LEAKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001003870058-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 58
• Publication Date: April 9, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP88B00443R001003870058-3
Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP88B00443R001003870058-3
 Approved For Release 2007i03107SrAE RDP88B00443R001003870058-3
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9 April 1981
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Leaks
There are a number of:.interrelated security problems which need
referred to the most immediate one in our telephone conversation
last. night:. At.the first NSC meeting when Haig and Weinberger return from
their trips, George Bush would like to have a careful briefing on the
handling -- of -se-nsiti ve- nfarmation in public statements by the members and
i think the system: needs overhauling. It seems to me there is a
to be thought through- and.some of which you may have to take action on
their subordinates;--- Dick Kerr and-Evan Hineman are up to date on this and
I attach-: some of _the offending clippings.
need to review and consalidate--the standards and cautions in the handling
of sensitive-material. For example, the PDB will specify than an item comes
from sensitive communications while the same item in the NID will report
the information but not indicate that it came from a sensitive source. I
understand it to be your view that specifying the sensitive source reminds
the reader of the PDB as to how he needs to handle the information. It
seems to me that perhaps some information has to be totally withheld from
the NID if we really want to protect the source.
while.I am away-
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 seems'-.to hit and miss to me.
4. I think we should round up and look at all the rules that have
been developed on this subject and.review them and see if we can improve
on them and make them coherent and meaningful, and figure what we need to
do to get them more or less uniformly applied. The way it is done now
5. The danger-of.leaks has created a rapidly growing phobia that any
piece.of paper will_get,1n the newspapers.' One way of getting at this is
have a way. to t h e - - , . to'investigate really serious leaks. The
Director of the.-FB
needs.Attorney General approval and he has demanded a
:commitment to prosecute before: approving an FBI investigation. There is
legislation now proposed to_>really authorize the FBI to investigate whenever
some high official certifies that a. leak of significance needs to be
addressed for=disctpl-inary-reasons. The Justice Department needs to be
protected.-from being,'regtrired- to investigate every leak. But someone
somewhere in Government'.'shoul.d_be able to say this is sufficient to justify
the FBI's=-time
6 There--:ft -al-so- a need for a Presidential caution. I attach a good
memorandum on this. which- just came to my attention. Frank Carlucci had
Dan Silver prepare it along with a draft Presidential letter during the
transition.
7. I attach that memorandum along with a response which
sent to Dan.
STAT
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 SECRET
Approved For Release 2007/03/07 : IA-RDP88B00443R001003870058-3
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with the Attorney General yesterday. It would be good if you could join
8. I also attach a memorandum from General Faurer, along with a
proposed draft of a cautionary note from the DCI to be sent to the White
House and national security officials.
9. As I said on the telephone last night, I have a lunch date with
Carlucci on Friday. to discuss these matters and'things that I discussed
us so that you;. could..do any f
SECRET
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP88B00443R001003870058-3
Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP88B00443R001003870058-3