REVISION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12036: NSC DECISIONMAKING STRUCTURE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001003870112-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 9
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 7, 2007
• Sequence Number: 112
• Publication Date: January 30, 1981
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Ruse 2007
} t8B00443R0 10038701?12.2
OGC 81-00814
'30 January 1981
Director of Central Intelligence
Daniel B..Silver
General Counsel
. ? evisi.on of Executive or
n response`to"your tasking at Monday's mornin
g .
meeting, as modified by'our subsequent discussion, I have
met with the DDO,.D/NFAC,-AD/RMS and Acting SA/DCI/CI to
discuss modifications-to'-Executive Order 12036 relating to
the decisionmaki.ng and. .approval process for covert action,
sensitive collection and, counterintelligence. This memo-
randum sets forth.our_.joint recommendations. F _-T
membership '-6f the:NSC,-.which consists of the President, Vice
P
=Decisionmaking Structure
,_Background:` E O:. 12036, while assigning to the
NationalSecurity..Council.(NSC) responsibility for review,
guidance -and direction for the conduct of all foreign intelli-
gence and-- counterintelligence activities, established two
NSC committees :; to exercise these functions. In the process
the order added for, specified purposes, to the statuto
Presiden Secretary_.of,:State and Secretary of Defense.
3._-The'two,committees are the Policy Review Committ
ee
(PRC) and . the' Special- Coordination Committee (SCC).
.
?are to establish requirements and priorities for national
foreign intelligence, to review the NFIP budget, to
-conduct periodical-evaluations of the quality of intel-
ligence produced and.to develop policy guidance.. The
PRC has met relatively infrequently for these purposes.
The membership consists of: DCI (Chairman); Vice
President; Secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense;
Assistant to the President for National Security,Affairs;
and Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
a._ Policy Review Committee. The
PRC' s functions
b. Special. Coordination Committee. The SCC has
been the main group of "Principals" dealing with intelli-
gence matters. Under the Executive Order the SCC is
required to submit to the President a policy recommenda-
tion (and any dissenting views) on each proposed covert
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worked well-in:'a .number_of respects. .. The major problems
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
(Chairman); Secretaries of State and Defense; Attorney
. The Executive Order requires that the SCC should
review those sensitive foreign intelligence collection
When meeting for.this purpose, the SCC includes:.
-.- Secretaries.. of_State,and Defense; Attorney General;
Assistant. to the President for National Security Affairs;
and DCI... The Order. also gives the SCC various responsi--
:-bilities for developing counterintelligence policy.
State and. Defense; Attorney General; Director, OMB;
.Assistant-.to-,-the President for National Security Affairs;
Chairman,. Joint; Chiefs of Staff; DCI; and Director,
action- For this purpose the membership consists of:
Staff; and DCI.
General; Director, OMB; Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
-:.to the SCC, under standards established by the President.
.operations reported to the Chairman, and by the Chairman
Membership.for:this purpose includes: Secretaries of
order -to 'carry_ .out, the foregoing duties.. In addition,
the:: Order; requires the SCC to conduct an annual review
- : intelligence --operations . n
: -:'of .special 'activities 'and sensitive foreign.. collection.
our'- view that this structure has not
.,to become involved. in too many decisions, many of them
trivial.. .This has"been especially troublesome with
respect to-covert:actions. The requirement that the
.President-not .approve any covert action without a
recommendation from`the SCC, which must meet in person,
.has led.to-substantial delays in obtaining approvals
for covert actions.
b. The Order and.the procedures developed by the
NSC staff have made no provision for formal working
groups except in. the area of counterintelligence.
There has been a Counterintelligence Working Group to
support the SCC(CI), and this generally has been'viewed
as working well. No similar staff support has existed
for the other intelligence work of the SCC.
