FO R As5iS tent to he Preside.a t . for
national Security Affairs
the Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
Director, United States Arms
Control and Disarra~,:`n; Agency
Chair;
4 -,.. , 'Jo+;lt Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT Public Disclosure of Classified
In te~ligence In formation
1 . In keening with my s to tutor ? ? , .
ties the yes. on -
for ~.rProtection of intelligence source:s;_i
and methods, I have `ra y y observed with growing ecn cei..
.-a ..ur,..a., i..u V1 1. 6?V W~-
ClaSSl.iled intelligence infor.,ation. Despite the
President's injunction of 2
caution in the public 1 December* 1970 urgi:~c
cation the p release of classified info;;-
, frequency of such disclosures has
reached alarming levels.
2. I have attached as. an annex to this merno-
randum a partial chronology o{ significant dis-
closures of classified intelligence information
ire 19.71. This annex illustrates clearly that
although any single disclosure may not seem
critical, the cumulative impact
is quite sobering. of this practice
3. I fully annreciate the occasional tempta-
tion to use intelligence information-to foster
public support Off policies in such matters as
weapons pro ra::s and arms control. But I would
be remiss in my obligations if I did not ou-L* that whatever th short-term
.gains, this
ILLEGIB
~.l
--.
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" I I
Practice may well jeopardize our ability to provide
the ?ntellicerce support required _
defense policy and no: ito;: ing arms control over
the longer teem.
4. This flood of t
public disclosures of C assi-
fied information gives ,
the US S-3 and Other ~ ;
Powers keen insights into the ca-D-b f?le`
limitations or oL _ ~iiities and
into-lige'nce s s~e;n.
tto urdern_re the- . y It also
tends o all levels at`itud`'- -c'uard security
of Governr:ent whic~. in turn encouraces ?'
more disciosuzes -=r Clarification and elaboration
be result o, these disclosures could
a sharp curLtailrant of the effectiveness, if
not the disappearance, of some of our -ost L
intelligence sources. i-::portan
5? The objective of this
~-~ na"~orardu.-n is to alert
you to this danger
cooperation potential n elirtina-inand to enlist your
closures ~inich any lures'=mar public dis-
can only damage our intelligence
post,.uia.
Richard Helms
Director
Attachment
is ,r!DUtwn:
ADDI (4 June 71)
T"% J.
.COPY 1 - Dr. Kissinger
2 - The Secretary of State
3 - The Secretary of Defense
4 - Director/ACDA
5 - Chairman, JCS
? 6 - Director
7 - DDCI
8 - Executive Registry
9 - DDI
10 DDI
11 USIB Secretariat
2 -
25X1`
25X1
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