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December 21, 2016
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June 10, 2008
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November 9, 1983
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r rrnr Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01404100112-1 I I I National Intelligence Council MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director of Central Intelligence NIC 8123/83 9 November 1983 Assistant National Intelligence Officer for Latin America SUBJECT: Cuban Capabilities to Destabilize Grenada REFERENCE: Memo from DCI to NIO/LA dated 7 November 1983, Subject: Grenada 1. Havana's capability to undermine the establishment of democracy in Grenada is limited, at least over the short term. There are major constraints on Havana's ability to take direct action on the island in the next few months. Havana would have little difficulty mounting a massive international propaganda campaign, but it may not move to establish a complementary subversive network until it has completd an internal review of its assets, objectives, and policies in the Caribbean Basin. New leaders will have to be identified; new groups, political parties and front groups formed; and new relationships established before the Cubans will be in a position to infuence political developments in Grenada significantly other than through random acts of terrorism. On-Island Assets 2. A small number of Grenadian radicals probably still remain at large in Grenada and perhaps a few Cubans have eluded capture. They could carry out isolated bombings or other acts of terrorism, but probably have not had the time to organize themselves to launch coordinated attacks against the new government or US military forces. We have seen no indications such individuals now are in contact with the Cuban Government or receiving directions from Havana 3. Although Castro might be able to infiltrate additional agents to conduct specific acts of sabotage or terrorism, he would have great difficulty establishing an organized resistance or a guerrilla movement on the island. Such a force would be difficult to establish and easy to detect because of the smallness of the island; the dearth of popular support for radical leftists; the current disarray in leftist ranks; possible language and cultural differences if any non-Grenadians are involved; the alertness of the interim government to such a threat; and the expu e Cuban, Soviet, and other Communist Bloc personnel from the island. ~ 7 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01404100112-1 CFrQ T Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01404100112-1 Exile Activities 4. We have reliable reports that some former Grenadian Ambassadors and High Commissioners have agreed to establish a government-in-exile which will have as its principal aim the disruption of future elections through terrorist acts carried out by remnants of the Armed Forces or New Jewel Movement still on the island. The Cubans almost certainly would be called upon to play a major role in helping to organize such a group, establish contact with sympathizers on the island, arrange meetings, facilitate communications and transportation, and provide advice and other support. The Cubans also are likely to offer their island as a refuge for such exiles in hopes this will help unify the resistance while enhancing Cuban influence over their activities. Havana may have already organized one such meeting in Havana which reportedly was attended by the former Grenadian Ambassador to the OAS, Dessima Williams, and the wife of Grenada's former Ambassadnr tn Cub .-.L,- s now declared herself the new Grenadian Ambassador to Cuba. 5. The remnants of the Bishop regime, however, are in disarray and discussions over the New Jewel Movement's future are just beginning. d a G en .a a the party should push for the total exclusion of Bernard Coard and his Marxist supporters from the Movement, as well as completely sever the party's ties with Cuba and the USSR. At least two officials have also rejected invitations by the former Grenadian Ambassador to the USSR to attend an organizational meeting of Grenadian diplomats in Moscow. 6. Havana is likely to make a major effort to penetrate any group that emerges, whether it is pro-Cuban or not. If the revised party did not contain radicals (such as Coard or Austin supporters) or anyone associated with the killing of Bishop and his ministers, the Socialist International might be willing to support it as a social democratic party. Havana might even support such an effort to reform the New Jewel Movement because such a party would be in a good position to insist on its right to participate in upcoming elections m the f ro and to lobby against any renewed efforts to expel the Nicaraguans Socialist International. Cuba, however, is not likely to be able to use exile groups effectively over the short term to destabilize Grenada. Foreign Surrogates 7. The Cubans have sufficient resources at home to work the Grenada problem, but probably lack the assets and network in the region to implement an effective program. While the Guyanese may have provided limited support to Havana during the Grenadian crisis, President Forbes Burnham's relations with Castro are "correct" at best. Castro has enjoyed closer relations with Burnham's opposition in Guyana, headed by Cheddi Jagan. A recent report: that the Guyanese might assist the Cub in an Pffnrt to assassinate Jamaican Prime Minister Seaga is suspect. Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01404100112-1 Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01404100112-1 8. Castro can no longer rely on the Surinamese government for support, which leaves only a rather motley group of radical and Marxist East Caribbean activists, such as George Odlum of Saint Lucia, Bobby Clark of Barbados, Tim Hector of Antigua, and Roosevelt Douglas in Dominica. Their organizations lack the resources to conduct any major operations against the new government in Grenada other than in the propaganda field, and their leaders would be reluctant tp acsnciate themselves too closely with such Cuban-directed activities. 9. Trevor Munroe's Jamaican Communist Workers' Party might provide a somewhat more substantial conduit for launching anti-Grenadian activities, but a dominant Jamaican hand in such operations would almost certainly be resented by Grenadian radicals involved. Havana and Moscow reportedly have criticized Munroe and other Marxists in Jamaica for mismanaging the Grenadian revolution, and reportedly have decided to cut off their financial support and shift it to Michael Manley's party. Moderates in Manley's party are likely to resist such fundi however, because they want to distance their party from Cuba and the USSR. Approved For Release 2008/06/10: CIA-RDP88B00443RO01404100112-1