TECHNOLOGY FOR PEACE: THE OTHER SIDE OF THE COIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R001500060040-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 21, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 25, 2008
• Sequence Number: 40
• Publication Date: April 18, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Leaders Magazine
18 Apr 84
Final
Assessing Soviet science and technology and the potential therein for
military and strategic surprise is perhaps the most critical and
difficult challenge we in the US Intelligence Community face. As of now
the US still appears ahead in most of the critical technologies we survey
but the Soviets have pulled even in some areas and are out in front in
others and our margins of advantage and the lead times we possess, have
shrunk. Even more troubling, however, is that recent assessments show
that the ability of the Soviet military-industrial complex to acquire and
assimilate Western technology far exceeds previous estimates.
During the late 1970s, the Soviets obtained about 30,000 samples of
Western production equipment, weapons and military components, and over
400,000 technical documents both classified and unclassified. The
majority was of US origin, with an increasing share of our technology
obtained through Western Europe and Japan. This truly impressive take
was acquired by both legal and illegal means. We estimate that during
this period, the KGB and its military intelligence equivalent, the GRU,
and their surrogates among the East European intelligence services,
procured abroad about 70 percent of the technology most vital to Soviet
military equipment and weapons programs. For example:
-- The Soviets had our plans for the C-5A even before it first
flew.
-- The precise gyros and bearings in their heavy missiles were
based on US designs.
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0 is
-- The radar in their AWACS is of US origin.
-- Their space shuttle is a virtual copy of the US shuttle
design.
-- The Soviet trucks which rolled into Afghanistan came from a
plant outfitted with $1.5 billion worth of modern American
and European machinery.
-- And the list goes on and on.
Just how do the Soviets get so much of our technology?
First of all this is not a haphazard program but one endorsed at the
highest levels in the Kremlin. Significantly, a single organization--the
Military Industrial Commission, or VPK--is responsible both for
supervising the collection of Western technology and for coordinating all
Soviet military research and production. The VPK, therefore, is well
positioned to know what the military needs in the way of Western
technology and to ensure that this technology is used effectively.
Defectors have told us that the search for Western technology
commands the highest priority in the KGB and the GRU. As a result, there
are several thousand Soviet bloc collection officers at work primarily in
the US, Western Europe and Japan. In addition to engaging in the more
classic forms of espionage, these Soviet agents comb through our open
literature, buy sensitive technologies through legal channels, and
religiously attend our scientific and technological conferences.
Students sent by the Soviets and their allies to study in the West also
serve as transmission belts for technological data that is easily
obtained.
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Since 1970 the Soviets purchased some $50 billion worth of Western
equipment and machinery, much of which had potential military
applications. For example, Western equipment openly purchased on the
world market is being used to make Soviet artillery barrels with
substantial savings in time, material and labor.
The Soviets also use dummy firms in sophisticated international
operations to divert and steal Western technology. We have identified
some 300 firms engaged in diversion schemes operating from more than 30
countries--and there are probably many more. Most diversions occur via
Western Europe, which is why we have sought the help of our European
allies in combating illegal trade activities.
The Soviets pinpoint and target small, highly innovative companies in
the computer and microelectronics field, not only because they are at the
leading edge of the technologies that Moscow most needs, but also because
the security procedures at such firms are usually inadequate to the
threat of penetration posed by a determined, hostile intelligence service.
US microelectronics production technology is the single most
significant industrial technology acquired by the USSR since World War
II. In the late 1970s alone, Moscow acquired thousands of pieces of
Western microelectronic equipment worth hundreds of millions of dollars
in all of the major processing and production areas. On this basis, the
Soviets have systematically built a modern microelectronics industry.
The Soviet equivalent of Silicon Valley, the Zelenograd Science Center,
for example, was equipped, literally from scratch, with Western
technology. In addition, all Soviet monolithic integrated circuits are
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copies of US designs. Today, the Soviets lag behind US and Japanese
microelectronics technology by about five years compared with a 10-year
lag in the mid-1970s. The gap in military microelectronic applications
is even less and is narrowing.
What can we do to stem this tide? We already have had a fair number
of successes in frustrating the Soviet technology search. I will cite
just one.
You may recall in late 1983 and early 1984, West German and Swedish
Customs seized several advanced VAX computers and 30 tons of related
equipment that were being smuggled to the USSR by the notorius illegal
trader, Richard Mueller. Unfortunately, our evidence shows that much
larger quantities of computing and electronic equipment have been
successfully diverted to the USSR through the activities of Mueller's
firms, others like them and unscrupulous Western manufacturers.
Despite successes like the VAX case, the West still needs to organize
more effectively to protect its military, industrial, commercial, and
scientific communities. In so doing, we ought to keep two objectives
clearly in view. First, the West must seek to maintain its technological
lead over the Soviets in vital design and manufacturing know-how.
Second, manufacturing, inspection, and, most importantly, automatic test
equipment, which can alleviate acute Soviet deficiencies in
military-related manufacturing areas, must be strictly controlled.
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Western governments not only have powerful incentives to stop the
hemorrhage of their technology, they also have substantial potential for
controlling and restricting its flow. The laws necessary to accomplish
this are largely in place--stricter enforcement of the existing laws,
however, is needed. To this end greater cooperation among states will
lead to greater effectiveness. A cooperative intra-state approach--if it
is to be successful--must also serve to alert the private businessman to
the nature and extent of the problem. Similarly, if the West is to be
successful, our intelligence services will also have to increase their
joint efforts to meet this challenge.
In the final analysis, the threat posed by growing Soviet
technological absorption will not soon disappear, and certainly not
because of any self induced change of heart by Kremlin leaders. The
stakes are sufficiently high to ensure that the Soviets will devote
whatever resources are required to fulfill critical military-related
collection requirements. The West can do no less if we are to succeed in
frustrating Soviet efforts.
William J. Casey
Director of Central Intelligence
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