- c. The committee structure established by the
Order is unwieldy and has involved too many officials
in decisions only tangentially related to their responsi-
bilities. In particular, the involvement of the
2 ;
 Approved. For Rase 200Lfl'rE 8B00443 O 10038701122
Attorney General and the Director, OMB, in a large
number of covert action and intelligence issues has
been not only unnecessary but often distinctly unhelpful-
The necessary budgetary determinations or legal rulings
could be obtained at a staff level without involving
these officers in the deliberative process. F __I
5_ CIA Proposal: The structure we would propose to
replace the existing E.O. 12036 structure is intended to be
simpler, to impose less on the time of Cabinet level officers.
and to make greater use of working groups at the sub-Cabinet
and staff levels. The proposal would establish three levels
:=Working Groups. The Intelligence Committee
the highest.level ofpolicymaking and guidance for the
conduct of intelligence activities and would consider
--those specific operations and recommendations referred
augmented by'the DCI and the Assistant to the President
for. National. Security Affairs. The NSC would constitute
a: ,The NSC. For intelligence purposes the NSC
:would consist.of.the.four statutory' members (President,
Vice President, and 'Secretaries of State and Defense)
by `-the Intelligence Committee.
the committee,would..be augmented by the Director ofIthe
FBI and. -the : Director-'of NSA.
recommending-body _:tar matters not deemed appropriate
for consideration by.the NSC.- For approval of special
activities and~-for=review of sensitive collection
operations, membership would consist of the DCI, the
Deputy Secretary.of_.-State, the Deputy Secretary of
Defense,-.the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs,=;and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of
Staff When meeting on. counterintelligence matters
-:Intelligence Committee." The Intelligence
Committee.=would ._ be_ the normal policymaking and approval
support- .One working group would deal with counter-
intelligence matters, the other with covert action
matters. The latter working group would review all
covert action proposals. When acting for this purpose,
the working group would be augmented on an ad hoc basis
by appropriate representatives of OMB and the Attorney
General when issues of funding or legal issues are
involved. The working group would be responsible for
ensuring that each covert action proposal was fully
staffed and coordinated, including resolution of all
legal and budgetary issues, before presentation to
would be.supported.by two working groups, consisting of
the same.institutional membership, but represented at
the Assistant Secretary level, with appropriate staff
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~SMY J.-. iaiOYZSL~~
the Intelligence Committee. If issues involving
entities not represented on the Intelligence Committee
could not be solved at the working group level, a Deputy
Secretary level representative of the affected department
or agency. would be invited on an ad hoc basis to attend
the Intelli
gence Committeeti 1
meeng.
6. Relation to State Department Proposal: The State
Department proposal (consisting of th
ree National Seit
cury
Decision Directives) would restructure the NSC decisionmaking
p
rocess in a manner that maximiz
t
es
he authoritf th
y oe
Secretary of
- -to submerge all intelligence
matters withintthc and appears
i.vielgn policy or
military :policy .formulation.. The kde
y ocument draft
, National Security Decision Directive 2, contains the fo11w-
ing key points:
NSC: The order provides that th
e NSC wold b
ue
the proper forum for national securit
y policy issues
'.-requiring Presidential determination. -The order provides
that"[h)eadsof
Dep
t
:
ar
ments and Ai
gences not statutory
mebers'shall_participate as ap
ro
i
t
p
pr
a
e when matt
ers
affecting-.their.'Departments or A
i
genc
es areid
consered."
Since ;the. DCI yis; not a statutory member of the NSC,
: this means ' ha t DCI -=- ,
l
---- .~ inc
uded as a
matter of -course :.in' NSC deliberations nn natio
na
unacceptable
.
Inaddition:the=order'provid
h
es t
at the Sti
ecreares of
"State-a.nd?Defense`respectively are responsible for
preparing :Zh'=NSC pa
pers on forili
egn pocy and defense
preparation .of_ a ers by + the - "` no ~UUILL for
P P Assistant to the President
for National'Se
i
cur
ty Affai bh
rs ory te DCI. This
aspect-- of : the. order also is unacce
t
bl
p
a
e since i:
,:
would deprive.the_Intelligerce Community of the ability
directltopresent'intelli
gence issu t th
.esoe NSC.
b.. Secretary of State and the SIG-FP. The draft
directive assi
l
gns p
enary authoto
riy over frmulation
and execution of foreign policy to the S
ecretary of
State, to be.assisted by the Senior Interdepartmental
FP
SI
G-
would be
made up of the Deputy Secretaries of St
t
a
e and Defen
se;
DCI; Chairman,' Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Assistant
to the President for National Security Affairs. In
addition, each Assistant Secretary of State would chair
an interdepartmental group at the Assistant Secretary
level. Under the definitional provisions it is reasonably
clear that most of the Intelligence Community's activities
abroad would be brought under the authority and responsi-
bility of the Secretary. of State by the directive.
