SNIE ON SOVIET SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001003870002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 1, 2007
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: April 29, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

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D FENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301
TS-552/UP 29 APR 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SUBJECT: SNIE on Soviet Support for Terrorism (U)
1. (S) Regretfully, I am .unable to endorse the NIC redraft of the SNIE. I
appreciate the difficulty of developing such a draft and the hard work which
went into the redraft. I can- concur with your view of the shortfalls of the
DIA submission, but I-believe that the NIC draft has failed to correct the
problems -- noted in your critique -- that plagued the SNIE at the outset.
2. (TS) To be specific, I find the Summary Conclusions section wholly
inadequate;. it should be eliminated. The Key Judgments section is
significantly better than what-has been written before. I could concur
with it if -key changes were made. My problems- with the section include the
following:
' tinction made between "revolutionary violence" and "terrorism",
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c.i rcumstances > Gages v -&- vi") ?.
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e:
so far as I can judge,-follows,-Soviet practice. Use of "revolutionary
violence".implies a legitimacy which-lacks substance and is apologetic. One
man's "revo-lutionary.violence"'is another's "terrorism." (Page v & others).
In the context:-of deliberate Soviet encouragement, direction, and
support;-for-terroris-t'a tivittes the distinction between "national
insurgencies," .,,separatist-Irredentist movements," and "nihilist groups"
is simply : misleading. The -d=istinction, I believe, issues from local
circumstances, which~,:from-the-`Soviet viewpoint, require different tactics
and avenues of's-upport. The-terrorist acts of such groups are the same
whatever. we. or the Soviets -cal.l the -groups. Moreover, the distinctions
between the_groups_.shou_lid--not be used to imply that the Soviets see their
contribution to Soviet global-objectives as being different in substance,
or.more,lor l:ess-worthy of support. Decisions about support are based on
objective factors - impacti-effectiveness, chances of success, operative
" d "indirect" used to characterize Soviet
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support, ten o e^c p
I realize that this result is certainly not intended by the drafters.
However, by its very nature, support for this kind of warfare is
clandestine: in other words --- indirect. In the final analysis, the
threat to US interests is affected by the substance of the assistance,
not whether it comes directly from the Soviet Union or through several
an
rrec
The terms:- d
I t bI ate the-Soviets rather than describe their method.
cutouts.. (Pages v, vi ,. & V11). .
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- The judgment about Soviet policy toward "nihilist groups is
inadequate from my reading of the evidence. That evidence -- the curiel
apparat, the training offered by Soviet client states, the transit and
safehaven privileges, etc. is sufficient to support a strong belief
that the Soviets are supporting the so-called western "nihilists" despite
public disavowals of the methods.th.e groups employ. To use the SNIE term,
the support is indirect -- but one would expect it to be indirect. I think
it is reasonable to presume that the Soviets see the circumstances in Europe
as similar to those in South Africa. There, we know that the Soviets have
.told the Africa National Congress (ANC) that the only paramilitary
'revolutionary technique available is urban terrorism..--(Page vi).
and Yemeni dependence on.the Soviet Union and its.satellites and the evidence
of Soviet training;."requests" for assistance in the Western Hemisphere,
"advice":o'n-how t6 conduct-terrorist activities, etc., I must conclude that
the Soviets exercise overpowering influence over the actions of those entities
as wel1-._-7 In-the--case of-Libya, Soviet and Libyan objectives frequently
coincide and I-.doubt-.that the Soviets encounter much difficulty convincing
Qadhafi-to support what the-Soviets want supported. (Page vi).
.The evidence on Soviet..-involvement with. Eastern Europeand Cuba indicates
full coordination-and,.in--effect, Soviet control. Given the extent of PLO
- Use of the words "support" and "condone" to characterize the Soviet
involvement with its communist satellites and client states or entities
in terrorist activities implies that they are-independent actors. I
believe that this is-a fundamental misinterpretation of the relationship.
Too-much is. made-of Soviet public and private statements about the
evils. of terrorism.- Soviet-practice is, as stated above, to distinguish
between legitimate. revolutionary violence - which they support, and.
"criminal" terrorism,. which they condemn verbally. This practice should be
explained in the-SNIE, but not used as- a basis-.for our own examination of
terrorism.(Page-vii).
The--key role played by-_-the International Department of the CPSU
Central-Committee and-the inevitable direction of the ruling members of
.the Politburo in Sovret-.support.for terrorist activities (which, again,
they des-cribre as legitimate revolutionary violence) are omitted i n;:the Key
Judgments and, indeed, the body of the SNIE, This is a major failing..
(Pages'vii & viii).
As noted-in the main text, the Soviets have coordinated th-e support of
"revolutionary" groups for Latin American terrorists and the organization
of those terrorists as well. Thus, the contrary general statement in the Key
Judgments is erroneous-. Moreover, Soviet involvement in the world socialist
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(communist) movement and other fora in which these groups participate,
the known and suspected activities of the CPSU Central Committee International
Department, and Soviet "requests" for PEQ'support for Armenian terrorists are
external signs of a significant-Soviet coordinating function, world-wide.
