ARTICLE ON ARMS CONTROL PARODY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001203960027-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 5, 2007
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: July 22, 1982
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/27: CIA-RDP88B00443R001203960027-5
EXECUTIVE SECRittAlUAT
Routing Slip
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/27: CIA-RDP88B00443R001203960027-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/27: CIA-RDP88B00443R001203960027-5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/27: CIA-RDP88B00443R001203960027-5
STAT
yr, It
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 261/02/27 : CIA-RDP88B00443R00120396062-7-5
22 July 19
-20
The Reagan administratiOn, has de 7'., '':teited one of these explosions, the SO
-
tided not- to.'reneVi negotiations on 'arl :Wets blandly replied that they were'
comprehensive
comprehensive nuclear ,test ban, pend "notoat fault." .1t ? .- - ., .;'.: TY,
hig.effortS'td iMprove.VerifiCation.of? ?,,,. ,- These were not the largest Soviet
the threshold test .tian it currently f tests; some have been in the 300.kilo-.
observing.. This represents a first hes-...., - ton' range But probability curies are
itint step, away from the whole notion .asymptotic ;?:- never reaching absolute
of negotiating arms agreements ..with .,:1' iero. .SO there will always be some
thg Soviet Urion. As the threshold test' ,:tiny -portion Of the curve under the
ban particularlyi illustrates the the- arms? .._:,150-kiloton s'' limit +-alwayS-.-.room.,':for
control process, has..by.noW. become-'.*:;,,Soine,Iesi-than-reaionable douht:, that
parody of itself. ?.,:i.:1.-'''.1:(-,..if ,,:"..::?;:z. .!%, ;:,-,:47.`. the, ; Soviets have. breached,' ":" the,
:.;Technically,, the threshold test bad!, ' treaty.
treaty is .?ti1,1 pellding,IrwasISIgned:in ' ?,Sq Ne.,prptesiji,i private, but do not
1974, but Senate ratification was never-, _ go public, accusing_ the Soviets of a vi-
pushed bjithe Ni)6nilbeFord adininis- - olation. Since; we can -never- be totally
rations The -tatter- -administration? certain, we .refrain from public
withdrew it from Senate confirmation ;..' charges that might `. fdisrupt " _farther
fearing that ratification of -a threshold -', aims negotiations
test ban wouldAnterferemith its et:" ' At some point,We're going to-have
forts to negotiate.,.a, comprehensive. to .Stop kidding Ourselves. We now
ban. But both the :U.S. and the Soviet'," ' have in hand the; spectacular Soviet
Union issued pledges to abide by the i violations of "the biological weapons
unratified treaty:-..just as the Reagan convention: The reasonable conclusion
administration: 'now promises not to has to be that they have systemati-,
"undercut"; the unratified SALT-II: '-,14 _cally violated the threshold test ban
? In backgrounding the press On tti6.!' .as well. While the terms of 'SALT-I
test ban. -problem,' :administration- are so Vague, it's almost Lmpossihle. to
spokesmen are using guarded Ian-: "violate"'. them, the Soviet deployment
guag,e '. concerning- :. doubts' about.'. of massive throw-weight in the _SS-19
whether' we ;can - verify that Soviet'.. missile vitiated the essential bargain
tests fall within the 150-kiloton thresh-i: involved ,In SALT-II, the issue of,the
old allowed by' the.'unratified treaty.' Backfire 'bomber , was "settled"'by
But verifying the treaty is not our. Chairman- Brezhnev handing ..Presi-
problem at all. We: have verified. it. 'dent Carter an unsigned paper prom-
The Russians.. are-.-cheating... ,Now . ising not to give the bomber intercon-
what?'? - '''.''.74 - . .--.1-- tinental range?a capability it already
The 'reason' for ' the 'guarded lan-
guage is that the' seismic data used ' ..TtieSe kindi of negotiations main-
for verification are :recorded in the... , festly deserve to be disrupted?not
relativistic language of probabilities..'' least to -preserve , some chance' of
We can record a seismic shock, and meaningful arms control if the Soviets
translate this into a probability that ever come to feel they must bargain
the explosion was: within' some' given- seriously: The administration's critics
range of possible yields:. For this rea- are ? saying that its deferral of any
son. the U.S. keeps its..tests well below.teomprehensive testtan talks:Mean-it
the thresholdobserVing;a deSigri.limit:Is not serious about arms control But
of 130 kilotons to make-clear-we have, ,I;the;pposite .ii true-.-aserious: ap-
complied with. the 4150-kiloton' limit.' .-.'. :'-. proachlo arriiScontrol demands a re- -
The Soviet tests,' by Contrast, have.-.=';fusal . to negotiate new' treaties 'while
repeatedly, produced prima faCie.Viii-;,',1.', old ones are -being' ..brOken. The ques-
Iations. In two 1979 tests -for eximpile;'- tio6 ,thanfieeds;:to he asked is how,
our monitors indicated explosions be-;,:;'..',Witli the Soviets' developingbiological
tween 110 and 440 kilotons.; The most frliitaporkand supplying, `.`yellow.rain"
likely yield was 20 kilotons; and the: -: to 'their pimpets, the administration
probability of a yield ofniore-than.11`, can. justify any arms negotiations at
was. K%. When the Americans pro-' all
? I. : . - ' , - ? ' ' -: -- ; ,..: - -:-. -
, :
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/27: CIA-RDP88B00443R001203960027-5