 Approved For Release 2007L 10"i''. A'' Dp88B00443ROO1003870112-2
? -
This clearly derogates from the responsibilities of the
DCI.
c_ Secretary of Defense and the SIG-DP. The
draft directive gives the Secretary of Defense authori-
ties with respect to formulation and execution of
defense policy that essentially parallel the authorities
given the Secretary of State in the foreign policy
area. The Secretary is to be assisted by a senior
Interdepartmental Group-Defense Policy (SIG-DP) with
the same membership.as the SIG-FP, and the Assistant
Secretaries are to be supported by interdepartmental
groups similar to-those supporting the Assistant
:Secretaries of. State. The definitions of the subject
matter under the authority of the Secretary of Defense
would appear to. absorb all of the Intelligence Community's
_activities.not put under the authority of the Secretary
of State,. with_considerable overla between the two.
Obviously,this is-unacceptable.
The proposed State Department directive has th
effect--whether:or;not::intentionally--of obliterating
virtually all' the authority of the DCI and subordinating the
activities of:the'autIntelligence Community to the overall
authorities and':responsibilities of the Secretaries of State
and Defense. .~: The; reasons: to oppose . this are self-evident.
If all'-intelligence: matters were removed from the scope of
the proposed directive,: the. remaining structure would not
have an-adverse impact on-Intelligence Community interests
and would appear to':be'workable, although there is some
reason to -fear..-. that.. the. proliferation of interdepartmental
working groups at the Assistant Secretary level would be
unwieldy.-::.We recommend 7. that the DCI's position with respect
to the State Department's. draft directives be that:
the- DCr .should be a member of the NSC for all
b. TT ntelhigence and intelligence-related issues
should_be.removed-from the purview of these draft
directives.and handled by a separate review and decision-
making process.along the lines of the proposals set
forth: in this memorandum.
7
8. Draft Directive: Attached is a draft. directive
that could be used by the President to institute the decision-
making mechanism recommended in this memorandum. II'
Attachment
25X1
25X1
 -Approved For. Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDP88B00443R00100387-0112-2-
Executive order
REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
National. Security Council.
Pur ose. .The National Se
c
National Security Act of 1947, as ame ded,candzaslPresiident
of the United States of America, in order to provide for the
review and approval of U 't
REVIEW AND APPROVAL OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES*
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution
and statutes of the United Stat f
activities, it is herm,'k,, a~Saatesrforeign intelligence
urity Council (NSC)
was established by the Natio 1
n
n out its
responsibilities-with.respect to national
foreigngintelligence
and counterinteligence=~activitie b
men ed by the President and Vice
Secretary . ofDefen_se'the:Assistant to the President for
National Security. Affairs;`- and the Director of Central
Intellige_nce.`rIn addition, heads of other departments and
agencies-shall`.;attendas.,. appropriate when matters affecting
their departments*or:-agencies are considered.
1-102. '. The -NSC?. shall h
e ' assist
national`-securit ark Policies relating to the
Y The NSC shall act as the highest Executive
Branch eztity..that-'provides review-of, guidance for, and
direction.to_theconductof all national foreign intelligence
.and counterintelligence activities. Meetings of the NSC for
this purpose-shall--be at' d
a Security.Act of 1947 to
advise. the President:: with. respect to the integration of
-domestic, .- foreign. -and ~milit
Committee y the Intelligence
,-- supported by--.- interdepartmental working groups..
1-2. NSC_ Intelligence, Committee.
1-201. Membershi The NSC
o
r o Central Intelligence.
When considering recommendations to the President for,approval
of special activities,. the Committee shall be composed of
the Chairman; the Deputy Secretary of State; the Deputy Secre-
tary of Defense; the Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs; and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff.
fntelligence Committee
shall be chaired by theniret
 Approved For Release` 2007103107: CIA-RDP88BO0443R001003870112:2
When meeting to consider sensitive intelligence collection
activities-referred by the Director of Central Intelligence,
the membership of the Committee shall be augmented, as necessary,
by the head of each-organization within the intelligence
Community directly involved in the activity in question.
