RUSSIA'S PERSHING PLOY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001304040096-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 96
• Publication Date: January 25, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2008/07/11: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01304040096-8
THE WASHINGTON POST - 25 January 1983
eon Sloss and Stanley Kober
..ussia's -Pershin - Ploy.
.Soviet arms control proposals since In addition, we should recognize that
ari Andropov's accession to the posi- the first-strike threat presented by the'
arty suggest that we are witnessing . Only 108 of these missiles are sched-
te beginning of a new Soviet peace of- uled to be deployed. Since each of them
nsive, in which the Soviets are using will carry only one warhead, and since
ne carrot and the stick to preserve the targeting plans typically assign two war-
)ulk of their military: buildup while heads to each hardened target, this force
Nowhere is this clearer than in the
Soviet approachto the negotiations on
intermediate-range missiles. On the
one hand, the Soviets offer to reduce ? nificant threat to the national Soviet
The number of their missiles-to the size command and control system, which is
of the British and French forces; on the highly centralized around the capital,
ICBM force-of almost 1,400 missiles.
%rustrating the Western response. poses a first-strike threat to only 54
other hand; they indicate that if their since, they cannot reach Moscow. In
proposal is not accepted, they will be short, these missiles, despite their ability
compelled by the deployment of Per- to hit the western U.S.S.R, cannot pos-
shing II missiles in Western Europe to sibly pose a disarming first-strike threat.
adopt a "launch on warning" posture. It would appear, therefore, that the
new Soviet proposal is designed to play
Whatever one thinks of the carrot, it on the: hopes and fears of Americans
is clear the, Soviet stick is a fraud. and Europeans with the objective of'
olitical offi
i
ls
... "
Soviet military and
p
c
a
W
f
h
l
or years
ave ta
ked about launch on
warning" as the basis for Soviet retalia-
tion. For example, as long ago as 1967,
Marshal Krylov wrote in the restricted
and highly authoritive journal, Military
Thought: "With the presence in the ar-
mament of troops- of launchers and
missiles which are completely ready for
operation, as well as systems for de-
tecting enemy missile launches and
other types of reconnaissance, an ag-
gressor is no longer able suddenly to
destroy the missiles before their launch
on the territory of -the country against
which the - aggression is committed.
They will have time during the flight of
the missiles of-the aggressor to leave
their launchers and inflict a retaliatory
strike against the enemy."
Indeed, this was so commonly ac-
cepted by Soviet leaders that Brezhnev
once said, according to a report carried'
in The Post on Nov. 18, 1978: "Carter
and I know we both have a couple
dozen minutes when satellites will tell
us missiles are coming.... I will still
have time to respond."
Nordo the Pershings represent a sig-
pressure on Western governments to
make concessions in the arms talks.
It is not surprising that Andropov
should embrace such a policy. In a
speech on June 5, 1974, he declared
that "the real changes in the correla-
tion of forces inevitably cause changes
in the views of people and in the minds
of political and state figures.... Public
opinion forces the ruling circles to
reckon with its desire to eliminate the
threat of war [our emphasis]."
This does not mean it is impossible to
reach agreement with the Soviet Union
or that Western governments should re-
spond inflexibly to the positive aspects
of Soviet proposals. It does mean, how-
ever, that in assessing Soviet proposals,
we should harbor no illusions about
Moscow's negotiating strategy.
Leon Sloss is a former assist.
ant director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency. Stan-
ley Kober is a political analyst for
SRI International.
--9
Approved For Release 2008/07/11: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01304040096-8