Indeed, the- geographic placement of Soviet proxies around the globe suggests a
regionalization of Soviet coordination,which takes advantage of ethnic
relationships which could not be developed with Soviet nationals'i'n direct
associations.. (Page viii).
3. (TS) These comments on the Key Judgments are relevant to the main text of
the SNIE as well. My difficulties with the main text are, however,-much
greater in both scope and substance. I have been able to devote too little
time to the text..to-develop a detailed critique. I can, however, relate a
few nagging concerns:- -
- Despite the initial. words-in the Key Judgments section, the main
text of the SNIE leaves_me with-the impression that the Soviet Union is
.a. benign actor,-.providing much--of the wherewithal of terrorism but
-exercisinglittle control."over its use or distribution or over the
recipients of the Soviet=.largesse. My instincts, my reading of available
evidence,",` and myexperience say that this treatment contradicts reality.
If the Bulgarians-send arms--to Turkish terrorists, there is no doubt in my
mind that the mastermind of the. act resides in Moscow not Sofia. If
Yemeni-:terrorist.training camps, staffed and funded by the Soviets, are
used to . train .. !=nihilist" terrorists-, I' cannot believe that the Soviets do not
endorse. the-activity-.o-r thatt-the "nihilist" leadership has any doubt about
whose support--th-ey enjoy.- These are but two examples of many in the main
text where logical=analysis,wou-1d easily have filled the gaps in direct
evidence.
I,'am,very much-`dfsturbed--.by-the references to Vladimir Sakharov and
Jan Sejna -Sakh--arov--has_testified that while he was an employee of the
MFA his-,work was in large part=for the KGB. The paragraph on page 11-3
about Jan-Sejna states that Sejna.knew nothing about "terrorist" training
and J n' the same-paragraph -notes his knowledge of Czech assistance to "national
liberation movements. Here-, again, the draft appears to have inadvertently
accepted- S-av-iet usage-,- -The-Soviets, of course, do not support terrorists; they
supportlegiftfmate "rrevo7iutionaries.' by definition. Sejna has recently
stated-to me that, at the tame-of his debriefings, he was using the,Soviet
lexicon (since he knew-no other) which. does not include the word "terrorist"
when discuss-ing- "legitimate-revolutionaries". I am convinced that the he
does know about Czech support through 1968 for those revolutionaries, whom I
would-call terrorists and--about the nature of the relationship between the
.Soviet Union and the intelligence services of Eastern Europe. I believe that,
because-of our own parti-cular perspectives, we have failed to exploit these
two sources-and others like them in the subject area of this SNIE.
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Finally, the main text appears to me to ignore years of Soviet
operational tradecraft experience relative to Soviet subversive operations use of cutouts, third parties., and surrogates to provide plausible denial,
overlaid with. Propaganda and drs.information to further obscure Soviet involvement.
.In any case, it would be useful to include a major section on such operational
techniques to help explain the nature of the evidence.
4. (S) I want to thank you for this opportunity to preview the redraft of
the SNIE. I.regret that I could not be more positive in my comments...I .
ado appreciate-the effort which must have gone into this draft,but I believe
that we are not yet out of the woods. While the attempt some of my people
made in the earlier redraft was less than adequate, I would like to offer
to take another try. 'I think all of us are beginning to understand better
the problems.faced in hurriedly putting a paper like this together.
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? The Director of Central Intelligence
Washing on. Q C 20505
30 April 1981
MEMORA ~:'M FOR: Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
SUBJECT SNIE on Soviet Support for Terrorism
1. Thanks for your critique on Draft No. 3 of the SNIE on
terrorist.. I have already asked for revisions dealing with some
of the paints it makes. I would rather not take the time to wait
for the :ll redraft but would be glad to get any redrafting
suggestions. as soon as you can make them available. I think we
would both like to get this out as soon as possible. My notion
is to now let one go around to identify points and dissent at
working level and as soon as possible bring it before the NFIB.
2. The issue that I ask be dealt with is the one set forth
in the last full paragraph 2 of your critique. I think the exist-
ence and significance of the Soviet apparatus needs to be brought
way up front and I have asked that this be done. I agree with you
that the word "condone" is not--appropriate in reference to an issue
which consistently trains terrorism and distributes weapons around
the world. I don't feel quite the same way "about the word "support".
3. I agree that the document should be carefully looked at
to minimize the degree with which we use language which the Soviets
have developed to put on a noble face to obscure activities they
carry out to further aggressive designs. I think this could be
done at the working group level and NFIB process. In the meantime,
please go ahead in preparing any draft language which you think
would improve the final document.
William J. Casey
TS-810215/1
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30 April 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, National Foreign Assessment Center
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: SNIE on Soviet Support for Terrorism
This response to General Tighe reflects my reaction to
his critique.
0
Attachment:
Memorandum dated 30 April 1981
Unclassified When Separated
From Top Secret Attachment
William J. Casey
77
TS-810216/2
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