When meeting to consider counterintelligence activities, the
Committee shall be au
gmented by the Director, Federal Bureau
of. Investigation and the Director, National security Agency.
-1-202. Duties. The NSC Intelligence Committee shall-
-:,(a) Establish requirements a
d
i
n
pr
orities for national
foreign intelligence-
(b) `.=Review such National Forei
I
gn
ntelligence Program
and budget. Proposals and other matters as are referred to it
by the Director of Central Intelligence;
(c) Consider and submit to the Presid
ent a policy
recommendation, including all dissents, on each special
activity; .provided,-however',-that, if any member considers
that such policy'- recommendation should-be reviewed by the
NSC,the_NSCshall consider the matter and, -unless the
President. is ' present`'-at-.such consideration,-shall submit an
NSC: recommendation-to`the._.President;
(d)Review proposals for sensitive foreign intelligence
collection.'-operations~-referred to the Committee by the
Director-.of.. Central:`Intelligence;
(e)``:Develop:standards and doctrine for. the counterintelli-
gence activities ;of=the' United States, resolve interagency
differences concerning the implementation of counterintelligence
policy, and develop and monitor guidelines, consistent with
applicable.law and Executive orders, for the maintenance of
central counterintelligence records;
"(f) `Conhider_and approve any counterintelligence activity
referred to the,Committee by the head of any organization' in
the Intelligence .Community;
(g) Submit to the*NSC an overall annual assessment of
the relative threat to United States interests from intelligence
and security services of foreign powers and from international
terrorist activities,-including an assessment of the effective-
ness of the United States counterintelligence activities;
(h) Conduct an annual review of ongoing special activities,
sensitive national foreign intelligence collection operations
and sensitive counterintelligence activities and report thereon
to the NSC; and
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(i) Carry out such additional coordination, review and
approval of i
t
i
n
ell
gence actiitih
ves as te President may
direct.
.1-203. Appeals. Any member of the NSC Intelligence
Committee ma
a
l
y
ppea
any decisio thf
nereo to the NSC.
1-3. Working Groups.
1-301. Working Groups The NSC I t
l
,j 910-ys
of Officials at the. Assistant Secretary level. oneoworking
group shall deal with special activities and shall be composed
of -representatives of'the.Director of Central Intelligence;
the Departments f St
o
lzgence
Committee shall be assisted hi two workin n e
ate and De.Lense; the Assistant to the
President. for National Security Affairs- and th
h
-
Department of. Justice..:-_,This working group ge shall and ensure the that
all proposals. forapproval of special activities by the NSC
Intelligence Committee,-:.the NSC and the President are
accompanied by adequate statements of, the foreign policy
implications and--.".by- the`position of the Director, Office of
Mana t
ern
d
airman,
Joint_Chiefs of Staff a C
,..augmented, when necessary, by repre-
sentatives_of.the.Office of Management and Bud t
g
en an
Budget on any questions of funding and of.the
Attorney-General on.
n any: ,issues of legality-,
1-302:`.;-the-"second working group shall
i
cons
der counter-
intelligence "matters-.and- shall be composed of representatives
of those- departments -and-agencies re
resent
d
p
e
on the NSC
Intelligence.:Commttee when it meets for the same purpose,
augmented, when necessary, by representatives of the Director,
Office of Management-.'and Budget and the Attorney General.
1-303. Appeals_~':If issues affecting a department or
agency not -: represented--on the Special Intelligence Committee
are raised at the working. group level and are not resolved
to the satisfaction.of':that department or agency, the affected
department or_agency shall be invited to participate in the
meeting of ._the NSC Intelligence Committee considering the
matter at issue-
1-4. Meetings.
1-401. Whenever possible, the work of the NSC Intelligence
Committee and the working groups shall be accomplished at
meetings at which all designated members, or their duly
appointed representatives, are present. When such meetings
are impracticable, or the issues involved do not warrant
such a meeting, the NSC Intelligence Committee and the
working groups can take action without meeting, as long as
the views of each member are obtained in writing. The
working groups may invite representatives of other departments
and agencies not normally represented to attend meetings
whenever deemed appropriate because of the issues to be
considered.
 Approved For Release 2007/03/07: CIA-RDE'88B00443R00100387011.:2=2.
Sections 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3 of Executive Order 12036 are
.hereby repealed. _