SOVIETS PLAGUED WITH SHORTAGES, INFLATION

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP88B00443R001103940168-2
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RIFPUB
Original Classification: 
K
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1
Document Creation Date: 
December 20, 2016
Document Release Date: 
November 27, 2007
Sequence Number: 
168
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
January 10, 1981
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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Approved For Release 2007/11/28: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103940168-2 ? THE WASHINGTON POST 10 January 1981 is Sjiiets Plagued nth Shortages, Inflation By Dusko Doder Washington Post Foreign Service MOSCOW-The Soviet economy, the world's largest state-run enter- prise, is entering the new year amid clear signs of crisis. Food shortages and soaring infla- tion have been created by three suc- cessive bad harvests, the strain of military competition with the United States, and the overall costs involved in?I;naintaining an empire ranging from Cuba to Vietnam to Afghan- istan:to Poland. & there are growing indications orftsie structural weakness that the ifikially planned system is imposing bn",iie Soviet economy, which today 1 *ond in size, complexity and Angth only to America's. [ le the rule by decree may hair-been effective in previous de- cades in laying the infrastructure for industrialization of a young Soviet state, the system now appears in danger of choking itself in its own cumbersomeness. There are two additional and long-term factors that are only be- ginning to affect the economy. One is the harsh fact that the So- viet Union is no longer a producer of low-cost energy conveniently located in European Russia. Rather, it is becoming a high-cost producer and poorly efficient consumer of abun- dant resources located in distant Si- beria and becoming increasingly costly. The other is posed by an acute demographic problem. The country's rate of population growth has been falling since 1960, when it was twice the current level of 0.84 percent per year. Economic forecasts warn that acute labor shortages should be ex- pected "in the most immediate fu- ture." The Kremlin leaders have intro- duced reforms to refine the existing system. New financial incentives and modest decentralization steps have been taken in an effort to raise labor productivity. But there has been re- sistance to these reforms at the local level. There was a note of near despair in recent speeches by President Leonid Brezhnev when he called for harder work, increased motivation and new improvements. The economic system has also come under public attacks in the' Soviet press. "We obviously have an abnormal situation here," the Com- munist Party newspaper Pravda said last week. "The planning mechanism was supposed to have been im- proved, yet we did not get rid of old sins." Pravda directly attacked the state planning commission for var- ious economic setbacks. A commentary in the daily Sovyetskaya Rosiya also minced no words about the difficulties. Criticiz- ing low labor productivity, the paper said that new reforms were not being implemented. "The labor organiza- tion in factories is not functioning," it added, "and the second misfortune lies in the fact that the economic system itself is not working" as it should. Despite growing frankness in the media about the nature of Soviet economic difficulties, there are no new or radical ideas on remedies to be applied. . The lack of a rational pricing sys- tem has burdened the $460 billion annual budget with the costs of ever- growing subsidies. At the same time, Moscow had to budget a 50 percent increase in its energy investment plan-to over $170 billion over the next four years-to produce margin- al net increments in oil, coal and electrical energy output. According to official figures,' 27 percent of the entire investment al- locations continue to be channeled into the weak agricultural sector, while well over $6 billion will have to be spent for grain and fodder im- ports again this year. The exact figures for military ex- penditures are not disclosed here. But there are clear signs that the Russians felt compelled to divert some additional resources for de- fense purposes in response to Pres- ident Reagan's plans to rebuild U.S. strategic strength. The Kremlin has reduced its planned capital expend- itures on capital construction by $42 billion during the current five-year plan. The Polish crisis has posed addi- tional economic strains. Soviet raw material, energy and food shipments to Poland have been extensive. The Poles and other Soviet allies are get- ting Soviet oil at 50 percent of the ,OPEC price. Meat shipments to Po- land have further reduced availabil- ity of meat in the Soviet Union. The Polish crisis also has pro- duced economic dislocations within the Soviet bloc economies. This is taking place at a time when the cost of supplying 10 million tons of oil to Cuba and supporting clients in Af- rica and Asia are steadily increasing. The economic situation with its accumulated difficulties provide eco- nomic evidence for Moscow's sincer- ity in arms reduction talks with the United States. It also provides an insight into the proverbial lethargy of Soviet bureau- cracy, which has resisted changes in the economic system. The combination of adverse long- term trends and the pressure to match America's military spending may create conditions here for rad- ical changes in the economy. The present leadership, however, is com- mitted to modest changes and cau- tious rejiggering of resources. Approved For Release 2007/11/28: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01103940168-2